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ARTICLES 
TAKING APPROPRIATIONS SERIOUSLY 
Gillian E. Metzger* 
Appropriations lie at the core of the administrative state and are becom-
ing increasingly important as deep partisan divides have stymied substan-
tive legislation. Both Congress and the President exploit appropriations to 
control government and advance their policy agendas, with the border wall 
battle being just one of several recent high-profile examples. Yet in public law 
doctrine, appropriations are ignored, pulled out for special legal treatment, 
or subjected to legal frameworks ill-suited for appropriations realities. This 
Article documents how appropriations are marginalized in a variety of public 
law contexts and assesses the reasons for this unjustified treatment. Appro-
priations’ doctrinal marginalization does not affect the political branches 
equally, but instead enhances executive branch and presidential power over 
appropriations at the expense of Congress. Yet legal doctrines governing ap-
propriations should have the opposite effect because constitutional text, struc-
ture, and history make clear the central importance of Congress’s appropria-
tions power. Appropriations’ doctrinal marginalization undermines the sep-
aration of powers even further by undercutting political accountability 
through Congress and creating de facto presidential spending authority, with 
the executive branch able to violate governing statutes on appropriations 
with minimal legal consequences. This Article then turns to the question of 
what taking appropriations seriously might mean for public law doctrine. It 
concludes that appropriations exceptionalism is not problematic if it reflects 
the realities of the appropriations process and does not downplay appropria-
tions’ significance. Doctrines should attend to the separation of powers 
dynamics raised by appropriations and reinforce Congress’s power of the 
purse. Among other consequences, this leads to jurisdictional doctrines that 
put primacy on congressional enforcement of appropriations limits in court. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Appropriations lie at the core of the administrative state. Without 
appropriations, the executive branch cannot act, and thus choices about 
agency funding have a fundamental impact on how the government 
operates. Long recognized as important, appropriations’ centrality to 
government is even more true today. Deepening partisan divides, 
competitive politics, and divided government have stymied substantive 
legislation in Congress and caused greater exploitation of must-pass 
funding measures to advance political agendas. Policy battles between 
Congress and the President increasingly are fought on the terrain of the 
budget, leading to longer and more frequent government shutdowns, 
ongoing contestation over the use of appropriated funds, unfulfilled 
statutory promises, and little long-term policy resolution. Rather than 
amending or repealing substantive authorizations, Congress resorts to 
appropriations riders and funding denials as its tools of choice to control 
government policy.1 The President, in turn, creatively interprets appropri-
ations statutes, imposes new grant conditions, repurposes and withholds 
funds, and invokes inadequate funding as a basis for broad assertions of 
presidential discretion.2 Meanwhile, dedicated funding streams and 
agency-generated funds are used to protect new regulatory initiatives 
against both congressional and presidential appropriations control.3 
A high-profile example of appropriations’ importance was the battle 
between President Trump and the Democratic-controlled House of 
Representatives over money to build a wall at the country’s southern bor-
der that marked the second half of Trump’s term in office. Disagreements 
over the border wall led to a record-setting thirty-five-day partial govern-
ment shutdown from December 2018 to January 2019.4 Immediately after 
signing an appropriations bill that included far less money for building a 
wall than he had sought, President Trump declared a national emergency 
                                                                                                                           
 1. See infra section I.B.1. 
 2. See infra section I.B.2. 
 3. See infra text accompanying notes 104, 121–122. 
 4. See Glenn Thrush, In a Divided Washington, Congress Averted a Shutdown—But 
at a Price, N.Y. Times (Feb. 15, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/15/us/politics/ 
border-wall-deal.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review). 
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and stated that his administration would transfer billions of dollars appro-
priated for other purposes to wall construction—sparking Democratic 
outrage and multiple lawsuits.5 A California district court quickly granted 
a preliminary injunction that the Supreme Court ultimately stayed.6 In 
June 2020, the Ninth Circuit upheld the district court’s subsequent 
permanent injunction, and the case is currently before the Supreme 
Court.7 Meanwhile, the D.C. Circuit recently held that the House of 
Representatives has standing to challenge the fund transfer as violating the 
Appropriations Clause.8 
President Trump is hardly alone in his creative use of appropriations 
to push his policy priorities. Consider President Obama’s efforts to fund 
key cost-sharing components of the Affordable Care Act (ACA), his 
signature political achievement. After no annual appropriation was 
enacted to cover the cost-sharing obligations the ACA imposes on insurers, 
the Obama Administration sought to use a permanent appropriation 
instead, an effort that was enjoined as a result of a lawsuit brought by the 
Republican-controlled House of Representatives.9 Congress also adopted 
an appropriations rider preventing the use of annual appropriations to 
fund the ACA’s risk-sharing program, leading insurers to file suit in the 
Court of Federal Claims. In Maine Community Health Options v. United States, 
the Supreme Court held that the government was liable for the unpaid 
risk corridor payments, which amounted to around $12 billion.10 
Yet another recent instance of appropriations dominating the nation-
al political landscape involved the Trump Administration’s withholding of 
military aid for Ukraine. It was this action that sparked President Trump’s 
first impeachment; the House of Representatives determined that the 
withholding was part of an effort by Trump to encourage a foreign 
                                                                                                                           
 5. See infra text accompanying notes 113–118. 
 6. Trump v. Sierra Club, 140 S. Ct. 1 (2019) (mem.). 
 7. See California v. Trump, 963 F.3d 926, 932 (9th Cir. 2020), cert. granted sub nom. 
Trump v. Sierra Club, 141 S. Ct. 618 (2020); Sierra Club v. Trump, 963 F.3d 874, 880 (9th 
Cir. 2020), cert. granted, 141 S. Ct. 618 (2020). The Court had scheduled Sierra Club for 
oral argument in February but removed the case from its calendar in response to a request 
from the Biden Administration, which is reviewing the border wall transfers. See Motion of 
the Petitioners to Hold the Briefing Schedule in Abeyance and to Remove the Case from 
the February 2021 Argument Calendar at 1–2, Biden v. Sierra Club, No. 20-138 (U.S. Feb. 
3, 2021); Amy Howe, Justices Take Immigration Cases Off February Calendar, SCOTUSBlog 
(Feb. 3, 2021), https://www.scotusblog.com/2021/02/justices-take-immigration-cases-off-
february-calendar [https://perma.cc/M8B5-W36F]. For further discussion of this case, see 
infra text accompanying notes 114–117, 246–255, and section IV.C. The Ninth Circuit also 
invalidated a separate transfer of funds for the border wall in Sierra Club v. Trump, 977 F.3d 
853, 861 (9th Cir. 2020), petition for cert. filed, No. 20-685 (U.S. Nov. 17, 2020). 
 8. U.S. House of Representatives v. Mnuchin, 976 F.3d 1, 13 (D.C. Cir. 2020). 
 9. See U.S. House of Representatives v. Burwell, 185 F. Supp. 3d 165, 168 (D.D.C. 
2016), vacated in part sub nom. U.S. House of Representatives v. Azar, No. 14-1967 (RMC), 
2018 WL 8576647 (D.D.C. May 18, 2018). 
 10. 140 S. Ct. 1308, 1315, 1318 (2020). 
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government’s interference in the U.S. presidential election by pressuring 
Ukraine to investigate his presidential rival, now-President Joe Biden.11 
Also in the news in 2020 was the Trump Administration’s withholding of 
appropriated funds from Puerto Rico, Native American tribes, and the 
World Health Organization, as well as President Trump’s threat to deny 
funds to states expanding absentee voting.12 Trump additionally directed 
high-level officials in his administration to identify a list of “anarchist 
jurisdictions” that would be ineligible to receive discretionary federal 
funds, promised $200 drug-discount cards to seniors, and threatened to 
deny funds to schools that did not reopen in the fall of 2020.13 Meanwhile 
any doubt about the policy and separation of powers significance of 
appropriations should be erased by the COVID-19 pandemic. Massive 
appropriations lie at the heart of the federal government’s response, with 
partisan fights over new funding and interbranch battles over oversight 
and allocation of the funds.14 
Of particular note, these recent appropriations disputes are often 
taking a legal as well as political guise. Federal courts are seeing a broad 
array of litigation involving appropriations and funding, including not just 
                                                                                                                           
 11. Nicholas Fandos & Michael D. Shear, Trump Impeached for Abuse of Power and 
Obstruction of Congress, N.Y. Times (Dec. 18, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/
18/us/politics/trump-impeached.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (last updated 
Feb. 10, 2021). 
 12. Berkeley Lovelace Jr. & Noah Higgins-Dunn, Trump Halts U.S. Funding for World 
Health Organization as It Conducts Coronavirus Review, CNBC (Apr. 14, 2020), https://
www.cnbc.com/2020/04/14/trump-calls-for-halt-to-us-funding-for-world-health-organization-
amid-coronavirus-outbreak.html [https://perma.cc/4KHT-JQDD]; Brett Neely, Trump 
Repeats Unfounded Claims About Mail-In Voting, Threatens Funding to 2 States, NPR (May 
20, 2020), https://www.npr.org/2020/05/20/859333693/trump-repeats-unfounded-claims-
about-mail-in-voting-threatens-funding-to-some-st [https://perma.cc/9DLZ-MDBU]; Mark 
Walker & Emily Cochrane, Native American Tribes Sue Treasury over Stimulus Aid as They 
Feud over Funding, N.Y. Times (May 1, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/01/
us/politics/coronavirus-native-american-tribes-treasury-stimulus.html (on file with the 
Columbia Law Review); Justin Wise, Trump Administration Ending Delay for over $8 billion 
in Puerto Rico Disaster Aid, Hill (Jan. 15, 2020), https://thehill.com/homenews/
administration/478332-trump-admin-ending-delay-for-over-8-billion-in-puerto-rico-disaster 
[https://perma.cc/5VPB-7PPV]. 
 13. See Memorandum on Reviewing Funding to State and Local Government 
Recipients that are Permitting Anarchy, Violence, and Destruction in American Cities, 2020 
Daily Comp. Pres. Doc. § 3 (Sept. 2, 2020); Peter Baker, Erica L. Green & Noah Weiland, 
Trump Threatens to Cut Funding if Schools Do Not Fully Reopen, N.Y. Times (July 8, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/08/us/politics/trump-schools-reopening.html (on file 
with the Columbia Law Review) (last updated July 24, 2020); Margot Sanger-Katz & Noah 
Weiland, Trump Promised Seniors Drug Discount Cards. They May Be Illegal., N.Y. Times 
(Oct. 22, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/22/us/politics/trump-prescription-
drugs.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review). 
 14. See Charlie Savage & Peter Baker, Trump Ousts Pandemic Spending Watchdog 
Known for Independence, N.Y. Times (Apr. 7, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/ 
07/us/politics/trump-coronavirus-watchdog-glenn-fine.html (on file with the Columbia Law 
Review). 
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the border wall and ACA-related lawsuits but also states’ challenges to the 
Trump Administration’s efforts to deny funds to sanctuary jurisdictions,15 
criminal defendants’ challenges to prosecution for marijuana offenses in 
violation of an appropriations rider,16 and challenges involving the 
government’s failure to meet statutory obligations due to inadequate fund-
ing.17 This increasing legal dimension is a relatively new phenomenon. To 
be sure, prior political clashes over spending have sometimes resulted in 
litigation, but the number of high-profile cases today in which courts are 
grappling with appropriations matters is unusual.18 
This increase in appropriations lawsuits is part of a broader trend in 
which courts are stepping into political battles in our polarized age, result-
ing in a marked expansion in separation of powers–infused litigation.19 Yet 
legal challenges to appropriations actions raise unique problems and 
concerns for two reasons. The first is that, despite their centrality to 
government operations, appropriations are marginalized in public law 
doctrine. The second is that the resultant rules courts apply to appropria-
tions disputes serve to enhance executive branch and presidential power 
over appropriations at the expense of Congress. 
The marginalization of appropriations in public law doctrine takes 
several forms. Many public law doctrines apply appropriations excep-
tionalism, pulling appropriations out from governing legal frameworks 
and employing sometimes arcane appropriations-specific rules. Others en-
gage in appropriations silence, either ignoring appropriations altogether 
or simply assimilating appropriations to existing frameworks without 
acknowledging that those frameworks ill-fit appropriations realities. And 
often marginalization takes the form of jurisdictional exclusion of appro-
priations disputes, whether as the result of appropriation-specific jurisdic-
tional rules or application of existing jurisdictional requirements that 
appropriations disputes cannot easily satisfy. 
For instance, constitutional jurisprudence on congressional delega-
tion rarely engages with the implications of appropriations, and the same 
is true of separation of powers cases more broadly.20 Expand from 
separation of powers to cases involving the spending of government funds 
                                                                                                                           
 15. E.g., City & County of San Francisco v. Barr, 965 F.3d 753 (9th Cir. 2020), cert. 
dismissed per stipulation sub nom. Wilkinson v. City & County of San Francisco, No. 20-666, 
2021 WL 1081230 (mem.) (U.S. Mar. 4, 2021). 
 16. E.g., United States v. McIntosh, 833 F.3d 1163 (9th Cir. 2016). 
 17. E.g., In re Aiken County, 725 F.3d 255 (D.C. Cir. 2013). 
 18. The numerous lawsuits triggered by President Nixon’s impoundments serve as an 
earlier example of a burst of appropriations-related litigation. See generally Ralph S. Abascal 
& John R. Kramer, Presidential Impoundment Part II: Judicial and Legislative Responses, 
63 Geo. L.J. 149 (1974) (describing impoundment cases). 
 19. See Trump v. Mazars, 140 S. Ct. 2019, 2031 (2020); Gillian E. Metzger, The Roberts 
Court and Administrative Law, 2019 Sup. Ct. Rev. 1, 2. 
 20. See infra sections II.A.1, II.A.3. 
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and this exclusion might seem less severe. Courts regularly consider 
constitutional limits on government funds in individual rights and 
federalism contexts.21 Yet even here, special rules often govern when 
government funds are involved. As just one example, the Supreme Court 
has indicated that the involvement of government funds may pull agency 
action outside of otherwise applicable structural constitutional 
constraints, such as Article III or the commandeering doctrine.22 
The marginalization of appropriations is even clearer in administra-
tive law and statutory interpretation. Appropriations actions are often 
exempt from standard procedural requirements, and barriers to judicial 
review of appropriations decisions are common.23 Even the personnel and 
offices involved in appropriations and budget matters differ from the 
administrative law norm. Within the executive branch, budget and 
accounting offices rather than substantive program divisions are the 
appropriations frontline, and appropriations also involve different central-
ized executive branch overseers.24 A number of other less familiar entities 
play starring roles as well, such as the Government Accountability Office 
(GAO), the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), and the Court of Federal 
Claims. When appropriations questions do surface in court, it is often in a 
statutory interpretation guise, resulting in a number of appropriations-
specific doctrines that minimize the impact of appropriations measures on 
substantive law.25 
Appropriations’ marginalization in doctrine does not necessarily en-
tail marginalization in practice. Sometimes doctrinal marginalization 
actually serves to make appropriations a more potent tool for the political 
branches by freeing appropriations from legally enforceable constraints.26 
Indeed, appropriations play a much more starring role in nondoctrinal 
public law. A well-established statutory and regulatory framework—replete 
with a substantial body of guidance, internal executive and legislative 
branch decisions, and longstanding norms—governs agency budgeting 
                                                                                                                           
 21. See, e.g., Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius (NFIB), 567 U.S. 519, 575–86 (2012) 
(holding that Congress could not withhold existing funds from states that declined to 
expand Medicaid eligibility under the ACA). 
 22. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 161, 167–68 (1992); infra section II.B.2. 
 23. See infra section II.B. 
 24. See Christopher J. Walker, Federal Agencies in the Legislative Process: Technical 
Assistance in Statutory Drafting: Final Report to the Administrative Conference of the 
United States 10, 14–16, 30–31, 37–38 (2015), https://www.acus.gov/sites/default/files/
documents/technical-assistance-final-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/CKM2-3L9E] (conclud-
ing that agency budget offices “often provide technical drafting assistance on legislation that 
directly affects those agencies”); Eloise Pasachoff, The President’s Budget as a Source of 
Agency Policy Control, 125 Yale L.J. 2182, 2199–201 (2016) [hereinafter Pasachoff, The 
President’s Budget] (describing resource management offices in OMB as centralized 
budget overseers). 
 25. See infra section II.C. 
 26. See infra section II.E. 
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and spending. This framework is primarily enforced by legislative and 
executive branch entities, making only rare appearances in court. Yet even 
this political branch public law of appropriations is increasingly marginal-
ized, with appropriations norms and practices being undermined by par-
tisan disagreements and policy disputes between the legislative and 
executive branches.27 
Importantly, moreover, appropriations’ doctrinal marginalization 
does not affect the political branches equally. Especially combined with 
the erosion of appropriations norms and practices that reinforce congres-
sional control, such doctrinal marginalization redounds to the executive 
branch’s benefit. This is especially true of doctrines that exclude appropri-
ations challenges from the jurisdiction of the federal courts. The cumula-
tive effect is the creation of a de facto presidential spending authority and 
a corresponding weakening of congressional control of the purse. 
Appropriations have long received substantial attention from political 
scientists and congressional scholars, who have examined among other 
things the political dynamics of the appropriations process and how 
Presidents wield influence over federal spending.28 But the 
marginalization of appropriations also exists in public law scholarship, 
which has largely ignored issues of agency funding.29 This blindness to 
appropriations is beginning to change, with a growing body of scholarship 
documenting the importance of appropriations to the administrative state. 
This work has opened a window on appropriations, offering rich accounts 
of how Congress,30 the President,31 and agencies32 use funding measures 
                                                                                                                           
 27. See infra section II.E. 
 28. See, e.g., Richard F. Fenno, Jr., The Power of the Purse: Appropriations Politics in 
Congress, at xiii (1966) (providing an “empirical description of the contemporary appro-
priations process”); John Hudak, Presidential Pork: White House Influence over the 
Distribution of Federal Grants 3 (2014) (discussing whether and how presidents engage in 
“pork barrel politics”); D. Roderick Kiewet & Mathew D. McCubbins, The Logic of 
Delegation: Congressional Parties and the Appropriations Process 3–4 (1991) (analyzing 
“key issues involving congressional parties and the delegation of policy-making authority in 
the context of the annual appropriations process”). 
 29. See, e.g., Pasachoff, The President’s Budget, supra note 24, at 2186 (“The budget 
itself . . . is a key tool for controlling agencies. Yet the mechanisms of control through the 
executive budget process remain little discussed and insufficiently understood.”). 
 30. See, e.g., Jack M. Beermann, Congressional Administration, 43 San Diego L. Rev. 
61, 84–90 (2006) (describing how “Congress has supervised agencies with great particular-
ity . . . through the appropriations process”); Matthew B. Lawrence, Disappropriation, 120 
Colum. L. Rev. 1, 26–44 (2020) [hereinafter Lawrence, Disappropriation] (discussing 
examples of how Congress has increasingly failed to fund mandatory obligations). 
 31. See, e.g., Pasachoff, The President’s Budget, supra note 24, at 2207–08; Note, 
Independence, Congressional Weakness, and the Importance of Appointment: The Impact 
of Combining Budgetary Autonomy with Removal Protection, 125 Harv. L. Rev. 1822, 1827–
29 (2012) (describing methods of presidential control over policy through appropriations). 
 32. See, e.g., Christopher C. DeMuth, Sr. & Michael S. Greve, Agency Finance in the 
Age of Executive Government, 24 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 555, 583–87 (2017) (discussing the 
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to advance their policy priorities. Scholars are also developing nuanced 
analyses of how appropriations fit into the constitutional separation of 
powers framework,33 a subject that has received little sustained engage-
ment since the 1980s in the aftermath of Iran–Contra.34 Still, the margin-
alization of appropriations in public law doctrine has gone mostly 
unremarked, and a comprehensive analysis of how courts do and should 
approach appropriations remains lacking. 
This Article aims to provide that analysis and explore the implications 
of taking appropriations seriously in public law doctrine. The disconnect 
between the lived appropriations-centric reality of administrative govern-
ance and the appropriations-excluded doctrinal rubrics of public law 
raises several questions: What explains the marginalization of appropria-
tions in public law doctrine? Is this marginalization constitutionally 
justified? And what would happen if we rethink public law by putting 
government funding at the core of the doctrinal analysis rather than 
pushing it to the periphery? 
Appropriations marginalization has several sources. One is the courts’ 
traditional reluctance to impose financial penalties or funding obligations 
on governments, which is connected to a belief that resource allocations 
are core policy and sovereign determinations that belong in the political 
branches. Put differently, the marginalization of appropriations in public 
law doctrine is closely linked to the centrality of appropriations in the 
political arena. At the same time, however, the doctrinal marginalization 
of appropriations also embodies normative judgments made by courts 
about how Congress should operate. In particular, a central basis is judicial 
prioritization of substantive legislative enactments over appropriations 
and skepticism of appropriations as a policymaking tool. 
These rationales fail to justify the current doctrinal marginalization 
of appropriations. For starters, this marginalization creates a disconnect 
between contemporary governance reality and governing legal frame-
works. More importantly, the downplaying of appropriations and corre-
sponding elevation of substantive legislative enactments is at odds with the 
Constitution. Constitutional text, structure, and history make clear the 
central importance of Congress’s appropriations power. Legal doctrines 
                                                                                                                           
consequences of agency self-funding); Mila Sohoni, On Dollars and Deference: Agencies, 
Spending, and Economic Rights, 66 Duke L.J. 1677, 1701–05 (2017) (describing how 
agencies use spending to advance policy goals). 
 33. See, e.g., Zachary S. Price, Funding Restrictions and Separation of Powers, 71 
Vand. L. Rev. 357, 361 (2018) (theorizing the extent of the President’s independent 
spending authority). 
 34. See J. Gregory Sidak, The President’s Power of the Purse, 1989 Duke L.J. 1162, 
1183–202 (arguing that the Constitution grants the President power to spend the minimum 
necessary to perform constitutional functions); Kate Stith, Congress’s Power of the Purse, 
97 Yale L.J. 1343, 1381–86 (1988) (articulating constitutional limits on congressional and 
presidential spending authority). Louis Fisher is an exception here. See generally Louis 
Fisher, Presidential Fiscal Accountability Following the Budget Act of 1974, 67 Me. L. Rev. 
286, 302–09 (2015) (describing spending disputes from the 1990s to the early 2010s). 
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governing appropriations therefore should seek to empower congres-
sional control of appropriations. Yet as noted above, doctrines that 
marginalize appropriations often have the opposite effect. They also serve 
to undercut political accountability through Congress, because appropri-
ations are one of the most available means by which Congress can shape 
policy today. The doctrinal marginalization of appropriations additionally 
threatens the rule of law by freeing government from legally enforceable 
checks with respect to appropriations. And appropriations’ doctrinal 
marginalization undermines the separation of powers even further by 
creating de facto presidential spending authority, enabling the executive 
branch to violate governing statutes on appropriations without legal 
consequences. 
This is not to deny that increased judicial involvement in 
appropriations carries separation of powers risks of its own. The concern 
that bringing appropriations into the public law mainstream will expand 
judicial power at the political branches’ expense is real and legitimate. But 
this fear must be balanced against the very serious separation of powers 
harms caused by appropriations’ exclusion in our current polarized era. 
The erosion of longstanding norms and practices in the wake of 
polarization means that political branch public law is increasingly unable 
to enforce congressional control over appropriations on its own. 
Moreover, courts are being dragged into appropriations disputes already, 
suggesting that the issue is not one of whether courts should play a role in 
such matters but rather what rules should govern the role they play. 
That leaves the question of what taking appropriations seriously might 
mean for public law doctrine. Here it is helpful to differentiate among the 
different forms that appropriations’ doctrinal marginalization takes. 
Appropriations silence is the most difficult to justify; at a minimum, taking 
appropriations seriously should mean that courts engage expressly with 
the import of appropriations and incorporate appropriations into their 
analysis. But rules that pull appropriations out for special treatment are 
not necessarily problematic, provided such appropriations exceptionalism 
reflects the realities of the appropriations process and is not an effort to 
downplay appropriations. Indeed, appropriations-specific rules can pro-
vide an important means of balancing different imperatives, such as 
enforcing congressionally imposed limits while also preserving needed 
budget flexibility. Taking appropriations seriously also entails paying 
special attention to the separation of powers dynamics raised by appropri-
ations, with interpretive doctrines structured so as to reinforce Congress’s 
power of the purse over the executive branch. It further requires including 
assessment of appropriations measures in separation of powers analysis. 
More radically yet, taking appropriations seriously—and also acknowledg-
ing the risks posed by expanding the judicial role in appropriations 
disputes—suggests rethinking jurisdictional doctrines to put primacy on 
congressional enforcement of appropriations limits in court. 
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In what follows, Part I begins by outlining the traditional frameworks 
and institutional arrangements that govern appropriations. It then 
describes appropriations’ current centrality to administrative government 
and contemporary separation of powers disputes. Part II turns to docu-
menting how, despite this importance, appropriations are marginalized in 
public law. It begins by identifying the different analytic mechanisms by 
which this sidelining of appropriations occurs and then looks in detail at 
how these mechanisms surface in constitutional and administrative law, 
statutory interpretation, and political branch public law. Part III takes a 
step back to assess appropriations marginalization in public law, first iden-
tifying the rationales on which such marginalization rests and then argu-
ing that these rationales fail to justify the sidelining of appropriations. It 
contends that the current marginalization is at odds with the constitutional 
importance of Congress’s appropriations power and undermines political 
accountability, the rule of law, and the separation of powers. Part IV turns 
to the reconstructive project, exploring what taking appropriations 
seriously might mean in practice and examining the implications of such 
a new approach to appropriations for the border wall funding dispute. 
A note on terminology is warranted. This Article uses the term 
“appropriations” expansively, including under its embrace not simply leg-
islation allocating budget authority to different government functions—
the traditional definition of appropriations—but also administrative 
actions implementing those allocations and making expenditures that 
more often are classified as involving government spending. Both appro-
priations and spending involve provision of government funds and are 
manifestations of the same congressional power of the purse. But spending 
is the term generally applied to grants of funds outside of the federal 
government, especially to state and local governments or private actors, 
whereas appropriations is used to refer to funding the federal government. 
The term appropriations is thus particularly tied to the separation of 
powers issues that dominate the analysis here. However, spending disputes 
often carry separation of powers dimensions, especially today, and thus 
merit inclusion in the discussion as well.35 
                                                                                                                           
 35. One could expand the lens even further to include other closely associated forms 
of government action, such as government contracting or revenue-raising activities. Indeed, 
government contracting and revenue-raising are in many ways similarly marginalized in ex-
isting public law doctrine. See Jody Freeman & Martha Minow, Reframing the Outsourcing 
Debate, in Government by Contract: Outsourcing and American Democracy 1, 4–5 (Jody 
Freeman & Martha Minow eds., 2009) (describing concerns that private contractors fall 
outside of existing government accountability regimes); Lawrence Zelenak, Maybe Just a 
Little Bit Special, After All?, 63 Duke L.J. 1897, 1898–900 (2014) (describing tax exception-
alism). Yet each of these modes of government functioning has distinct features not present 
in the case of appropriations and spending—in the case of government contracting, the 
frequent transfer of government power to private hands; in the case of revenue-raising, the 
governmental power to obtain an exaction from private actors. Intragovernmental contract-
ing may come closest—and, like appropriations, it is an area governed by arcane legal 
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I. THE CONTEMPORARY IMPORTANCE OF APPROPRIATIONS 
Appropriations have always been a central site of political contestation 
in the United States and pivotal for the functioning of administrative 
government.36 In today’s polarized world, the critical importance of appro-
priations is only greater. Both Congress and the President are increasingly 
resorting to appropriations to advance their policy agendas and exert con-
trol over the administrative state. To place these developments in context, 
this Part begins with a brief overview and history of the appropriations and 
budget process. It then turns to depicting appropriations’ changing role 
and contemporary significance. 
A. The Appropriations and Budget Process Over Time 
Struggles over appropriations have a very long history, with appropri-
ations representing a central means by which Parliament established its 
dominance over the British king.37 Concern over the corrupting power of 
government spending, as well as the danger that profligate spending 
would necessitate higher taxes, led the Framers to firmly vest control over 
appropriations in Congress.38 The Appropriations Clause provides, “No 
Money shall be drawn from the Treasury but in Consequence of Appropri-
ations made by Law.”39 This requirement of legislative authorization for 
appropriations is accompanied by other constitutional provisions reinforc-
ing Congress’s control of the federal fisc, including Congress’s authority 
to “lay and collect Taxes,” “pay the Debts,” “provide for the common 
Defence and general Welfare,” and “borrow Money on the credit of the 
                                                                                                                           
requirements overwhelmingly enforced by the political branches. See Eloise Pasachoff, 
Federal Grant Rules and Realities in the Intergovernmental Administrative State: 
Compliance, Performance, and Politics, 37 Yale J. on Regul. 573, 577, 582–92 (2020); see 
also Bridget A. Fahey, Federalism by Contract, 129 Yale L.J. 2326, 2329 (2020) (emphasizing 
the “thousands of written agreements that facilitate shared governance among levels of 
government”). On the other hand, substantial overlap exists between intragovernmental 
contracting and federal spending programs in practice, as federal grants are frequently 
implemented through intragovernmental contracts. Fahey, supra, at 2339–43. In any event, 
the limited inclusion of spending within the appropriations umbrella here is not meant to 
preclude the possibility that other federal government fiscal activities could also be 
profitably linked. 
 36. See generally Lucius Wilmerding, Jr., The Spending Power: A History of the Efforts 
of Congress to Control Expenditures (1971) (providing a history of disputes over federal 
expenditures from the Framing to the early decades of the twentieth century). 
 37. William C. Banks & Peter Raven-Hansen, National Security Law and the Power of 
the Purse 11–18 (1994); Josh Chafetz, Congress’s Constitution: Legislative Authority and 
the Separation of Powers 45–52 (2017) [hereinafter Chafetz, Congress’s Constitution]. 
 38. Chafetz, Congress’s Constitution, supra note 37, at 54–57. 
 39. U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 7. 
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United States,” as well as the Constitution’s stipulation that “All Bills for 
raising Revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives.”40 
Besides specifying that no appropriation for the army shall last longer 
than two years,41 however, the Constitution is silent on how the principle 
of congressional control of the purse should be implemented. A few 
appropriations practices have existed since the Founding—such as annual 
appropriations,42 appropriations being separate from legislation,43 and 
origination of appropriations measures in the House44—although all of 
these practices have experienced some erosion over time. Other aspects of 
the process for appropriating and spending federal funds have changed 
more dramatically, in response to new national needs, wars, political 
developments, and institutional rivalries.45 
One particularly important institutional rivalry is the enduring battle 
between Congress and the President for control of appropriations. The 
constitutional principle of congressional control of the purse has always 
coexisted with substantial executive branch influence on appropriations.46 
After initially deferring broadly to estimates provided by Treasury 
Secretary Alexander Hamilton in the early years of the Washington 
Administration, Congress soon pushed for more control, with Representa-
tive Albert Gallatin prevailing in his quest for line-item appropriations over 
Hamilton’s resistance.47 Appropriations bills continued to include substan-
tial detail until the growing complexity and size of the federal government 
                                                                                                                           
 40. Id. §§ 7–8; see also Lawrence, Disappropriation, supra note 30, at 11–14 (adopting 
a more capacious definition of Congress’s power of the purse that includes all “means of 
economic inducement potentially wielded by the government”); Price, supra note 33, at 366 
(“The Constitution thus ensures that Congress, with its distributed representation and 
resulting capacity for bargained trade-offs, holds ultimate authority over both collection and 
distribution of public resources.”). 
 41. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 12. 
 42. Chafetz, Congress’s Constitution, supra note 37, at 58–61. 
 43. James V. Saturno & Brian T. Yeh, Cong. Rsch. Serv., R42098, Authorization of 
Appropriations: Procedural and Legal Issues 1–2 (2016); Allen Schick, Cong. Rsch. Serv., 
Rep. No. 84-106 GOV, Legislation, Appropriations, and Budgets: The Development of 
Spending Decision-Making in Congress 8–17 (1984). 
 44. Allen Schick, The Federal Budget: Politics, Policy, Process 217, 232 (3d ed. 2007) 
[hereinafter Schick, Federal Budget]. 
 45. See id. at 13–14. For a detailed account of the changes in the appropriations 
process over the period 1865–1921, see Charles H. Stewart III, Budget Reform Politics: The 
Design of the Appropriations Process in the House of Representatives 1865–1921, at 79–132 
(1989). 
 46. See Louis Fisher, Presidential Spending Power 10–19, 21–58 (1975) [hereinafter 
Fisher, Presidential Spending Power] (discussing the President’s role in federal spending 
decisions from 1789 to 1974). 
 47. Gerhard Casper, Appropriations of Power, 13 U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev. 1, 9–22 
(1990); Chafetz, Congress’s Constitution, supra note 37, at 58–59. 
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that developed over the twentieth century—and concomitant need for 
flexibility—led to broader lump-sum appropriations.48 
Over time, Congress enacted a variety of framework measures to 
control executive branch spending, even as it also granted the presidency 
a central role in the budgeting process. A critical statute is the 
Antideficiency Act, first enacted in 1870 as a response to executive officials’ 
practices of “coercing” Congress to make additional appropriations, for 
example by spending their entire annual appropriations quickly or 
entering into contracts they lacked funds to cover.49 Subsequently 
amended several times, the Antideficiency Act prohibits federal officers or 
employees from spending or obligating federal funds in excess of the 
amount currently available in an appropriation.50 The Act also bars receipt 
of voluntary services, except when “authorized by law” or for “emergencies 
involving the safety of human life or the protection of property.”51 It is 
reinforced by the Miscellaneous Receipts Act, which requires that a 
government official “receiving money for the Government from any 
source shall deposit the money in the Treasury as soon as practicable.”52 
Agencies thus need congressional authorization to retain and spend funds 
they independently collect.53 The “purpose statute,” another cornerstone 
measure initially adopted in 1809, provides that “[a]ppropriations shall be 
applied only to the objects for which [they] . . . were made . . . .”54 Congress 
also has sought to prevent the President and executive branch from 
refusing to spend appropriated funds through the Impoundment Control 
Act of 1974 (ICA). The ICA requires congressional approval for any 
permanent impoundment—termed a rescission—of appropriated funds 
and otherwise limits Presidents to within-fiscal-year deferrals that cannot 
be based on policy disagreement absent congressional approval.55 Despite 
these multiple enactments, the nature and size of the federal budget leaves 
agencies and the President with substantial legal discretion over federal 
                                                                                                                           
 48. Fisher, Presidential Spending Power, supra note 46, at 59–76. Lump-sum 
appropriations “cover a number of specific programs, projects, or items” and allow the 
executive branch to determine their specific use, whereas line-item appropriations are 
“available only for the specific object described.” 2 U.S. Gov’t Accountability Off., GAO-06-
382SP, Principles of Federal Appropriations Law ch. 6, at 5–7 (3d ed. 2006). 
 49. Gary L. Hopkins & Robert M. Nutt, The Anti-Deficiency Act (Revised Statutes 
3679): and Funding Federal Contracts: An Analysis, 80 Mil. L. Rev. 51, 56–60 (1978); Stith, 
supra note 34, at 1370–77. 
 50. 31 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(1) (2018). 
 51. Id. § 1342. 
 52. Id. § 3302(b); Stith, supra note 34, at 1364–70. 
 53. U.S. Gov’t Accountability Off., GAO-16-464SP, Principles of Federal 
Appropriations Law ch. 2, at 5–6 (4th ed. 2016) [hereinafter GAO Red Book, GAO-16-
464SP]. 
 54. 31 U.S.C. § 1301(a); see also U.S. Gov’t Accountability Off., GAO-17-797SP, 
Principles of Federal Appropriations Law ch. 3, at 9–10 (4th ed. 2017). 
 55. 2 U.S.C. §§ 683–684, 688 (2018). 
2021] TAKING APPROPRIATIONS SERIOUSLY 1089 
spending, even if subject to political and informal constraints from 
Congress.56 This institutional rivalry is also reflected in the presence of two 
simultaneously created government agencies with appropriations 
enforcement responsibilities: GAO, understood to be affiliated with 
Congress, and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), the 
executive branch’s central appropriations and budget actor.57 
A second set of institutional rivalries has existed within Congress. Ever 
since appropriations committees were created after the Civil War, they 
have fought subject-area “authorizing committees” for control over spend-
ing.58 The longstanding principle that appropriations are distinct from 
legislation translates into a requirement that appropriations be separately 
authorized, a responsibility that falls to authorizing committees.59 The 
result is a two-step appropriations process with enactment of legislation 
authorizing activities and expenditures up to a certain level occurring first, 
followed by enactment of appropriations legislation specifying the actual 
amount to be spent on authorized activities in a given year.60 This division 
is enforced by House and Senate Rules that allow a member of each 
chamber to raise a point of order against nonconforming measures.61 Yet 
departures from this model have been frequent.62 In particular, the 
development of the twentieth-century welfare state led to enactment of 
substantive statutes that directly mandated spending and sometimes 
provided permanent appropriations, with mandatory spending now 
                                                                                                                           
 56. See Pasachoff, The President’s Budget, supra note 24, at 2188, 2207–43; David E. 
Lewis, Political Control and the Presidential Spending Power 9, 24–28 (Vanderbilt Univ. 
Ctr. for the Study of Democratic Insts., Working Paper No. 1-2017, 2017), https://www. 
vanderbilt.edu/csdi/includes/WP_1_2017_final.pdf [https://perma.cc/7ZEY-3U85]. 
 57. Stephen Skowronek, Building a New American State: The Expansion of National 
Administrative Capacities, 1877–1920, at 207 (1982); Jesse M. Cross & Abbe R. Gluck, The 
Congressional Bureaucracy, 168 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1541, 1587–94 (2020). CBO is another later-
created congressional budget agency. Id. at 1573–78. 
 58. Schick, Federal Budget, supra note 44, at 203. These fights were not just 
institutional turf wars but reflected broader factors such as partisanship, economic policy 
disagreements, interparty dynamics, and coordination needs. See Fenno, supra note 28, at 
43–46; Kiewet & McCubbins, supra note 28, at 63–72; Stewart, supra note 45, at 79–80, 85–
87, 128–30. 
 59. See Schick, Federal Budget, supra note 44, at 194–99; Amanda Chuzi, Note, 
Defense Lawmaking, 120 Colum. L. Rev. 995, 1002–04 (2020). 
 60. Bill Heniff Jr., Cong. Rsch. Serv., RS20371, Overview of the Authorization-
Appropriations Process 1 (2012). 
 61. Schick, Federal Budget, supra note 44, at 250–57; see also Karen L. Haas, H. 
Comm. on Rules, 116th Cong., Rules of the House of Representatives 35 (2019); Standing 
Rules of the Senate, S. Doc. No. 113-18, r. XXV, at 20 (2013). 
 62. Louis Fisher, The Authorization-Appropriation Process in Congress: Formal Rules 
and Informal Practices, 29 Cath. U. L. Rev. 51, 53 (1979) (“The real world of the legislative 
process differs considerably from the idealized model of the two-step authorization-
appropriation procedure.”). 
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representing sixty-one percent of the annual budget.63 Appropriations 
committees have encroached on authorizing committees’ domains as well, 
with substantive riders and legislative provisions regularly appearing in 
annual appropriations bills.64 Over the twentieth century, appropriators 
have also vied with congressional and party leaders for control of the 
appropriations process, with leadership becoming dominant in the 1980s 
and 1990s.65 
Today, the official contours of the budget and appropriations process 
remain largely those set by the 1974 Congressional Budget Act (CBA).66 
Under the CBA, the President submits an annual budget to Congress in 
early February, and the House and Senate Budget Committees are sup-
posed to adopt a concurrent resolution specifying an overall budget 
amount by mid-April.67 Then the Appropriations Committees divide the 
total amount listed for annual appropriations among their twelve subcom-
mittees, and each subcommittee drafts an appropriations bill that allocates 
its amount among the different agencies and programs within its jurisdic-
tion.68 Although appropriations bills may provide set amounts for particu-
lar activities, more often that detailed allocation is provided in the com-
mittee report and the bill lists the amount of budget authority by budget 
account, with each account often spanning multiple activities.69 The sub-
committee bills then must pass the full Appropriations Committees, the 
House and Senate, and be signed by the President by the start of the fiscal 
year on the first of October.70 This legislation constitutes the basic annual 
appropriations for the fiscal year, but it represents only part of the federal 
                                                                                                                           
 63. See Schick, Federal Budget, supra note 44, at 209–12; The Federal Budget in 2019: 
An Infographic, CBO (Apr. 15, 2020), https://www.cbo.gov/publication/56324 [https://
perma.cc/9PKS-AYW7] (noting that mandatory spending made up $2.7 trillion out of $4.4 
trillion in federal outlays in FY2019). 
 64. Walter J. Oleszek, Mark J. Oleszek, Elizabeth Rybicki & Bill Heniff Jr., Congressional 
Procedures and the Policy Process 59–63 (11th ed. 2020); Schick, Federal Budget, supra 
note 44, at 268. 
 65. See Geoffrey W. Buhl, Scott A. Frisch & Sean Q. Kelly, Appropriations to the 
Extreme: Partisanship and the Power of the Purse, in Politics to the Extreme 3, 9–10 (Scott 
A. Frisch & Sean Q. Kelly eds., 2013); Schick, Federal Budget, supra note 44, at 219–23. 
 66. 2 U.S.C. §§ 631–645(a) (2018). Congress has occasionally adopted measures that 
impose budget caps or sequesters. See, e.g., Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit 
Control (Gramm–Rudman–Hollings) Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-177, § 251, 99 Stat. 1038, 
1063–72 (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. § 901 (2018)); Budget Control Act of 2011, Pub. 
L. No. 112-25, § 101, 125 Stat. 240, 241–45 (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. § 901 (2018)). 
 67. 2 U.S.C. § 632. 
 68. Schick, Federal Budget, supra note 44, at 230, 234 tbl.9-6. 
 69. 2 U.S.C. § 632(d); U.S. Gov’t Accountability Off., GAO-05-734SP, A Glossary of 
Terms Used in the Federal Budget Process app. I, at 107 (2005), https://www.gao.gov/
assets/80/76911.pdf [https://perma.cc/9DHR-ECG6]; Schick, Federal Budget, supra note 
44, at 263. 
 70. Schick, Federal Budget, supra note 44, at 234 tbl.9-6. 
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government’s actual annual spending.71 Substantial sums are also provided 
by permanent appropriations and supplemental appropriations, the latter 
intended for unexpected or unusual demands during the year.72 The CBA 
also provides for a reconciliation process that was originally intended as a 
streamlined means for aligning the enacted budget with fiscal items such 
as revenue, direct spending, and the debt ceiling.73 Increasingly, however, 
reconciliation has been used to enact controversial tax-related legislation 
that could not pass through ordinary procedures.74 
On the executive branch side, the task of developing the President’s 
budget and then executing appropriations acts falls to OMB, housed in 
the Executive Office of the President. Critically, agencies must obtain 
OMB’s approval of their budget requests and comply with OMB’s instruc-
tions regarding what activities and programs to include.75 They are also 
prohibited from disclosing disagreement with the budget requests the 
President ultimately submits to Congress.76 The Antideficiency Act 
requires that appropriations be apportioned over the year and among the 
different programs and activities that each budget account covers.77 The 
executive branch is generally allowed to reapportion or reprogram funds 
to different uses within the account to which they were appropriated, but 
transfers between accounts require statutory authority.78 Agencies propose 
initial allotments of appropriated funds, but the actual apportionment of 
funds that governs the agency is made by OMB. OMB’s approval is also 
needed for any reprogramming or transfer of appropriated funds.79 
                                                                                                                           
 71. See id. at 215. 
 72. Kate P. McClanahan, James V. Saturno, Megan S. Lynch, Bill Heniff Jr. & Justin 
Murray, Cong. Rsch. Serv., R42647, Continuing Resolutions: Overview of Components and 
Practices 2–4 (2019); Schick, Federal Budget, supra note 44, at 256–63. 
 73. See Schick, Federal Budget, supra note 44, at 142. 
 74. Oleszek et al., supra note 64, at 72–77; see also Barbara Sinclair, Unorthodox 
Lawmaking: New Legislative Processes in the U.S. Congress 127–30 (5th ed. 2017) (noting 
the use of reconciliation to enact controversial policies); Emily Cochrane, How Biden Could 
Use Reconciliation to Speed Through His Pandemic Aid Plan, N.Y. Times. (Jan. 27, 2021), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/27/us/politics/budget-reconciliation-coronavirus-
stimulus.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (discussing the possibility that 
Democrats may use reconciliation to enact President Biden’s pandemic relief bill in the face 
of Republican opposition and a divided Senate). 
 75. Off. of Mgmt. & Budget, Exec. Off. of the President, Circular No. A-11, Prepa-
ration, Submission, and Execution of the Budget § 10.5 (2020), https://www.whitehouse
.gov/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/a11.pdf [https://perma.cc/F9AV-KRA5] [hereinafter 
Circular A-11]. 
 76. Id. § 22.1; Pasachoff, The President’s Budget, supra note 24, at 2213–27. 
 77. 31 U.S.C. § 1512(a)–(b) (2018). 
 78. Id. § 1532; GAO Red Book, GAO-16-464SP, supra note 53, ch. 2, at 38–43; Michelle 
D. Christensen, Cong. Rsch. Serv., R43098, Transfer and Reprogramming of Appropriations: 
An Overview of Authorities, Limitations, and Procedures 2–8 (2013). 
 79. Circular A-11, supra note 75, § 120; Pasachoff, The President’s Budget, supra note 
24, at 2231. 
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Congress has also tasked GAO with a number of responsibilities related to 
budget execution, such as auditing agencies’ expenditure of funds as well 
as investigating and reporting on potential Antideficiency Act and ICA 
violations.80 
B. Appropriations Today 
1. Polarization, Appropriations, and Congress. — This official tale of the 
budget and appropriations process—often called the “regular order” of 
appropriations81—has always been somewhat aspirational; after all, 
Congress has enacted appropriations bills on time only four times since 
1977.82 But the gap between the ideal and the real has grown much larger 
of late. For example, Congress enacted a budget resolution each year from 
1975 to 1998 but has failed to do so seven times in the period FY2011–
FY2020.83 Appropriations bills are now regularly packaged together into 
omnibus or minibus legislation to increase their chances of enactment. In 
addition, they are often adopted well past the start of the new fiscal year, 
necessitating enactment of multiple continuing resolutions (CRs) in the 
interim.84 Congress is also foregoing authorization legislation for appro-
priations. In FY2020, $332 billion—nearly a third of all discretionary 
spending—had an expired authorization, up from $121 billion in 
FY2000.85 
The congressional move to “unorthodox” procedures is certainly not 
unique to appropriations and results from the same political forces under-
mining Congress’s ability to function in other domains.86 Historically, 
                                                                                                                           
 80. 2 U.S.C. §§ 686–687 (2018); U.S. Gov’t Accountability Off., GAO-16-463SP, 
Principles of Federal Appropriations Law ch. 1, at 21–24 (4th ed. 2016) [hereinafter GAO 
Red Book, GAO-16-463SP]. 
 81. Peter Hanson, Too Weak to Govern: Majority Party Power and Appropriations in 
the U.S. Senate 3, 17–18 (2014). 
 82. See, e.g., Drew Desilver, Congress Has Long Struggled to Pass Spending Bills on 
Time, Pew Rsch. Ctr. (Jan. 16, 2018), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/01/ 
16/congress-has-long-struggled-to-pass-spending-bills-on-time [https://perma.cc/DF8R-RZ 
E9] (noting that Congress has enacted all of the budget and appropriations measures called 
for in the CBA on time only four times since the CBA’s enactment in 1974). 
 83. Megan S. Lynch, Cong. Rsch. Serv., R44296, Deeming Resolutions: Budget 
Enforcement in the Absence of a Budget Resolution 5 tbl.1 (2019). 
 84. Hanson, supra note 81, at 19, 25–32; Molly E. Reynolds, The Senate Passed Another 
“Minibus” Funding Package. Now What?, Brookings (Aug. 2, 2018), https://www.brook 
ings.edu/blog/fixgov/2018/08/02/minibus-funding-package-now-what [https://perma.cc 
/4GH7-XGWL]. 
 85. CBO, Expired and Expiring Authorizations of Appropriations: Fiscal Year 2020, at 
3 tbl.1 (2020), https://www.cbo.gov/system/files/2020-02/56082-CBO-EEAA.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/B9JX-VLNS]; CBO, Unauthorized Appropriations and Expiring Authorizations 4 
tbl.1 (2000), https://www.cbo.gov/system/files/2019-04/12063-UAEA.pdf [https://perma 
.cc/TU7X-ZVY4]; Chuzi, supra note 59, at 1011–15 & tbl.1. 
 86. See Thomas E. Mann & Norman J. Ornstein, It’s Even Worse than It Looks: How 
the American Constitutional System Collided with the New Politics of Extremism, at xiii–xiv 
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appropriations were an area of bipartisanship, but the intense partisan 
polarization that has dominated Congress since the 1990s has now also 
overtaken the appropriations process.87 Sharp partisan differences on 
spending priorities, budget deficits, and the loss of earmarks also impede 
bipartisan compromise.88 Meanwhile, the narrow margins of party control 
in each chamber of Congress operate to reinforce party loyalty, discourage 
interparty compromise, and increase the chances of divided government.89 
At the same time, these political factors increase the difficulty of enacting 
legislation generally, making it more likely that members of Congress will 
seek to attach substantive measures to appropriations bills to take 
advantage of appropriations’ must-pass status and the greater ease of 
getting appropriations measures to the floor.90 
This turn toward enacting substantive policy through the appropria-
tions process is evident in increased reliance on appropriations riders, 
which are provisions in appropriations legislation that limit (or occasion-
ally require) the use of funds for purposes or activities an agency is author-
ized to undertake.91 Riders are plainly aimed at changing governmental 
policy: Their prime use is to forestall the executive branch from 
proceeding with or developing particular agency initiatives, and they 
frequently surface in prominent policy disputes when the President and 
Congress are at odds.92 A 2010 study of riders found that approximately 
                                                                                                                           
(2012) (identifying two main sources of political dysfunction in Congress); Sarah Binder, 
The Dysfunctional Congress, 18 Ann. Rev. Pol. Sci. 85, 94–98 (2015). See generally Sinclair, 
supra note 74 (describing the “unorthodox lawmaking” phenomenon). 
 87. See Buhl et al., supra note 65, at 4, 7–11; Schick, Federal Budget, supra note 44, at 
219–22; see also Lee Drutman & Peter C. Hanson, Does Regular Order Produce a More 
Deliberative Congress?: Evidence from the Annual Appropriations Process, in Can America 
Govern Itself? 155, 178–79 (Frances E. Lee & Nolan McCarty eds., 2019) (identifying 
substantial bipartisanship still on appropriations but noting the dangers that polarization 
poses); Nolan McCarty, The Decline of Regular Order in Appropriations: Does it Matter, in 
Transformation of American Politics: Activist Government and the Rise of Conservatism 
223, 224–32 (Paul Pierson & Theda Skocpol eds., 2007) (describing the impact of 
polarization on appropriations, but arguing that other factors appear in play as well). 
 88. Buhl et al., supra note 65, at 11–12 (earmarks); David Scott Louk & David Gamage, 
Preventing Government Shutdowns: Designing Default Rules for Budgets, 86 U. Colo. L. 
Rev. 181, 202–16 (2015) (spending priorities and deficits). 
 89. See Frances E. Lee, Insecure Majorities: Congress and the Perpetual Campaign 2–
3 (2016). 
 90. Buhl et al., supra note 65, at 9–10; Richard J. Lazarus, Congressional Descent: The 
Demise of Deliberative Democracy in Environmental Law, 94 Geo. L.J. 619, 635–37 (2006). 
 91. Curtis W. Copeland, Cong. Rsch. Serv., RL34354, Congressional Influence on 
Rulemaking and Regulation Through Appropriations Restrictions 3–12 (2008) (providing 
examples of riders that limit or require rulemaking). Because appropriations riders usually 
limit or prohibit activities, they are often called “limitation riders.” Jason A. MacDonald, 
Limitation Riders and Congressional Influence over Bureaucratic Policy Decisions, 104 Am. 
Pol. Sci. Rev. 166, 166 (2010). 
 92. Lazarus, supra note 90, at 632–52 (describing riders in the 1990s and noting their 
decline with the Bush II presidency); Thomas O. McGarity, Deregulatory Riders Redux, 1 
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300 riders affecting policy were included every year in appropriations bills 
proposed by the House Appropriations Committee in the ten-year period 
FY1993–FY2003, with most riders prohibiting specific agency actions.93 
Although appropriations riders are a longstanding phenomenon, several 
commentators trace an uptick in the use of such riders to the 1990s, 
coinciding with the 1994 Republican takeover of the House and the onset 
of intensified partisan divides in Congress.94 
The Affordable Care Act (ACA) represents one of the most promi-
nent uses of appropriations to push through controversial policy. The ACA 
itself was initially passed through the reconciliation process to bypass the 
Senate filibuster.95 More recently, appropriations riders substantially 
curtailed the money available to cover insurer costs under the ACA’s now-
expired risk corridor program, and Congress also has refused to appropri-
ate funds to cover cost-sharing obligations that the ACA imposes on 
insurers.96 A particularly striking feature of these moves is that despite 
Congress’s refusal to appropriate the necessary amounts, the government 
remained statutorily obligated to cover insurers’ costs under the ACA’s risk 
corridor and cost-sharing programs.97 According to Matthew Lawrence, 
these instances are part of a newly emerging phenomenon of “legislative 
failure to appropriate funds necessary to honor a government commit-
ment.”98 To be sure, Congress regularly funds programs at less than their 
fullest authorized amount, and often at less than the amount needed for 
agencies to meet all their statutory responsibilities in a timely and effective 
fashion.99 But in the past, these failures to fund tended to involve discre-
tionary spending; Congress almost always honored mandatory spending 
                                                                                                                           
Mich. J. Env’t & Admin. L. 33, 53–56, 64–70 (2012) (detailing the environmental 
appropriations riders during Obama’s second term); Price, supra note 33, at 371–78 
(discussing riders affecting Guantánamo Bay transfers, diplomacy, and White House 
advisors). 
 93. MacDonald, supra note 91, at 767, 769–70. 
 94. See, e.g., McGarity, supra note 92, at 35–36, 39–40; see also Neal E. Devins, 
Regulation of Government Agencies Through Limitation Riders, 1987 Duke L.J. 456, 462–
63, 472–73 (tracing the uses of riders back to the 1870s). 
 95. Abbe R. Gluck, Imperfect Statutes, Imperfect Courts: Understanding Congress’s 
Plan in the Era of Unorthodox Lawmaking, 129 Harv. L. Rev. 62, 78–79 (2015) [hereinafter 
Gluck, Imperfect Statutes]. 
 96. See supra text accompanying notes 9–10. 
 97. Me. Cmty. Health Options v. United States, 140 S. Ct. 1308, 1323 (2020); Cmty. 
Health Choice, Inc. v. United States, 141 Fed. Cl. 744, 757–62 (2019), aff’d in part, rev’d in 
part, remanded, 970 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2020). 
 98. Lawrence, Disappropriation, supra note 30, at 25; see also id. at 27–44 (providing 
other examples). 
 99. See Oleszek et al., supra note 64, at 46; Rena Steinzor & Sidney Shapiro, The 
People’s Agents and the Battle to Protect the American Public: Special Interests, 
Government, and Threats to Health, Safety, and the Environment 4–5, 10, 12, 19, 24–25 
(2010). 
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obligations in statutes, even as such commitments came to dominate 
annual expenditures.100 
A second manifestation of growing partisanship in appropriations is 
the increased reliance on temporary funding and greater risk of govern-
ment shutdowns. Shutdowns occur when there is a funding gap of more 
than trivial duration, with Congress failing to pass either appropriations 
legislation for the new fiscal year or a CR to keep the government funded 
in the interim.101 But what transforms a funding gap into a shutdown is the 
Antideficiency Act’s prohibition on receipt of voluntary services, which 
since 1981 has been read to necessitate furloughing most federal employ-
ees when there is a funding gap.102 Otherwise, employees could continue 
to work with the expectation they would be paid once appropriations are 
made.103 As shutdowns are tied to annual appropriations from Congress, 
programs that are funded by permanent appropriations or agency-
generated funds such as user fees can continue to operate.104 
Shutdowns are not a new phenomenon. The government has had 
twenty funding gaps since the CBA was enacted in 1974, and early on a 
number of these gaps lasted for ten days or more.105 But over time the 
shutdown threat has become more constant, a result of growing polariza-
tion and stark partisan differences over the budget. Since 1981, ten 
funding gaps have lasted more than a day and involved significant costs 
and furloughs, and three shutdowns have occurred in the last ten years.106 
As significant, Congress is relying more often and for longer periods on 
temporary stopgap funding through CRs to keep the government 
                                                                                                                           
 100. Lawrence, Disappropriation, supra note 30, at 26–27. 
 101. Clinton T. Brass, Ida A. Brudnick, Natalie Keegan, Barry J. McMillion, John W. 
Rollins & Brian T. Yeh, Cong. Rsch. Serv., RL34680, Shutdown of the Federal Government: 
Causes, Processes, and Effects 1–2 (2018). A funding gap of a day or less, or one occurring 
over a weekend, may not lead to an actual government shutdown. Id. at 2. 
 102. See id. at 4–5; James V. Saturno, Cong. Rsch. Serv., RS20348, Federal Funding 
Gaps: A Brief Overview 4 (2019) (noting that prior to 1981, “the expectation was that 
agencies would not shut down during a funding gap”). 
 103. This expectation was codified into law with an amendment to the Antideficiency 
Act in early 2019. Government Employee Fair Treatment Act of 2019, Pub. L. No. 116-1, 133 
Stat. 3 (to be codified at 31 U.S.C. § 1341). 
 104. See U.S. Gov’t Accountability Off., GAO-19-289T, Government-Wide Inventory of 
Accounts with Spending Authority and Permanent Appropriations, Fiscal Years 1995 to 
2015, at 5–6 (2018) (statement of Tranchau (Kris) T. Nguyen, Acting Dir., Strategic Issues 
& Julia C. Matta, Managing Assoc. Gen. Coins., Off. of the Gen. Couns.) https://www.gao.
gov/assets/700/695894.pdf [https://perma.cc/3Q7A-5W4K]; DeMuth & Greve, supra note 
32, at 561–63. 
 105. See Saturno, supra note 102, at 1–3 & tbl.1 (2019) (counting only those funding 
gaps for which there was at least one full day without budget authority). 
 106. Id. at 3 tbl.1; see also Josh Hicks, How Much Did the Shutdown Cost the Economy?, 
Wash. Post (Oct. 18, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/federal-eye/wp/20 
13/10/18/how-much-did-the-shutdown-cost-the-economy (on file with the Columbia Law 
Review) (detailing the cost of the 2013 shutdown). 
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running.107 Both shutdowns and temporary funding impose significant 
costs on agencies—disrupting activities and creating uncertainty that 
makes it difficult for agencies to plan effectively.108 
2. Presidential Administration and Appropriations. — Eloise Pasachoff has 
described in detail the many ways in which the ordinary budget drafting 
and execution processes allow the President, through OMB, to wield 
significant power over agency policy and push presidential priorities.109 
Even so, multiple scholars and budget participants report that Presidents 
are now exercising more control over federal spending than at any point 
in the recent past.110 This is part of a broader recent trend toward 
presidential administration and greater presidential control over adminis-
trative government.111 Deepening partisan polarization is also an instigat-
ing factor here, making Presidents both less able to push their agendas 
through Congress and more committed on partisan grounds to advancing 
certain policies.112 
President Trump’s transfer of appropriated funds to build the 
southern border wall is exhibit A of such enhanced presidential control.113 
                                                                                                                           
 107. Continuing resolutions have been used every fiscal year since FY1998 and their 
period of use generally increased over the period FY1998–FY2020. McClanahan et al., supra 
note 72, at 12–13 tbl.3; see also id. at 10 (noting that no appropriation bills were enacted 
before the start of the fiscal year fifteen times in the period FY1978–FY2010, with ten of 
those instances happening since FY2001). 
 108. On the costs of shutdowns, see U.S. Senate, Perm. Subcomm. on Investigations, 
The True Cost of Shutdowns 31, 45, 172 (2019); Brass et al., supra note 101, at 13–19, 25–
36. On the costs of temporary funding, see U.S. Gov’t Accountability Off., GAO-18-368T, 
Continuing Resolutions and Other Budget Uncertainties Present Management Challenges 
4–6 (2018) (statement of Heather Krause, Dir., Strategic Issues), https://www.gao.gov/
assets/690/689914.pdf [https://perma.cc/5X8A-Q5ER]; U.S. Gov’t Accountability Off., 
GAO-09-879, Continuing Resolutions: Uncertainty Limited Management Options and 
Increased Work Load in Selected Agencies 24–25 (2009), https://www.gao.gov/assets/300/
295970.pdf [https://perma.cc/V84Y-TF5E]; Philip G. Joyce, IBM Ctr. for Bus. of Gov’t, The 
Costs of Budget Uncertainty: Analyzing the Impact of Late Appropriations 20–29 (2012), 
http://www.businessofgovernment.org/sites/default/files/The%20Costs%20of%20Budge
t%20Uncertainty.pdf [https://perma.cc/SGB8-9UMX]. 
 109. Pasachoff, The President’s Budget, supra note 24, at 2186; see also Lewis, supra 
note 56, at 10–15 (discussing OMB efforts to influence agency spending and instances when 
presidential influence is likely to be strong). 
 110. Emily Cochrane, As Trump Seizes Wall Money, Congress’s Spending Power 
Weakens, N.Y. Times (Feb. 21, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/21/us/politics/
congress-spending-trump-wall.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review). 
 111. See Jerry L. Mashaw & David Berke, Presidential Administration in a Regime of 
Separated Powers: An Analysis of Recent American Experience, 35 Yale J. on Regul. 549, 
605–07 (2018); Kathryn A. Watts, Controlling Presidential Control, 114 Mich. L. Rev. 683, 
692–706 (2016). 
 112. See Mashaw & Berke, supra note 111, at 561–62; Gillian E. Metzger, Agencies, 
Polarization, and the States, 115 Colum. L. Rev. 1739, 1752–57 (2015). 
 113. See supra text accompanying notes 4–8. 
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The FY2019 appropriations bill that ended the 2018–2019 shutdown pro-
vided $1.375 billion for “construction of primary pedestrian fencing . . . in 
the Rio Grande Valley Sector,” whereas Trump had requested $5.7 billion 
for a steel wall along the full border.114 After signing the bill, Trump 
immediately declared a national emergency and claimed authority to 
redirect up to $8.1 billion that had been appropriated for other purposes 
to constructing the wall, with the DOD being the main source of the addi-
tional funds.115 Among the statutes that the Administration cited for this 
authority, Section 8005 of the FY2019 DOD Appropriations Act empow-
ered the Secretary of Defense, upon determining “that such action is nec-
essary in the national interest,” to transfer up to $4 billion among DOD’s 
appropriations accounts, provided certain conditions were met.116 Under 
longstanding norms, agencies obtain approval from their appropriations 
subcommittees before going ahead with a transfer, but here DOD went 
ahead in the face of disapproval from both the House Appropriations and 
Armed Services Committees. A joint resolution terminating the emer-
gency declaration passed both houses of Congress twice, but both times it 
was vetoed by the President.117 DOD initially transferred $1.8 billion to be 
used for border wall construction and subsequently committed additional 
amounts, invoking other transfer and reprogramming authority.118 In one 
of his first executive actions upon assuming office, President Biden issued 
an executive order terminating the national emergency and calling for a 
pause in wall construction, a review of the wall’s funding, and a plan for 
redirecting funds.119 
Presidents use their control over budget execution to advance their 
policy interests in other ways than reprogramming appropriated funds. 
                                                                                                                           
 114. Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2019, Pub. L. No. 116-6, § 230(a)(1), 133 Stat. 
13, 28; Marianne Levine & Quint Forgey, White House Asks Congress for $5.7 Billion for 
‘Steel Barrier’, Politico (Jan. 6, 2019), https://www.politico.com/story/2019/01/06/trump 
-emergency-border-wall-government-shutdown-1082712 [https://perma.cc/FQ7A-5NLR]. 
 115. Proclamation No. 9844, 84 Fed. Reg. 4949, 4949–50 (Feb. 15, 2019); President 
Donald J. Trump’s Border Security Victory, White House (Feb. 15, 2019), https://trump
whitehouse.archives.gov/briefings-statements/president-donald-j-trumps-border-security-
victory [https://perma.cc/N6R2-JF5Y]. 
 116. Department of Defense and Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education 
Appropriations Act, 2019 and Continuing Appropriations Act, 2019 (CAA), Pub. L. No. 115-
245, § 8005, 132 Stat. 2981, 2999 (2018). 
 117. California v. Trump, 963 F.3d 926, 932 n.3 (9th Cir. 2020), cert. granted sub nom. 
Trump v. Sierra Club, 141 S. Ct. 618 (2020); GAO Red Book, GAO-16-464SP, supra note 53, 
ch. 2, at 46–47; see also Letter from Peter J. Visclosky, Rep., Ind., to David L. Norquist, 
Under Sec’y of Def., Comptroller, Dep’t of Def. (Mar. 26, 2019) (denying DOD’s request to 
reprogram funds for the border wall). 
 118. California v. Trump, 963 F.3d at 947 (noting the invocation of 10 U.S.C. § 2808 
(2018)); Eloise Pasachoff, The President’s Budget Powers in the Trump Era, in Executive 
Policymaking: The Role of the OMB in the Presidency 69, 80–82 (Meena Bose & Andrew 
Rudalevige eds., 2020) [hereinafter Pasachoff, Trump Era Budget Powers]. 
 119. See Proclamation No. 10142, 86 Fed. Reg. 7225, 7225–26 (Jan. 20, 2021). 
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During the 2018–2019 shutdown, the Trump Administration took a broad 
view of the extent to which nonessential personnel paid through annual 
appropriations could work to process payments funded through 
permanent appropriations without violating the Antideficiency Act.120 
Meanwhile, the Obama Administration implemented its deferred action 
initiative for parents of legal permanent residents and dreamers (DAPA) 
through the Customs and Immigration Service, which is funded almost 
entirely through fees. The effect was to immunize the initiative against 
congressional Republican efforts to stop it through an appropriations 
rider.121 Congress sometimes responds in kind, providing independent 
funding streams that exempt agencies from presidential budgetary over-
sight, albeit also from congressional appropriations control. A prominent 
recent example is the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), 
created in 2010, which by statute is entitled to the amount of funding from 
the Federal Reserve’s earnings that the CFPB Director deems reasonably 
necessary to carry out its responsibilities, up to a maximum percentage of 
the Federal Reserve’s own expenses.122 
Grant awards and conditions on federal spending are another key 
mechanism for presidential influence.123 Prominent uses of federal grants 
to push presidential policy occurred during the Obama Administration, a 
prime example being the Race to the Top Competitive Grant Program at 
the Department of Education.124 Although the American Reinvestment 
and Recovery Act provided $5 billion for competitive grants and innova-
tions awards in education, it left the specifics of how these funds were to 
be allotted largely to the Secretary of Education’s discretion.125 The result-
ant Race to the Top Program put a premium on grant applicants that 
adopted educational policy measures the Obama Administration favored 
and was effective in getting states and localities to adopt even controversial 
                                                                                                                           
 120. See Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union v. United States, Nos. 19-50 (RJL), 19-51 (RJL), 
19-62 (RJL), 2019 WL 266381, at *1 (D.D.C. Jan. 18, 2019); see also Am. Fed’n of Gov’t 
Emps. v. Rivlin, No. 95-2115 (EGS), 1995 WL 697236, at *1 (D.D.C. Nov. 17, 1995) 
(challenging a requirement that employees work without pay during the 1995–1996 
shutdowns). 
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Decentralization in Contemporary American Federalism, 64 Revue française de science 
politique (English ed.) 27, 38–39 (2014). 
 125. The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009: Saving and Creating Jobs 
and Reforming Education, U.S. Dep’t of Educ. (Mar. 7, 2009), https://www2.ed.gov/policy
/gen/leg/recovery/implementation.html [https://perma.cc/CBE8-9EMZ]. 
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policies, such as common state standards and expanding the number of 
charter schools.126 Loan programs can provide similar opportunities for 
exercise of executive branch control. The Obama Administration 
significantly expanded access to student loan forgiveness by taking 
advantage of a permanent appropriation for student loans.127 
The Trump Administration also sought to advance its policies through 
grant conditions, most notably by attaching new conditions on grants 
under the DOJ’s Edward Byrne Memorial Justice Assistance Grant (Byrne 
JAG) Program, the main source of federal criminal justice funding to states 
and localities.128 The new conditions were meant to assist the federal 
government in immigration law enforcement and curtail immigration 
sanctuary policies.129 Trump also suggested that any federal funds to help 
states and localities with the fiscal impact of COVID-19 might be condi-
tioned on revoking sanctuary policies.130 And the Trump Administration 
imposed new conditions on grants under the competitive grant Teen 
Pregnancy Prevention Program (TPPP).131 
On the flip side, Presidents also exert control by refusing to spend 
appropriated funds at odds with presidential policies. Although prior 
Presidents had occasionally “impounded” funds in this fashion, President 
Nixon developed the practice into a high art, impounding tens of billions 
of appropriated funds and triggering enactment of the ICA.132 Both 
President George W. Bush and President Obama proposed few deferrals 
and no rescissions, but President Trump was more active. In 2018, he 
proposed $15 billion in rescissions targeting foreign aid, which Congress 
rejected on a bipartisan basis, and in the last week of his presidency he 
proposed an additional $27.4 billion in rescissions that President Biden 
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(2011); Grover J. “Russ” Whitehurst, Did Congress Authorize Race to the Top?, Brookings 
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280 (3d Cir. 2019) (describing the conditions). 
 130. Justin Wise, Trump Suggests Coronavirus Funding for States Could Be Tied to 
Sanctuary City Policies, Hill (Apr. 28, 2020), https://thehill.com/homenews/admini 
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rma.cc/2RMX-SFG9]. 
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quickly reversed.133 Far more high profile was the Trump Administration’s 
delay in releasing hundreds of millions of dollars Congress appropriated 
in military aid for Ukraine.134 The Trump Administration also withheld 
funds appropriated to assist Puerto Rico and the WHO.135 
3. Appropriations Litigation. — Appropriations matters are often 
thought of primarily in terms of the political branches. But they are 
increasingly showing up in court, with many of the developments detailed 
above prompting litigation. 
As mentioned, both the ACA risk corridor appropriations rider and 
President Trump’s border wall funds transfer have surfaced at the 
Supreme Court and also triggered substantial litigation in lower courts.136 
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After the Obama Administration’s effort to fund cost-sharing through a 
permanent appropriation was enjoined, numerous insurers sued success-
fully in the Court of Claims to recover the unpaid cost-sharing payments.137 
A number of federal defendants charged with marijuana crimes have also 
succeeded in enjoining their prosecutions after Congress enacted an 
appropriations rider prohibiting expenditure of appropriated DOJ funds 
in a way that would prevent states from implementing their medical 
marijuana laws.138 
Many lawsuits were also filed by states and localities challenging the 
new Byrne JAG conditions. Most district and appellate courts held that the 
Trump Administration lacked statutory authorization for the new 
conditions, concluding that the conditions were at odds with the plain 
meaning of the underlying statute and with the Byrne JAG’s status as a 
formula grant program rather than one where awards are left to agency 
discretion.139 However, the Second Circuit upheld the conditions, creating 
a circuit split.140 Several courts have similarly invalidated the Trump 
Administration’s new conditions on TPPP grants, unanimously conclud-
ing that at least some of the new conditions violate the plain meaning of 
the program’s authorizing statute.141 
Shutdowns and temporary funding measures, on the other hand, 
have provoked relatively little litigation.142 During the lengthy 2018–2019 
shutdown, government employees required to work without pay sued, 
claiming inter alia that the government was violating the Antideficiency 
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Health & Hum. Servs., 337 F. Supp. 3d 308, 320–24 (S.D.N.Y. 2018). 
 142. One reason is no doubt that the frequently short duration of shutdowns sometimes 
leads suits that are filed to be declared moot once the shutdown ends. See, e.g., Atlas Brew 
Works, LLC v. Barr, 391 F. Supp. 3d 6, 9 (D.D.C. 2019), aff’d, 820 F. App’x 4, 5 (D.C. Cir. 
2020). 
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Act by reading its emergency exception too broadly.143 That claim might 
well have legs on the merits; GAO subsequently held that some of the 
Trump Administration’s excepted employee determinations violated the 
Act.144 Not surprisingly, however, the district court was unwilling to second 
guess agency determinations about which employees were needed on an 
emergency basis to protect human safety and property.145 On the other 
hand, the Court of Federal Claims held that employees forced to work 
without pay during the 2013 shutdown were owed damages under the Fair 
Labor Standards Act, notwithstanding that the Antideficiency Act 
precluded the government from paying their wages.146 Contractors have 
also brought administrative claims to recoup costs imposed by shutdowns, 
with their success often turning on the nature of their contracts and the 
presence of particular clauses.147 Still, despite these occasional suits for 
compensation, shutdowns and reliance on temporary spending remain 
predominantly political events. 
This lack of litigation is also true of impoundments. Agency efforts to 
withhold appropriated funds occasionally lead to suits but not violations 
of the ICA.148 Instead, administrations have generally released the funds at 
issue in the face of congressional outcry or a GAO finding of an ICA viola-
tion.149 In January 2020, GAO determined that the hold on Ukraine’s 
                                                                                                                           
 143. See supra note 120 and accompanying text. 
 144. Nat’l Archives & Recs. Admin.—Publ’n of Fed. Reg. During the Fiscal Year 2019 
Lapse in Appropriations, B-331091, 2020 WL 4013489, at *1 (Comp. Gen. July 16, 2020) 
(concluding that publications in the Federal Register violated the Act); see also U.S. Dep’t 
of the Treasury—Tax Return Activities During the Fiscal Year 2019 Lapse in Appropriations, 
B-331093, 2019 WL 5390179, at *1 (Comp. Gen. Oct. 22, 2019) (finding that using annually 
funded employees to process tax returns violated the Act). 
 145. Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union v. United States, Nos. 19-50 (RJL), 19-51 (RJL), 19-62 
(RJL), 2019 WL 266381, at *2 (D.D.C. Jan. 18, 2019); see also Am. Fed’n of Gov’t Emps. v. 
Rivlin, No. 95-2115 (EGS), 1995 WL 697236, at *4 (D.D.C. Nov. 17, 1995) (denying 
plaintiffs’ motion for a temporary restraining order during the 1995–1996 shutdowns 
because it was still unclear “how much deference, if any, . . . the court [should] afford to 
the Executive Branch’s construction and interpretation of the relevant statutes and 
regulations”). 
 146. Martin v. United States, 130 Fed. Cl. 578, 584–85 (2017). 
 147. Compare Cleveland Telecomms. Corp. v. United States, 39 Fed. Cl. 649, 650 (1997) 
(holding that the contractor “should bear the risk of the unforeseen furlough” under a firm 
fixed-price contract), with Raytheon STX Corp. v. Dep’t of Com., GSBCA No. 14296-COM, 
00-1 BCA P 30632 (1999) (determining that “cost-reimbursement contracts obligate the 
Government to bear the increased costs attributable to the shutdown”). See generally 
Darrell Curren, Note, Government Contracting in the Shadow of the October 2013 
Shutdown, 44 Pub. Cont. L.J. 349 (2015) (reviewing “the use of risk allocation clauses in the 
different types of contracts used between the government and contractors”). 
 148. E.g., In re Aiken County, 725 F.3d 255, 259–60 (D.C. Cir. 2013); see infra notes 
258–261. 
 149. See, e.g., Impoundment of the Advanced Research Projects Agency–Energy 
Appropriation Resulting from Legislative Proposals in the President’s Budget Request for 
Fiscal Year 2018, B-329092, 2017 WL 6335684, at *1 (Comp. Gen. Dec. 12, 2017); U.S. Gov’t 
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funds violated the ICA, rejecting OMB’s claim that it was simply an 
acceptable programmatic delay.150 According to GAO, the hold was under-
taken to advance President Trump’s policy goals, not because of some 
external factor, and as a result represented a prohibited policy deferral.151 
II. THE MARGINALIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS IN PUBLIC LAW DOCTRINE 
Viewed cumulatively, these phenomena demonstrate the contempo-
rary prominence of appropriations as a tool of government control, as well 
as the extent to which current appropriations and budget practices are 
deviating from the past regular order. These examples also show how 
appropriations issues are spilling over into court. It is increasingly appar-
ent that appropriations are playing a starring role in the contemporary 
administrative state that lawyers cannot ignore. 
Yet despite their importance, appropriations are marginalized in pub-
lic law doctrine. This is particularly true of constitutional and administra-
tive law doctrines and litigation, where appropriations are often ignored 
or given little weight. Appropriations arise more frequently in statutory 
interpretation case law but still are often downplayed in their import. And 
while public law in the political branches engages with appropriations 
extensively, marginalization is arguably evident here too, as political polar-
ization and legislative–executive disputes increasingly push established 
appropriations measures to the sidelines. 
The term marginalization often carries a negative connotation, and 
the discussion here identifies several analytic flaws underlying the lack of 
attention to appropriations in public law doctrine. But as Parts III and IV 
make clear, whether appropriations’ doctrinal marginalization is problem-
atic is a hard question that cannot be determined in gross. The focus in 
this Part is simply on demonstrating the many ways in which such doctrinal 
exclusion of appropriations occurs. 
A. The How of Marginalization 
Literally conveying being pushed to the margins or sidelines, to be 
marginalized means to be “relegate[d] . . . to an unimportant or powerless 
                                                                                                                           
Accountability Off., Impoundment Control Act: Use and Impact of Rescission Procedures 2 
(1999) (statement of Gary L. Kepplinger, Assoc. Gen. Couns., Off. of Gen. Couns.), 
https://www.gao.gov/assets/110/108076.pdf [https://perma.cc/5LVS-4CW8] (noting funds 
generally released and that GAO had filed suit only once). 
 150. Off. of Mgmt. & Budget—Withholding of Ukr. Sec. Assistance, B-331564, 2020 WL 
241373, at *7 (Comp. Gen. Jan. 16, 2020) (concluding that the hold was undertaken to 
advance President Trump’s policy goals, not because of some external factor, and as a result 
represented a prohibited policy deferral); Letter from Mark R. Paoletta to Tom Armstrong, 
supra note 134, at 9. 
 151. Withholding of Ukr. Sec. Assistance, 2020 WL 241373, at *7. 
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position.”152 Several distinct mechanisms of appropriations marginaliza-
tion repeat across the doctrines discussed below. As a result, an initial tax-
onomy of the different forms that appropriations marginalization takes is 
in order. Such a taxonomy helps not only to identify the shared marginal-
ization dynamic linking these varying doctrines but also to underscore that 
marginalization in doctrine and marginalization in practice are distinct 
phenomena. Sometimes these two phenomena overlap, but sometimes the 
effect of appropriations’ doctrinal marginalization is actually to expand 
their real-world import. 
1. Exceptionalism, Silence, Assimilation, and Jurisdictional Exclusion. — A 
first form of marginalization is what we might call appropriations 
exceptionalism, or the application of legal rules that are specific to appro-
priations. Examples span the areas of doctrine detailed below, from the 
singling out of appropriations for different constitutional and procedural 
requirements that apply to regulation, to the frequent barriers to judicial 
review of appropriations actions, to the imposition of special canons for 
interpreting appropriations measures. Although appropriations are 
thereby pushed to the edges of standard public law doctrines, whether they 
are marginalized in the sense of being rendered unimportant depends on 
the specific substantive rules to which they are then subject. 
A second approach, appropriations silence, is diametrically opposite. 
Rather than fashioning new legal requirements because of appropriations’ 
distinct features, this technique stands out for not taking heed of 
appropriations. Sometimes courts ignore appropriations altogether, while 
other times courts assimilate appropriations to existing legal doctrines 
without considering whether those rules fit the appropriations context. It 
is worth noting, however, that not all appropriations assimilation takes the 
form of appropriations silence. In some instances, courts explain why they 
are subjecting appropriations measures to standard legal rules. The dis-
tinctive trait of appropriations silence, by contrast, is that courts fail to 
engage with appropriations or to discuss whether the fact that appropria-
tions are involved should affect the legal analysis. This distinction matters 
because such express appropriations assimilation is not necessarily a man-
ifestation of appropriations marginalization; appropriations are neither 
pushed to the sidelines nor ignored but instead engaged with by courts 
and treated as part of standard public law. Instead, like appropriations 
exceptionalism, whether express appropriations assimilation ends up mar-
ginalizing appropriations will turn on the reasons the court gives for assim-
ilating appropriations and the impact of such assimilation in practice. 
The final approach is jurisdictional exclusion. A striking array of 
jurisdictional obstacles either preclude bringing appropriations claims in 
court or at least allow such claims to be excluded. Such jurisdictional 
exclusion sometimes takes the form of appropriations exceptionalism, 
                                                                                                                           
 152. Marginalize, Merriam-Webster, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/ 
marginalize [https://perma.cc/7L54-KSSX] (last visited Jan. 15, 2021). 
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with efforts to challenge appropriations measures or actions facing unique 
barriers to judicial review. Sometimes, however, jurisdictional exclusion 
results from appropriations silence and assimilation. For example, given 
the frequent generalized aspect of appropriations and the fact that appro-
priations statutes are primarily geared to funding agencies, application of 
standard standing or zone of interests requirements may serve to exclude 
appropriations challenges from courts.153 
2. Marginalization in Doctrine Versus Marginalization in Practice. — As 
this description of the different methods of marginalization highlights, the 
focus in what follows is primarily on appropriations’ marginalization in 
doctrine. Sometimes doctrinal marginalization also serves to limit the 
impact an appropriations measure has in practice, but that is not always 
the case. On the contrary, some forms of doctrinal marginalization can 
operate to enhance the potency of appropriations as a governance tool. 
This variation between doctrine and practical effect results in large part 
because doctrinal marginalization can allow appropriations to operate 
with fewer judicially enforceable legal constraints. Hence, not surprisingly 
it is doctrinal marginalization of the jurisdictional exclusion variety that is 
most likely to expand the practical import of an appropriations measure. 
Other forms of marginalization are less clearly identified with particular 
practical outcomes—at times enhancing the power of an appropriations 
measure and at times undermining it. 
But generalizations here are easily misleading. In particular, it would 
be a mistake to conclude that freeing appropriations from judicially 
enforceable constraints enhances the potency of appropriations across the 
board. Although jurisdictional exclusion makes appropriations a particu-
larly powerful tool for the President and the executive branch, the effect 
on Congress is mixed. Congress similarly benefits from preserving flexibil-
ity in appropriations and from being able to wield its political influence 
without risk of judicial interference, but jurisdictional obstacles also limit 
Congress’s ability to rely on courts to enforce statutory appropriations 
requirements on a recalcitrant executive branch. These variations—
between doctrine and practice, and in the positions of the two political 
branches—make it necessary to consider appropriations’ status in political 
branch public law as well as in public law doctrine. This Part undertakes 
both. 
                                                                                                                           
 153. See infra text accompanying notes 175–183; see also Hein v. Freedom from 
Religion Found., Inc., 551 U.S. 587, 599–607, 609–10 (2007) (rejecting taxpayer standing to 
challenge an executive branch funding decision for violating the Establishment Clause and 
distinguishing precedent allowing taxpayer standing to challenge appropriations statutes on 
this ground); see also id. at 618 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (arguing that 
precedent should be repudiated and no taxpayer standing be allowed). 
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B. Appropriations and Constitutional Law 
As the contemporary disputes noted above underscore, appropria-
tions are central to the separation of powers in practice, and courts 
frequently invoke the appropriations power as a tool Congress can use to 
control the President.154 Nonetheless, much separation of powers case law 
ignores appropriations altogether or pushes appropriations matters out of 
the courts’ purview. 
1. Delegation. — A good place to start is with delegation. Challenges to 
congressional delegations as unconstitutional grants of legislative author-
ity to the executive branch are the “Energizer Bunny” of the separation of 
powers; notwithstanding longstanding precedent repeatedly knocking 
down such challenges, they continue to be made.155 Indeed, delegation 
challenges appear to be gaining traction. In Gundy v. United States, Justice 
Gorsuch criticized the Court’s current approach to delegation, under 
which a delegation is constitutional provided Congress provides an “intel-
ligible principle,” very loosely defined, to guide executive decisionmak-
ing.156 At issue in Gundy was a provision of the Sex Offender Registration 
and Notification Act (SORNA) that authorized the Attorney General “to 
specify the applicability” of the Act’s sex offender registration require-
ments to individuals convicted before SORNA was adopted and “prescribe 
rules for [their] registration.”157 Writing for himself, Chief Justice Roberts, 
and Justice Thomas, Gorsuch argued that this provision was an unconsti-
tutional delegation because it allowed the Attorney General to make 
“unbounded policy choices” about whether and how SORNA would apply 
to pre-Act offenders.158 Although a plurality of the Court upheld the pro-
vision under the intelligible principle test in an opinion written by Justice 
Kagan,159 Justice Alito separately voiced his willingness to reconsider the 
nondelegation doctrine, as did Justice Kavanaugh after he joined the 
Court.160 
                                                                                                                           
 154. For a recent example, see Comm. on the Judiciary v. McGahn, 951 F.3d 510, 528–
29 (D.C. Cir. 2020), vacated en banc, 968 F.3d 755 (D.C. Cir. 2020). 
 155. Gary Lawson, Delegation and Original Meaning, 88 Va. L. Rev. 327, 330 (2002); 
see also Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2129 (2019) (plurality opinion) (Kagan, J.) 
(reviewing precedent). 
 156. Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2138–40 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). 
 157. 34 U.S.C. § 20913 (2018). SORNA was part of the Adam Walsh Child Protection 
and Safety Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-248, 120 Stat. 587 (codified at 34 U.S.C. § 20911 
(2018)). 
 158. Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2132–33 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). 
 159. See id. at 2129 (plurality opinion) (Kagan, J.). 
 160. See id. at 2131 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment) (signaling support for 
reconsidering “the approach we have taken [to nondelegation] for the past 84 years”); Paul 
v. United States, 140 S. Ct. 342, 342 (2019) (Kavanaugh, J., statement on the denial of 
certiorari) (“Justice Gorsuch’s scholarly analysis of the Constitution’s nondelegation 
doctrine . . . may warrant further consideration in future cases.”). 
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Interestingly, in concluding that the delegation at issue in Gundy was 
unconstitutionally broad, Justice Gorsuch considered only the text of 
SORNA itself.161 Justice Kagan similarly focused only on SORNA, among 
other things describing detailed statements in SORNA’s legislative history 
indicating that members of Congress were particularly concerned with 
registering 100,000 past offenders who had not complied with existing 
registration requirements.162 In so doing, both Gorsuch and Kagan were 
in good company; the Court’s prior delegation precedents similarly look 
only at the organic or substantive statute authorizing the agency action in 
question.163 More specifically, these cases are prime examples of appropri-
ations silence—they do not look to see if Congress has appropriated funds 
or authorized appropriations for the action the agency took. Yet if 
congressional determination of policy is the concern, then action taken by 
Congress to fund or authorize funding for the agency’s policy should be 
relevant.164 
In the case of SORNA, Congress has not specifically addressed the 
registration of pre-Act offenders in its appropriations legislation or subse-
quent authorization of appropriations. But since 2007, it has regularly ap-
propriated substantial sums for SORNA implementation, including up to 
$20 million annually for sex offender management assistance and up to 
$50 million for the U.S. Marshals Service to assist in enforcing registration 
requirements.165 The Attorney General’s final guidelines on registration 
by pre-Act offenders were issued in 2009. Hearings and reports held in 
2008 and 2009 make clear that Congress was monitoring sex offender reg-
istration efforts and aware that the registration requirements were being 
                                                                                                                           
 161. See Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2131–32 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). 
 162. Id. at 2126–29 (plurality opinion) (Kagan, J.). 
 163. E.g., Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 473–76 (2001). 
 164. See Jonathan H. Adler & Christopher J. Walker, Delegation and Time, 105 Iowa L. 
Rev. 1931, 1956–57, 1966, 1979–80 (2020) (identifying periodic enactment of legislation 
authorizing appropriations as a means of addressing concerns raised by delegation, 
although arguing that limitations of the appropriations process mean that enactment of 
appropriations measures alone is not enough to address delegation concerns). 
 165. E.g., Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-31, div. B, tit. II, 131 
Stat. 135, 204 (appropriating $20 million for state and local sex-offender-management 
assistance and $1 million for a national registry); Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008, 
Pub. L. No. 110-161, div. B, tit. II, 121 Stat. 1844, 1911 (2007) (appropriating roughly $4.2 
million for sex offender management); William J. Krouse, Celinda Franco & Nathan James, 
Cong. Rsch. Serv., RL34530, Department of Justice (DOJ) Appropriations for FY2008 and 
FY2009, at 14, 27 (Aug. 1, 2008) (noting the allocation of $50 million in funding for U.S. 
Marshals to enforce the Adam Walsh Act and other sex offender enforcement funding); 
Garrine P. Laney, Cong. Rsch. Serv., RL32800, Sex Offender Registration and Community 
Notification Law: Recent Legislation and Issues 1–3, 30–32 (June 3, 2008) (describing 
proposed and enacted legislation on sex offenders and noting funding amounts). 
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applied retroactively.166 Despite being aware of the Attorney General’s ap-
plication of SORNA and enacting legislation annually to fund SORNA 
registration and enforcement, Congress never precluded the Attorney 
General from using appropriated funds to register pre-Act offenders. To 
the contrary, language in appropriations subcommittee reports from 
FY2009 to FY2011 repeatedly voiced disappointment that the Obama 
Administration did not request additional funds so that the U.S. Marshals 
Service could address the “estimated caseload of 100,000 noncompliant 
sex offenders.”167 These were the same 100,000 past offenders that Justice 
Kagan flagged as of particular concern to Congress in enacting SORNA 
and that would only be subject to SORNA’s requirements if the Attorney 
General applied SORNA retroactively. In addition, the conference 
reports—reflecting the views of both houses—signaled that Congress 
intended the Administration to be, if anything, more aggressive in enforc-
ing SORNA with respect to these individuals, specifically recommending 
that additional funds of $20 million and more be spent to reduce the case-
load of noncompliant offenders.168 
In short, Congress not only appropriated significant funds to support 
federal enforcement of SORNA well aware that the Attorney General had 
                                                                                                                           
 166. See Sex Offender Notification and Registration Act (SORNA): Barriers to Timely 
Compliance by States, Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland 
Sec. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 1–3, 51, 57–58, 158 (2009); Commerce, 
Justice, Science, and Related Agencies Appropriations for Fiscal Year 2008: Hearing on H.R. 
3093 and S. 1745 Before the Subcomm. on Comm., Just., Sci. & Related Agencies of S. 
Comm. on Appropriations, 110th Cong. 290 (2007) (statement of Sen. Richard Shelby) (“As 
many as 100,000 [sex offenders] are not in compliance with their registry requirements . . . . 
How long would it take the [U.S. Marshals] Service to fully enforce this law, and what kind 
of resources would be required?”). 
 167. H.R. Rep. No. 110-919, at 49–50 (2008) (“The Committee is disappointed that the 
Administration did not request funds for the Marshals to execute their responsibilities 
under the Adam Walsh . . . Act. Although this legislation was passed in 2006, the Marshals 
still have no significant resources dedicated to addressing an estimated caseload of 100,000 
noncompliant sex offenders.”); see also S. Rep. No. 111-34, at 61 (2009) (noting the same 
concern that the U.S. Marshals Service would need substantially greater resources to “fulfill 
its Adam Walsh Act responsibilities” but not invoking the 100,000 number); H.R. Rep. No. 
111-149, at 60–61 (2009) (“If the Marshals are going to make a significant impact on the 
estimated caseload of 100,000 non-compliant sex offenders, a concerted, multiyear effort to 
dedicate additional resources to the program is necessary.”); S. Rep. No. 110-397, at 51 
(2008) (“The Committee is deeply concerned that the administration has failed to request 
resources to carry out this act.”). In FY2011, the relevant Senate subcommittee raised its 
estimate of noncompliant offenders to 135,000. S. Rep. No. 111-229, at 57 (2010). 
 168. See H.R. Rep. No. 111-366, at 665 (2009) (Conf. Rep.) (“The conference 
agreement includes an increase of $27,500,000 over the budget request to expand Adam 
Walsh Act enforcement activities in districts across the country.”); see also S. Rep. No. 111-
34, at 61 (recommending an increase of $35 million); H.R. Rep. No. 111-149, at 61 (“[T]he 
Committee’s recommendation includes $20,000,000 to expand Adam Walsh Act 
enforcement . . . .”). 
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applied registration requirements retroactively, it repeatedly recom-
mended allocating more money specifically to expand enforcement of 
SORNA against past offenders. True, these actions do not take the form of 
an express statutory endorsement of the Attorney General’s approach. But 
they surely call into question any suggestion that the Attorney General ap-
plied SORNA to pre-Act offenders without congressional sanction. None-
theless, the opinions in Gundy—and the briefs—all ignored these appro-
priations actions entirely. Moreover, in a rare recent instance when claims 
were made that Congress had sanctioned agency action through appropri-
ations—involving the actions of the Federal Housing Finance Authority 
(FHFA) with respect to the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie 
Mae) and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac) 
during the last financial crisis—the Fifth Circuit en banc was highly 
resistant to the suggestion of such appropriations ratification.169 
2. Article III. — When it comes to Article III, the marginalization of 
appropriations is baked into the doctrine. This is particularly true with 
respect to challenges arguing that Article III is violated by adjudication 
occurring outside of federal courts. Traditionally, Article III adjudication 
was not required for matters of public right, which centrally included dis-
putes over public funds. Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 
the paradigmatic case in which Article III adjudication was held to be not 
required on public right grounds, involved a federal customs collector 
found to owe the government over $1.3 million after an administrative 
audit.170 Over the course of the twentieth century, the Supreme Court 
moved away from giving the presence of a public right such talismanic 
importance, but more recent jurisprudence has returned to drawing a 
strict doctrinal divide between public and private rights in determining 
whether Article III adjudication is required.171 In a similar vein, sovereign 
immunity doctrine operates to bar suits for money from the federal gov-
ernment without its consent. As Congress has tied its consent to being sued 
to certain venues, those seeking wrongfully withheld funds are often 
forced to sue in the Court of Federal Claims rather than ordinary district 
courts.172 
                                                                                                                           
 169. Collins v. Mnuchin, 938 F.3d 553, 572–73 (5th Cir. 2019) (en banc), cert. granted, 
141 S. Ct. 193 (2020). 
 170. 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272, 275 (1856). 
 171. Compare Oil States Energy Servs., LLC v. Greene’s Energy Grp., LLC, 138 S. Ct. 
1365, 1373 (2018) (“When determining whether a proceeding involves an exercise of 
Article III judicial power, this Court’s precedents have distinguished between ‘public rights’ 
and ‘private rights.’”), with Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 
853–54 (1986) (“[T]his Court has rejected any attempt to make determinative for Article 
III purposes the distinction between public rights and private rights . . . .”). 
 172. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., John F. Manning, Daniel J. Meltzer & David L. Shapiro, 
Hart and Wechsler’s The Federal Courts and the Federal System 89–90 (7th ed. 2015) 
[hereinafter Hart & Wechsler]. 
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This exemption from Article III is a form of appropriations exception-
alism, with the Court expressly invoking the fact that government funds 
are involved as a reason why Article III adjudication is not required and 
may even be precluded.173 On the other hand, the public rights doctrine 
is not limited to instances of appropriations but applies more broadly to 
civil adjudication in which the government is a party or the right at issue 
“is integrally related to particular Federal Government action.”174 In that 
sense, the exemption of public funds disputes from the mandatory scope 
of Article III can also be viewed as simply the assimilation of appropriations 
matters into a broader category for which Article III adjudication is 
optional, rather than as an instance of appropriations-specific exception-
alism. Either way, the net result is to push some adjudication of appropri-
ations disputes to the Article III sidelines. 
A further sign of appropriations marginalization under Article III 
comes from case law on standing. Courts regularly find that entities and 
individuals who claim a right to funds under a statute, or even a right to 
compete for funds, have standing to challenge executive branch actions 
that operate to deny them those funds.175 But establishing standing to 
challenge government uses of funds or grants to third parties, without also 
claiming a right to the funds in question, is more difficult.176 Courts can 
be skeptical of plaintiffs’ claims of particularized injury and causality in 
such appropriations contexts.177 Litigants sometimes resort to asserting 
their interests as taxpayers, but the Court has repeatedly held that “[a]s a 
general matter, the interest of a federal taxpayer in seeing that Treasury 
                                                                                                                           
 173. See Murray’s Lessee, 59 U.S. (18 How.) at 281–84; Haines v. Fed. Motor Carrier 
Safety Admin., 814 F.3d 417, 425–26 (6th Cir. 2016) (explaining that federal sovereign 
immunity bars suit for money damages in federal district court). 
 174. Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462, 489–91 (2011). 
 175. See, e.g., Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 429–36 (1998); Planned 
Parenthood of Greater Wash. & N. Idaho v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., 946 F.3d 
1100, 1109 (9th Cir. 2020). This ability of individuals to sue for money they were entitled to 
by law was established implicitly in Kendall v. United States ex rel. Stokes, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 
524, 623–26 (1838), which affirmed a writ of mandamus ordering the postmaster general to 
pay out money owed to the plaintiffs. 
 176. See Sohoni, supra note 32, at 1706–07. 
 177. See, e.g., Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 740 (1984) (rejecting standing to challenge 
the IRS’s grant of tax-exempt status to racially discriminatory schools on the ground that 
the plaintiffs did not show that this grant of financial benefits had harmed their children’s 
access to desegregated schools and that the injury of funding racially discriminatory schools 
was too generalized); El Paso County v. Trump, 982 F.3d 332, 339–42 (5th Cir. 2020) 
(concluding that standing was lacking to challenge diverted appropriations because the 
alleged injury was too general, causation insufficiently direct, and redressability unclear). 
But see California v. Trump, 963 F.3d 926, 935–40 (9th Cir. 2020), cert. granted sub nom. 
Trump v. Sierra Club, 141 S. Ct. 618 (2020) (concluding that states met the tripartite 
standing requirements because the government’s use of funds to build the border wall 
harmed their environmental interests). 
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funds are spent in accordance with the Constitution does not give rise to 
the kind of redressable ‘personal injury’ required for Article III standing.”178 
To be sure, establishing standing based on claims of injury from the 
impact of government actions on third parties can be difficult outside the 
appropriations context as well.179 But these generalized injury and causa-
tion problems are especially predictable when it comes to appropriations, 
given appropriations’ programmatic aspect and the optional character of 
financial incentives. Yet courts silently assimilate appropriations to 
standard standing analysis, without addressing how well that analysis fits 
the appropriations realities. 
The appropriations context is also home to many disputes over 
congressional standing. In Raines v. Byrd, the Supreme Court held that 
individual members of Congress lacked standing to challenge the consti-
tutionality of the Line Item Veto Act, which authorized the President to 
cancel statutory provisions granting discretionary budget authority, direct 
spending, or limited tax relief within five days of enactment.180 Raines is 
striking in its refusal to take account of Congress’s constitutional role in 
appropriations, instead insisting that the case should be governed by the 
same standing rules that apply to private suits against governmental 
action.181 Recently, the en banc D.C. Circuit concluded that neither Raines 
nor subsequent Supreme Court case law addressing state legislative stand-
ing precluded the House of Representatives from suing to challenge the 
Trump Administration’s transfer of funds appropriated for other purposes 
to build the border wall.182 According to the D.C. Circuit, the House met 
the conventional requirements of standing because the transfer caused it 
a distinct institutional injury, in the form of the loss of its constitutionally 
protected power to prevent expenditures, that it could seek to redress in 
court.183 
3. Congressional and Presidential Powers. — Appropriations play a 
surprisingly tangential role in cases addressing the scope of congressional 
and presidential powers, given how central the congressional–presidential 
                                                                                                                           
 178. Hein v. Freedom from Religion Found., Inc., 551 U.S. 587, 599–600 (2007); see 
also United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 174–75 (1974) (rejecting a taxpayer’s effort 
to enforce the Appropriations Clause’s statement-and-account requirement to obtain a 
statement of the CIA’s expenditures). 
 179. See, e.g., Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561–62 (1992). 
 180. 521 U.S. 811, 829–30 (1997) (discussing 2 U.S.C. § 691(a) (1996)). 
 181. Id. at 820–21 (“[A]ppellees’ claim of standing is based on a loss of political power, 
not loss of any private right, which would make the injury more concrete.”). But see id. at 
841–42 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (finding that the “systematic nature of the harm” to the 
validity of the laws, including “all appropriations laws,” presented a stronger claim for 
justiciability than the majority observed). 
 182. See U.S. House of Representatives v. Mnuchin, 976 F.3d 1, 6–13 (D.C. Cir. 2020). 
 183. See id. at 8–9, rev’ing 379 F. Supp. 3d 8, 14–16, 18–19 (D.D.C. 2019) (holding in 
the district court that the House lacked standing to challenge President Trump’s transfer 
and reprogramming of military funds to build the border wall, relying heavily on Raines). 
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rivalry over spending is in practice to the balance of power between the 
branches. One of the rare instances of appropriations factoring into such 
assessments involves invocation of military appropriations as signaling con-
gressional sanction for presidentially initiated military activities. Although 
courts rarely review the constitutionality of presidential uses of force, sev-
eral decisions emphasized congressional appropriations in rejecting legal 
challenges to the Vietnam War.184 Congress subsequently stated in the War 
Powers Resolution that congressional authorization for the use of force 
shall not be inferred from “any provision of law . . . including any provi-
sion contained in any appropriation Act,” unless the provision specifically 
so states.185 Yet appropriations continue to factor into executive branch 
justifications for use of force and are occasionally identified by courts as 
reasons why challenges to military actions are nonjusticiable political 
questions.186 
Several leading separation of powers decisions have emerged from 
the appropriations and budget context. Strikingly, however, the Court 
engaged in appropriations silence and ignored the appropriations 
dimension of these cases, other than to note how appropriations provided 
the factual background of the dispute at hand. Clinton v. City of New York is 
a prime example.187 The Line Item Veto Act at issue there was inextricably 
tied to the appropriations process; not only did the Act authorize 
presidential vetoing of revenue and spending measures, but the Act 
emerged from concerns over Congress’s lack of budget discipline and 
prior battles over presidential impoundments of appropriated funds.188 Yet 
in holding the Act unconstitutional, the majority focused on the 
                                                                                                                           
 184. See, e.g., Orlando v. Laird, 443 F.2d 1039, 1042 & n.2 (2d Cir. 1971) (“Congress 
has ratified the executive’s initiatives by appropriating billions of dollars to carry out military 
operations in Southeast Asia . . . .”); see also Banks & Raven-Hansen, supra note 37, at 119 
(characterizing the Vietnam War appropriations as “legitimating,” from which “the 
executive infers authority for national security actions”). But see Mitchell v. Laird, 488 F.2d 
611, 615 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (“This court cannot be unmindful of what every schoolboy 
knows . . . . A Congressman wholly opposed to the war’s commencement and continuation 
might vote for the military appropriations . . . because he was unwilling to abandon without 
support men already fighting.”). 
 185. 50 U.S.C. § 1547(a)(1) (2018). 
 186. Campbell v. Clinton, 203 F.3d 19, 23 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (noting that Congress could 
end the United States’ involvement in Yugoslavia by “cut[ting] off funds for the American 
role in the conflict”); Authorization for Continuing Hostilities in Kos., 24 Op. O.L.C. 327, 
346–65 (2000) (discussing in detail whether appropriations have authorized the use of force 
and concluding that emergency supplemental appropriations for military operations in 
Kosovo had such an effect, even though a bill authorizing the action failed in Congress). 
 187. 524 U.S. 417 (1998). 
 188. See H.R. Rep. No. 104-491, at 15 (1996) (Conf. Rep.) (“This legislation . . . moves 
to meet [the demand for greater fiscal accountability] by enhancing the President’s ability 
to eliminate wasteful federal spending and to cancel special tax breaks.”); see also Clinton, 
524 U.S. at 449, 451 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (noting the relationship to excessive 
spending). 
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Constitution’s general bicameralism and presentment requirements for 
enacting legislation and did not address whether the appropriations 
context might affect how—or whether—those requirements apply.189 
Bowsher v. Synar similarly involved a budget measure, the Balanced 
Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, known as the Gramm–
Rudman–Hollings Act.190 It set maximum deficit amounts that declined 
over five years until reaching zero and directed the Comptroller General—
the head of GAO who was removable by a joint resolution by Congress—
to specify required spending reductions by program if the annual federal 
deficit exceeded the allowed amount, after reviewing reductions proposed 
by OMB and CBO.191 The arrangement was challenged as an 
unconstitutional exercise of congressional control over law execution.192 
Writing in dissent to uphold the measure, Justice White suggested that the 
fact appropriations were involved mattered to the analysis: 
Determining the level of spending by the Federal 
Government is not by nature a function central either to 
the exercise of the President’s enumerated powers or to 
his general duty to ensure execution of the laws; rather, 
appropriating funds is a peculiarly legislative function, and 
one expressly committed to Congress by Art. I, § 9 . . . . 
Delegating the execution of this legislation . . . to an 
officer independent of the President’s will does not 
deprive the President of any power that he would 
otherwise have or that is essential to the performance of 
the duties of his office.193 
But Justice White was a lone voice. A majority of the Court concluded 
that this scheme entailed Congress retaining control of an executive 
officer in violation of the separation of powers,194 while two concurring 
Justices held it was an instance of part of the legislative branch acting out-
side of the Constitution’s requirement of bicameralism and present-
ment.195 Neither opinion gave any attention to the fact that the appropri-
ations power was involved. 
                                                                                                                           
 189. Clinton, 524 U.S. at 438–40; see also id. at 440–41, 446–47 (briefly rejecting the 
relevance of the executive branch’s historical discretion over expenditures and the statute’s 
lockbox aspect). The dissenters gave more play to the appropriations background, arguing 
that the President’s discretion under the Act was “no broader than the discretion 
traditionally granted the President in his execution of spending laws.” Id. at 466–69 (Scalia, 
J., dissenting); id. at 470–71, 483 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 190. 478 U.S. 714, 717–18 (1986). 
 191. Id. 
 192. Id. at 719–21. 
 193. Id. at 763 (White, J., dissenting). 
 194. Id. at 733–34 (majority opinion). 
 195. Id. at 737 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
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Finally, appropriations largely have not factored into analysis of 
whether agencies are too insulated from presidential control. To begin 
with, unitary executive claims that the Constitution grants the President 
full control over all executive branch officers and decisionmaking rarely 
engage with the fact that Congress’s power of the purse allows it to impose 
quite detailed instructions on the executive branch.196 In addition, courts 
have given little consideration to whether an agency has access to inde-
pendent funding and what the impact of that budgetary independence 
might mean. Indeed, in Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Co. Accounting Oversight 
Board, the Court went beyond appropriations silence to expressly dismiss-
ing the significance of appropriations.197 There, Chief Justice Roberts’s 
majority opinion dismissed the fact that the budget of the Public Company 
Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) was entirely controlled by the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), deeming questions of “who 
controls the agency’s budget requests and funding” to be “bureaucratic 
minutiae” not relevant to the separation of powers challenge at hand.198 
There are signs that this exclusion of appropriations from jurispru-
dence on presidential power may be changing. Some courts invalidating 
the Trump Administration’s conditions on Byrne JAG grants held that the 
conditions violated the separation of powers,199 and the Ninth Circuit also 
raised separation of powers concerns in the border wall litigation.200 Even 
                                                                                                                           
 196. See Steven G. Calabresi & Kevin H. Rhodes, The Structural Constitution: Unitary 
Executive, Plural Judiciary, 105 Harv. L. Rev. 1153, 1183 n.149 (1992) (“Neither the unitary 
executive debate nor the jurisdiction-stripping debate has yet turned on the scope of 
Congress’s ability to use the appropriations power to undermine the separation of 
powers.”). For a rare discussion of the President’s spending dependence as a sign of limits 
on presidential control of the executive branch, see Saikrishna B. Prakash, Fragmented 
Features of the Constitution’s Unitary Executive, 45 Willamette L. Rev. 701, 702, 711–12 
(2009). 
 197. 561 U.S. 477 (2010). 
 198. Id. at 499–500, 504; see also id. at 524 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (noting that “who 
controls the agency’s budget requests and funding . . . [is] more likely to affect the 
President’s power to get something done” than a power of at-will removal but otherwise not 
mentioning appropriations); Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 660–63 (1988) (upholding 
the constitutionality of the independent counsel without discussing that the DOJ had to pay 
the counsel’s costs but could not control them, nor referencing the multiple provisions in 
the independent counsel statute specifying costs the counsel could incur); PHH Corp. v. 
Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 881 F.3d 75, 96 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (en banc) (“The CFPB’s 
independent funding source has no constitutionally salient effect on the President’s 
power.”), abrogated by Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 140 S. Ct. 2183 
(2020). 
 199. See City & County of San Francisco v. Trump, 897 F.3d 1225, 1231 (9th Cir. 2018); 
City of Philadelphia v. Sessions, 280 F. Supp. 3d 579, 639 (E.D. Pa. 2017); City of Chicago v. 
Sessions, 264 F. Supp. 3d 933, 943 (N.D. Ill. 2017). 
 200. California v. Trump, 963 F.3d 926, 943 (9th Cir. 2020), cert. granted sub nom. 
Trump v. Sierra Club, 141 S. Ct. 618 (2020); Sierra Club v. Trump, 963 F.3d 874, 887 (9th 
Cir. 2020), cert. granted, 141 S. Ct. 618 (2020); Sierra Club v. Trump, 929 F.3d 670, 686–87, 
689, 701–04 (9th Cir. 2019). 
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more significant is Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau 
from last Term, in which the Court held that removal protection for the 
Director of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau violated the 
President’s constitutional powers.201 In reaching this result, Chief Justice 
Roberts noted the CFPB’s independent budget authority, arguing that the 
“CFPB’s receipt of funds outside the appropriations process further 
aggravates the agency’s threat to Presidential control” by denying the 
President’s ability to influence the agency’s actions through “budgetary 
controls.”202 Appropriations may also factor in the latest removal power 
challenge involving the FHFA, pending before the Court when this Article 
went to press.203 Not only does the FHFA also enjoy budgetary autonomy, 
the action challenged in the case arose out of the government’s provision 
of hundreds of billions of dollars to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac—two 
government-sponsored enterprises—during the last recession.204 
Yet so far, these references to appropriations in presidential power 
disputes have been fleeting and undeveloped. Even in Seila, appropria-
tions were treated as a sideshow, with the Court focusing predominantly 
on the CFPB’s single-director structure and removal protection. Remarka-
bly, moreover, in Seila the Court only mentioned the impact of the CFPB’s 
budgetary independence on the President. It never considered whether 
making the CFPB Director removable at will—and thus giving the 
President broad control over an agency that operates independent of 
Congress’s budgetary constraints—would raise separation of powers con-
cerns of its own. 
At the same time that appropriations are excluded from jurispru-
dence on presidential power, questions about presidential power are often 
ignored in cases that focus on appropriations.205 Courts generally 
approach challenges alleging that administrative actions violate statutes 
appropriating funds or providing grants solely as questions of statutory 
interpretation. As a result, they avoid the issue of whether the President 
enjoys any inherent constitutional power to spend without congressional 
authorization or to refuse to spend in the face of congressional direction. 
This avoidance is evident in numerous cases addressing President Nixon’s 
impoundment of funds. Although Nixon claimed a right to refuse to 
                                                                                                                           
 201. 140 S. Ct. 2183, 2192 (2020). 
 202. Id. at 2204. 
 203. Collins v. Mnuchin, 938 F.3d 553 (5th Cir. 2019) (en banc), cert. granted, 141 S. 
Ct. 193 (2020). 
 204. See id. at 564–65, 567–68. 
 205. An exception is Office of Personnel Management v. Richmond, 496 U.S. 414 
(1990). There, the Court emphasized that “[i]f agents of the Executive were able, by their 
unauthorized oral or written statements to citizens, to obligate the Treasury for the payment 
of funds, the control over public funds that the Clause reposes in Congress in effect could 
be transferred to the Executive.” Id. at 428. 
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spend with constitutional overtones,206 the government defended the chal-
lenged impoundments in statutory terms, and the courts overwhelmingly 
rejected impoundments on a similar statutory basis.207 The effect was to 
deny any presidential impoundment power not provided by statute, but 
courts let that implication go almost entirely unacknowledged.208 Accord-
ing to Keith Whittington, the courts’ limited intervention also made clear 
that “[c]ontrolling the constitutional budgeting process required institu-
tion building more than it required judicial pronouncements.”209 This 
recognition underlay enactment of the major 1974 budget reforms, both 
the CBA and the ICA, and Congress’s assumption of a more active role in 
the budget process.210 
4. The Spending Power. — It is hard to view spending power jurispru-
dence as an instance of doctrinal marginalization of appropriations. To be 
sure, these cases fall squarely in the camp of appropriations exceptional-
ism, with courts creating a body of doctrine specifically to govern the use 
of federal funds. But far from being pushed to the sidelines, questions 
about the constitutional significance of federal funds take center stage 
here. In the past, spending power cases have largely focused on claims that 
statutory spending conditions violate federalism or individual rights, but, 
as noted above, separation of powers has risen to the fore in many recent 
sanctuary cities decisions. These cases arose out of a Trump executive 
order directing that jurisdictions that willfully refuse to allow their agen-
cies and employees to share immigration information with federal immi-
gration authorities “are not eligible to receive Federal grants, except as 
deemed necessary for law enforcement purposes.”211 Concluding that this 
                                                                                                                           
 206. See 119 Cong. Rec. 4143 (1973) (statement of Rep. Pickle) (“The constitutional 
right for the President of the United States to impound funds . . . is absolutely clear.” 
(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting The Impoundment Battle, Wash. Post, Feb. 6, 
1973 (quoting President Nixon))). 
 207. See Train v. City of New York, 420 U.S. 35, 43–44 (1975) (concluding that $5 billion 
to $7 billion appropriated for grants in FY1973–FY1975 to help cover the cost of municipal 
sewers and sewage treatment works were statutorily required to be allotted, rejecting 
President Nixon’s instruction that no more than $2–3 billion be allotted); see also Brief for 
the Petitioner at 46 n.17, Train, 420 U.S. 35 (Nos. 73-1377, 73-1378), 1974 WL 187558 (“The 
question whether Congress’s use of mandatory language can subsequently prevent the 
President from spending less than the total amount appropriated . . . presents difficult and 
complex constitutional issues involving the allocation of powers [that the Court need not 
reach].”). 
 208. The Eighth Circuit noted in passing that “[i]t should require no citation of 
authority to reaffirm the proposition that the Secretary’s authority is limited to carrying out 
the law according to its terms.” State Highway Comm’n v. Volpe, 479 F.2d 1099, 1111 (8th 
Cir. 1973). 
 209. Keith E. Whittington, Constitutional Construction: Divided Powers and 
Constitutional Meaning 168 (1999). 
 210. Id. at 168–73. 
 211. Exec. Order 13,768, 82 Fed. Reg. 8799 (Jan. 25, 2017) (referencing the 
requirement of 8 U.S.C. § 1373 (2012) that “a Federal, State, or local government entity or 
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condition on federal grants was not authorized by Congress, the Ninth 
Circuit and several other courts held that the executive order “violate[d] 
the constitutional principle of the Separation of Powers” because the 
Administration had “claimed for itself Congress’s exclusive spending 
power . . . [and] also attempted to coopt Congress’s power to legislate.”212 
Yet there is one way in which spending power doctrine could be said 
to marginalize appropriations: by leaving the spending of federal funds 
relatively free from judicially enforceable constitutional limits.213 Although 
the Court has invalidated some spending measures as unconstitutional 
and imposed significant clear statement requirements,214 the spending 
power remains less constrained than other major congressional authori-
ties.215 The textual requirement that spending must advance the “general 
Welfare” is left for political determination, and the courts are also highly 
deferential to the political branches on whether a spending condition is 
related to the federal interest in the program under which a grant is 
made.216 Further, the Court has often rejected individual rights challenges 
to spending conditions, emphasizing the government’s ability to use pub-
lic funds to advance its preferred message and insisting that “[a]s a general 
matter, if a party objects to a condition on the receipt of federal funding, 
its recourse is to decline the funds.”217 
                                                                                                                           
official may not prohibit . . . any government entity or official from sending to, or receiving 
from, . . . [federal immigration authorities] information regarding the citizenship or 
immigration status, lawful or unlawful, of any individual”). 
 212. City & County of San Francisco v. Trump, 897 F.3d 1225, 1234–35 (9th Cir. 2018); 
see also City of Chicago v. Barr, 961 F.3d 882, 887 (7th Cir. 2020) (“The executive branch 
has significant powers over immigration matters; the power of the purse is not one of them. 
This tendency to overlook the formalities of the separation of powers to address the issue-
of-the-day has been seen many times by the courts, and it is no more persuasive now . . . .”). 
But see New York v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 951 F.3d 84, 111 (2d Cir. 2020) (“The Attorney 
General was authorized to impose the challenged Certification Condition and did not 
violate the . . . separation of powers by doing so.”). 
 213. NFIB, 567 U.S. 519, 537 (2012); South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 206–07 (1987). 
 214. See Agency for Int’l Dev. v. Open Soc’y (USAID), 570 U.S. 205, 217 (2013) (ruling 
that a funding condition violated the First Amendment); NFIB, 567 U.S. at 580–82 (striking 
down a condition on Medicaid funds as coercive); Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. 
Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981) (implementing a clear statement requirement); United 
States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 315–17 (1946) (invalidating an appropriations measure as an 
unconstitutional bill of attainder). 
 215. NFIB, 567 U.S. at 537; see also Nat’l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley (NEA), 524 
U.S. 569, 587–88 (1998) (“Government may allocate competitive funding according to 
criteria that would be impermissible were direct regulation of speech or a criminal penalty 
at stake.”). 
 216. Dole, 483 U.S. at 207–09; see also Samuel R. Bagenstos, Spending Clause Litigation 
in the Roberts Court, 58 Duke L.J. 345, 367–69 (2008). 
 217. USAID, 570 U.S. at 214; see also NEA, 524 U.S. at 572, 587–88 (upholding the 
requirement that NEA “tak[e] into consideration general standards of decency” in making 
grant awards); Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 193–95 (1991) (upholding a prohibition on 
doctors in a government-funded program from discussing abortion with their patients). 
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Of course, even if this lack of constitutional limits is seen as marginal-
izing spending in constitutional doctrine, it has the opposite effect in prac-
tice. The federal government’s ability to employ federal funds in ways that 
it cannot regulate enhances appropriations’ usefulness as a policymaking 
tool. Indeed, the same is true of some other forms of appropriations’ mar-
ginalization in constitutional law. The ability to adjudicate appropriations 
disputes in non–Article III contexts, or limitations on standing to chal-
lenge appropriations decisions, also serve to enhance appropriations’ 
potency as mechanisms of action for the government. 
C. Appropriations and Administrative Law 
For all that appropriations are sidelined in constitutional jurispru-
dence, their marginalization in administrative law is even more pro-
nounced. Across a number of central domains in administrative law—
administrative procedure, access to judicial review, and judicial review of 
administrative decisionmaking—appropriations are pulled out of the 
usual analytic frameworks. And often litigation over appropriations takes 
place in venues and under statutes quite different than those that domi-
nate standard administrative law. 
1. Administrative Procedure. — On the procedural front, the marginali-
zation of appropriations stems not from administrative law doctrine but 
instead from the text of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). Section 
553 of the APA requires notice and an opportunity for comment, as well 
as publication and a statement of basis and purpose, for most agency rule-
making.218 But it excepts rulemakings “to the extent that there is 
involved . . . a matter relating to agency management or personnel or to 
public property, loans, grants, benefits, or contracts.”219 A number of sub-
stantive statutes impose rulemaking requirements on benefit programs,220 
and many grantmaking agencies have waived this exemption in keeping 
with recommendations from the Administrative Conference of the United 
States.221 But the exemption means that the use of standard rulemaking 
procedures may be optional for government actions involving loans, 
                                                                                                                           
 218. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2018). 
 219. Id. § 553(a)(2). Appropriations programs do not enjoy a similar categorical 
exemption from adjudication procedures, but the procedures mandated by the APA are 
likely to be limited because the applicability of formal adjudication requirements and the 
substance of the requirements themselves are often read narrowly. See Michael Asimow, 
ACUS Sourcebook on Federal Administrative Adjudication Outside the Administrative 
Procedure Act 15–18 (2019). 
 220. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1395hh(a)–(c) (2018) (imposing a notice, comment, and 
publication requirement for regulations promulgated under the Medicare Act). 
 221. ACUS Recommendation 69-8, Elimination of Certain Exemptions from the APA 
Rulemaking Requirements, 1 C.F.R. § 305.69-8 (1992) (repealed 1995); see also, e.g., 29 
C.F.R. § 2.7 (1981) (DOL); 36 Fed. Reg. 2532 (Jan. 28, 1971) (Department of Health, 
Education and Welfare). 
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grants, benefits, and contracts, all of which are closely tied to appropria-
tions.222 The impetus behind the APA exemption was the same idea that 
underlies the public rights doctrine that puts appropriations outside of 
Article III’s strictures: Use of public property or receipt of public benefits 
and contracts was considered voluntary and a matter of privilege rather 
than of right, in contrast to instances when individuals had no choice but 
to adhere to governing regulations of their private conduct.223 That tradi-
tional right–privilege distinction no longer governs procedural due pro-
cess analysis but lives on in the APA’s rulemaking exemption.224 
A similar lack of statutorily mandated procedure surrounds other 
administrative decisions on appropriations, such as OMB and agency 
apportionment, reprogramming, and transfer decisions. Statutes often 
require agencies to notify the relevant appropriations subcommittees and 
subject-matter committees and wait a set period before transferring or 
reprogramming. In practice, the norm is for agencies to obtain committee 
approval, given that angering their appropriations overseers risks trigger-
ing a pullback in funding and transfer authority in the future.225 But few 
other significant procedures are generally imposed; the government is not 
even currently required to provide public disclosure of its reprogramming 
and transfer decisions.226 Reprogramming decisions, which occur within a 
single budget account, are especially hard for external observers to iden-
tify and police if agencies fail to disclose them.227 And the Antideficiency 
                                                                                                                           
 222. Some agencies, such as the USDA, have rescinded their earlier waivers of the 
§ 553(a)(2) exemption. See Public Participation in Rule Making, 36 Fed. Reg. 13,804 (July 
24, 1971) (exempting rulemakings related to “public property, loans, grants, benefits, or 
contracts” from the notice and comment requirements); see also Revocation of Statement 
of Policy on Public Participation in Rulemaking, 78 Fed. Reg. 64,194 (Oct. 28, 2013) 
(rescinding the 1971 waiver of a § 553(a)(2) exemption). 
 223. See Arthur Earl Bonfield, Public Participation in Federal Rulemaking Relating to 
Public Property, Loans, Grants, Benefits, or Contracts, 118 U. Pa. L. Rev. 540, 571–73 
(1970). 
 224. As a result, individual determinations under benefit programs funded through 
appropriations may be subject to procedural due process requirements. E.g., Kapps v. Wing, 
404 F.3d 105, 108 (2d Cir. 2005). 
 225. Louis Fisher, The Legislative Veto: Invalidated, It Survives, 56 Law & Contemp. 
Probs. 273, 288–91 (1993) [hereinafter Fisher, Legislative Veto]; see also GAO Red Book, 
GAO-16-464SP, supra note 53, ch. 2, at 46–47 (describing agency norms); cf. Lincoln v. Vigil, 
508 U.S. 182, 193 (1993) (“[O]f course, we hardly need to note that an agency’s decision to 
ignore congressional expectations may expose it to grave political consequences.”). 
 226. Legislation that would require such disclosure was recently introduced in the 
House of Representatives. See Congressional Power of the Purse Act, H.R. 6628, 116th 
Cong., §§ 101–105, 201–214 (2020). But the bill ultimately did not receive a vote and was 
not enacted into law. H.R.6628—Congressional Power of the Purse Act, Congress.gov, 
https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/house-bill/6628/all-actions [https://perma.c
c/K9WV-X2FD] (last visited Jan. 26, 2021). 
 227. Lewis, supra note 56, at 7; see also Pasachoff, The President’s Budget, supra note 
24, at 2251–62 (raising concerns about secrecy in budgeting generally, especially OMB’s 
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Act simply requires apportionment and stipulates which official shall 
apportion without imposing any other procedures on how apportionment 
is done.228 The APA’s rulemaking exemption plays a role here too: Given 
that decisions setting requirements on future uses of government funds 
have been held to be rules, some reprogramming and apportionment 
decisions might trigger notice and comment requirements were it not for 
the exemption.229 
2. Access to Judicial Review. — Perhaps no area demonstrates 
appropriations’ marginalization in administrative law more than doctrines 
governing access to judicial review. To begin with, the sovereign immunity 
waiver in the APA is limited to those “seeking relief other than money 
damages.”230 The Supreme Court has read this language to allow an 
equitable action seeking specific relief, even if the effect of the relief would 
be to require an agency to pay funds.231 But lower courts have held that in 
order to avoid being barred by sovereign immunity, a suit under the APA 
can seek only additional funds from the same appropriation under which 
the funds were mistakenly withheld.232 Often, however, those appropria-
tions are exhausted by the time suit is brought, leading to suits being 
dismissed as moot.233 
Even when amounts remain available in an appropriation, the 
Supreme Court has rejected suits challenging agency allocation decisions 
under lump-sum appropriations on the grounds that such decisions are 
“committed to agency discretion under law” and not reviewable under 
Section 701(a)(2) of the APA.234 In Lincoln v. Vigil, the Indian Health 
Service decided to discontinue the provision of clinical services to handi-
                                                                                                                           
role); Michelle Mrdeza & Kenneth Gold, Reprogramming Funds: Understanding the 
Appropriators’ Perspective, Gov’t Affs. Inst. at Georgetown Univ., http://gai.georgetown
.edu/reprogramming-funds-understanding [https://perma.cc/8XG9-7L7Q] (“At some 
level, all agencies routinely move funds around within accounts as needs shift, and as a 
matter of sound budgeting. Much of this takes place without the knowledge of 
appropriators, or even high level agency officials.”) (last visited Jan. 15, 2021). 
 228. 31 U.S.C. §§ 1512–1513 (2018). 
 229. See Sugar Cane Growers Co-op of Fla. v. Veneman, 289 F.3d 89, 95–97 (D.C. Cir. 
2002); see also Lincoln, 508 U.S. at 196–98 & n.5 (stating that even if the decision by the 
Indian Health Service to discontinue using lump-sum appropriations to provide clinical 
services was a rule, it was exempt from notice and comment requirements as a general 
statement of policy, noting that the agency had waived its § 553(a)(2) exemption). 
 230. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2018). 
 231. Bowen v. Massachusetts, 487 U.S. 879, 893–94 (1988). 
 232. See Modoc Lassen Indian Hous. Auth. v. Dep’t of Hous. & Urb. Dev., 881 F.3d 
1181, 1195–98 (10th Cir. 2017); County of Suffolk v. Sebelius, 605 F.3d 135, 140–44 (2d Cir. 
2010); City of Houston v. Dep’t of Hous. & Urb. Dev., 24 F.3d 1421, 1428 (D.C. Cir. 1994). 
 233. See, e.g., County of Suffolk, 605 F.3d at 137–38. 
 234. 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2). 
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capped Native American children in the southwest, opting instead to real-
locate resources to support nationwide programs.235 A group of children 
eligible for services challenged this decision—announced in a memoran-
dum that sought “public input” but not through notice and comment 
procedures—under the APA.236 Noting that Congress had never expressly 
authorized funds for the program and the Service previously paid for the 
program using annual lump-sum appropriations, the Court identified “a 
fundamental principle of appropriations law” as being that when 
“‘Congress merely appropriates lump-sum amounts without statutorily 
restricting what can be done with those funds, a clear inference arises that 
it does not intend to impose legally binding restrictions.’”237 As a result, 
the Court concluded that “the allocation of funds from a lump-sum 
appropriation is . . . [an] administrative decision traditionally regarded as 
committed to agency discretion.”238 This lack of judicial review for lump-
sum appropriations underlies agencies’ broad powers to reprogram funds 
within a single budget account. 
The nonreviewability of lump-sum appropriations is a prime example 
of appropriations exceptionalism. With respect to substantive statutes, the 
fact that an agency enjoys broad discretion to set policy does not preclude 
judicial review.239 Moreover, the treatment of lump-sum appropriations 
actions stands out even compared to other agency actions pulled out from 
judicial review as committed to agency discretion. Agency nonenforce-
ment decisions are another category of agency action that is often nonre-
viewable on this basis—in part on a similar rationale that nonenforcement 
decisions turn on assessments about how to most effectively utilize agency 
resources that are particularly within agency expertise.240 Yet nonenforce-
ment decisions are only presumptively nonreviewable,241 whereas Lincoln 
imposed no such qualification. 
Lincoln does not preclude judicial review of appropriations decisions 
when Congress does allocate funds for specific programs or imposes 
specific prohibitions.242 But here a separate obstacle to suit under the APA 
                                                                                                                           
 235. 508 U.S. 182, 182 (1993). 
 236. Id. at 188–89. 
 237. Id. at 192 (quoting LTV Aerospace Corp., B-183851, 1975 WL 11581, at *11 (Comp. 
Gen. Oct. 1, 1975)). 
 238. Id. 
 239. Weyerhaeuser Co. v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 139 S. Ct. 361, 370–72 (2018). 
 240. Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831–34 (1985). 
 241. Id. 
 242. Cf. Lincoln, 508 U.S. at 193; see also Shawnee Tribe v. Mnuchin, 984 F.3d 94, 100 
(D.C. Cir. 2021) (rejecting the Secretary’s argument that the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and 
Economic Security (CARES) Act appropriation, which provided funds for “necessary 
expenditures incurred due to the public health emergency with respect to” COVID-19 and 
directed the Secretary to “ensure that all amounts available” be “distributed to Tribal 
governments,” was a lump-sum appropriation (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 
42 U.S.C. § 801(c)(7), (d)(1) (2018))). The court further held that the CARES Act 
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can arise, namely the requirement that to sue under the APA’s right of 
action a challenger must be within the zone of interests protected by the 
statute at issue.243 Ordinarily, the APA’s zone of interests test is easily met.244 
All that is required is that the interest asserted by the plaintiff be “‘arguably 
within the zone of interests to be protected . . . by the statute,’” with suit 
foreclosed “only when a plaintiff’s ‘interests are so marginally related to 
or inconsistent with the purposes implicit in the statute.’”245 However, the 
zone of interests test can prove more challenging to meet in the appropri-
ations context, because the interests asserted by parties injured by uses of 
appropriated funds may be pretty marginal to the appropriations statutes 
at issue. Hence, here appropriations assimilation in the form of applying 
the usual zone of interests test can operate to exclude appropriations from 
judicial review. 
Consider the Ninth Circuit border wall litigation, where a number of 
states and environmental organizations challenged the Trump Administra-
tion’s transfer of appropriated funds as unlawful and violating Section 8005 
of the FY2019 DOD Appropriations Act. All based their claims of injury 
largely on the environmental effects of the border wall and its impact on 
wildlife in the region.246 The Ninth Circuit held that the states satisfied the 
APA’s zone of interests requirement with respect to Section 8005, empha-
sizing that their interests “are congruent with those of Congress” and the 
challenge they were raising “actively furthers Congress’s intent to ‘tighten 
congressional control of the reprogramming process’” and “congressional 
power over appropriations.”247 The appellate court also emphasized that 
in the past Section 8005 had been used to transfer funds to rebuild military 
bases in states hit by natural disasters, arguing that showed states were 
                                                                                                                           
appropriation provided a judicially manageable standard by which to judge the Secretary’s 
action. Id. at 100. Courts have sometimes found specific appropriations committed to 
agency discretion as well, however. See, e.g., Milk Train, Inc. v. Veneman, 310 F.3d 747, 751–
52 (D.C. Cir. 2002). 
 243. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2018) (“A person . . . adversely affected or aggrieved by agency 
action within the meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof.”); Nat’l 
Credit Union Admin. v. First Nat’l Bank & Tr. Co., 522 U.S. 479, 488 (1998). 
 244. See Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118, 130 
(2014) (“We have said, in the APA context, that the test is not ‘especially demanding.’” 
(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band of 
Pottawatomi Indians v. Patchak, 567 U.S. 209, 225 (2012))). 
 245. Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band, 567 U.S. at 225 (first quoting Ass’n of Data 
Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153 (1970); then quoting Clarke v. Sec. 
Indus. Ass’n, 479 U.S. 388, 399 (1987)). 
 246. California v. Trump, 963 F.3d 926, 936–40 (9th Cir. 2020), cert. granted sub nom. 
Trump v. Sierra Club, 141 S. Ct. 618 (2020) (asserting additionally the states’ sovereign 
interests in enforcing their environmental laws); see also Sierra Club v. Trump, 963 F.3d 
874, 883–84 (9th Cir. 2020), cert. granted, 141 S. Ct. 618 (2020) (asserting “recreational, 
professional, scientific, educational, and aesthetic benefits” from their activities in the U.S.–
Mexico border area and the wildlife in those areas). 
 247. California v. Trump, 963 F.3d at 942 (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 93-662, at 16 (1973)). 
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predictable challengers under Section 8005.248 But these arguments 
mistakenly focus on the nature of the states’ claim—that the repro-
gramming was unlawful—rather than the environmental and wildlife 
interests the states were asserting, which are marginal at best to Congress’s 
interests in controlling the federal fisc.249 It also claimed that the states 
have unique sovereign interests in enforcing their laws, but that argument 
would be more on point if Section 8005 itself displaced state law, which it 
does not.250 
The Ninth Circuit’s more interesting arguments sounded in a consti-
tutional register. Perhaps recognizing that its zone of interests arguments 
were tenuous, it insisted that “[t]he field of suitable challengers must be 
construed broadly in this context because . . . restrictions on congressional 
standing make it difficult for Congress to enforce [Section 8005’s] obliga-
tions itself.”251 The appellate court deserves credit for emphasizing the 
separation of powers harm that would result if no one could enforce 
statutory appropriations limits on the executive branch. But the Supreme 
Court has long rejected the argument that “otherwise no one could sue” 
as reason to allow a suit to go forward.252 More precedent supports the 
Ninth Circuit’s argument that no statutory cause of action was required 
because an implied equitable action exists to challenge allegedly 
unconstitutional or ultra vires actions. Here, the constitutional claim was 
that the unauthorized transfers violated the Appropriations Clause.253 Yet 
the Supreme Court has pulled back on this line of case law allowing 
equitable actions.254 And the Court signaled skepticism about this basis for 
suit here when it stated that “the Government has made a sufficient 
showing at this stage that the plaintiffs have no cause of action to obtain 
                                                                                                                           
 248. See id. at 943. 
 249. See id. at 960–62 (Collins, J., dissenting); see also Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed., 497 
U.S. 871, 883 (1990) (“[T]he plaintiff must establish that the injury he complains of . . . falls 
within the ‘zone of interests’ sought to be protected by the statutory provision whose 
violation forms the legal basis for his complaint.”). 
 250. California v. Trump, 963 F.3d at 938–40; id. at 954, 960 (Collins, J., dissenting). The 
appellate court also contended that states had benefited from past Section 8005 transfers 
and therefore were predictable challengers. But that amounts to the claim that “once within 
the zone, always within the zone,” regardless of interests asserted, which seems a dubious 
proposition. 
 251. Id. at 942. 
 252. Thole v. U.S. Bank, 140 S. Ct. 1615, 1621 (2020). 
 253. Sierra Club v. Trump, 963 F.3d 874, 887–93 (9th Cir. 2020), cert. granted, 141 S. 
Ct. 618 (2020); see also Nat’l Lab. Rels. Bd. v. Noel Canning, 573 U.S. 513, 556–57 (2014) 
(implying a cause of action based on the Recess Appointments Clause). 
 254. See Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Ctr., Inc., 575 U.S. 320, 325–27 (2015). The 
APA has been held to not displace the traditional equitable cause of action, however. See 
Dart v. United States, 848 F.2d 217, 224 (D.C. Cir. 1988). 
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review of . . . compliance with § 8005” in granting the stay that the Ninth 
Circuit denied.255 
Cause of action obstacles also arise with respect to other appropria-
tions statutes.256 For instance, courts have read the Antideficiency Act’s 
provisions for administrative reporting and penalties as precluding a pri-
vate right of action to enforce the Act.257 The ICA authorizes the 
Comptroller General to sue if funds that the Comptroller General con-
cludes were unlawfully withheld are not released, a remedial provision that 
some courts have read as indicating no private right of action exists to 
enforce the ICA.258 On the other hand, the ICA also provides that nothing 
in it “shall be construed as . . . affecting in any way the claims or defenses 
of any party to litigation concerning any impoundment.”259 President 
Nixon’s impoundments prompted a number of lawsuits under the substan-
tive statutes at issue,260 and given the ICA’s caveat, such statutory suits 
should still be available as a means to challenge impoundments.261 
3. Judicial Review of Administrative Decisionmaking. — In short, judicial 
review of agency decisionmaking on appropriations can be hard to come 
by and may confront obstacles that are not a significant impediment for 
other challenges to administrative action. Appropriations disputes also 
look different when judicial review does occur. Most notably, courts rarely 
defer to agency interpretations of appropriations statutes.262 Many reasons 
are given for this lack of deference. In denying a stay of preliminary relief 
in the border wall litigation, the Ninth Circuit held that Chevron deference 
                                                                                                                           
 255. Trump v. Sierra Club, 140 S. Ct. 1 (2019) (mem.). 
 256. In the federal grant context, the Court has pulled back significantly on implying 
causes of actions in governing statutes, and the extent to which third-party beneficiaries can 
enforce contractual requirements that underlie federal government grants is unclear. See 
Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 279, 284, 293 (2001) (concluding that a private right 
of action exists to enforce the prohibition on intentional racial discrimination contained in 
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act but not governmental regulations enforcing that 
prohibition); Fahey, supra note 35, at 2382–87 (describing the evolution of case law on 
third-party beneficiary enforcement). 
 257. See, e.g., Feldman v. Bowser, 315 F. Supp. 3d 299, 305 (D.D.C. 2018) (quoting 
Thurston v. United States, 696 F. Supp. 680, 683 (D.D.C. 1988)). 
 258. See, e.g., Rogers v. United States, 14 Cl. Ct. 39, 50 (1987), aff’d, 861 F.2d 729 (Fed. 
Cir. 1988); Pub. Citizen v. Stockman, 528 F. Supp. 824, 827 (D.D.C. 1981). 
 259. 2 U.S.C. § 681 (2018). 
 260. See, e.g., Train v. City of New York, 420 U.S. 35, 40 (1975). 
 261. See U.S. Gov’t Accountability Off., OGC-82-9, President’s Eighth Special Message 
for Fiscal Year 1982, at 4–24 (1982) (discussing in detail the continuing vitality of pre-ICA 
impoundment case law and concluding it is still valid); see also Maine v. Goldschmidt, 494 
F. Supp. 93, 98–99 (D. Me. 1980) (holding that a mandatory spending obligation in a statute 
allows suit). 
 262. Matthew B. Lawrence, Congress’s Domain: Appropriations, Time, and Chevron, 70 
Duke L.J. 1057, 1082–90 (2021) [hereinafter Lawrence, Congress’s Domain] (noting that 
“[j]udicial decisions regarding the applicability of Chevron to appropriations are relatively 
rare” and describing a range of approaches largely denying deference). 
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would be inappropriate for DOD’s interpretation of Section 8005 because 
the DOD had not issued its interpretation through rulemaking and did 
not have rulemaking power under its appropriations statutes.263 It further 
rejected even weaker Skidmore deference on the ground that DOD’s 
statement was “entirely conclusory.”264 At other times, courts have rejected 
deference after concluding that the agency lacked any special expertise 
with respect to the appropriation statute at issue or that the meaning of 
the statute was clear so deference was inapplicable.265 Often, courts review 
agency interpretations de novo without even addressing the question of 
Chevron deference.266 
To be sure, on occasion courts do find deference applicable to appro-
priations,267 and more importantly grounds exist for denying deference 
that are not unique to the appropriations context. For example, Chevron 
deference is only applicable when Congress has given an agency distinct 
responsibility to implement a statute,268 and Congress has charged multi-
ple actors—agencies, the President and OMB, and GAO—with responsi-
bility for implementing appropriations.269 Moreover, as Lawrence has 
                                                                                                                           
 263. Sierra Club v. Trump, 929 F.3d 670, 692–93 (9th Cir. 2019). 
 264. Id. at 693. 
 265. Oregon v. Trump, 406 F. Supp. 3d 940, 961–62 (D. Or. 2019) (concluding that the 
DOJ’s interpretation of grant conditions applicable under the Byrne JAG program was not 
entitled to Chevron deference because the statute at issue was clear and the interpretation 
did not carry the force of law); Multnomah County v. Azar, 340 F. Supp. 3d 1046, 1063 (D. 
Or. 2018) (determining Chevron to be inapplicable when the statute is clear); see also U.S. 
House of Representatives v. Burwell, 185 F. Supp. 3d 165, 188 (D.D.C. 2016), vacated in part 
sub nom. U.S. House of Representatives v. Azar, No. 14-1967 (RMC), 2018 WL 8576647 
(D.D.C. May 18, 2018) (refusing to grant Chevron deference to agencies’ interpretation of a 
tax refund provision because agencies were not delegated authority to fill gaps and the 
provision’s meaning was clear). 
 266. See, e.g., California v. Trump, 963 F.3d 926, 944–49 (9th Cir. 2020), cert. granted 
sub nom. Trump v. Sierra Club, 141 S. Ct. 618 (2020) (concluding that Section 8005 clearly 
prohibited DOD’s transfers without referencing deference doctrines or GAO’s contrary 
view); Planned Parenthood of Greater Wash. & N. Idaho v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Hum. 
Servs., 946 F.3d 1100, 1112–14 (9th Cir. 2020) (concluding that the meaning of a statute 
providing grants for TPPP was clear and at odds in part with agency interpretation, with only 
a passing citation to Chevron); Moda Health Plan, Inc. v. United States, 892 F.3d 1311, 1320–
22 (Fed. Cir. 2018), rev’d and remanded sub nom. Me. Cmty. Health Options v. United 
States, 140 S. Ct. 1308 (2020) (determining the meaning of an appropriations rider de novo 
without discussing deference); see also United States v. McIntosh, 833 F.3d 1163, 1174–79 
(9th Cir. 2016) (interpreting independently an appropriations rider limiting the DOJ’s 
ability to prosecute without considering the applicability of Chevron, but in a criminal 
context where Chevron does not usually apply). 
 267. See California ex rel. Becerra v. Azar, 950 F.3d 1067, 1084–88 (9th Cir. 2020); 
WildEarth Guardians v. U.S. Forest Serv., 668 F. Supp. 2d 1314, 1329–31 (D.N.M. 2009). 
 268. See Pro. Reactor Operator Soc’y v. U.S. Nuclear Regul. Comm’n, 939 F.2d 1047, 
1051 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (“[C]ourts do not owe the same deference to an agency’s 
interpretation of statutes that, like the APA, are outside the agency’s particular expertise 
and special charge to administer.”). 
 269. See, e.g., 31 U.S.C. §§ 1513–1514 (2018). 
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noted, annual appropriations measures often are not on the books long 
enough for agencies to interpret them through notice and comment rule-
making, which would increase the chances of deference.270 Hence, the 
frequent lack of deference to agency interpretations of appropriations 
statutes can be the result of applying the standard Chevron framework to 
appropriations—an instance of appropriations assimilation more than 
appropriations exceptionalism. Yet the rarity of deference stands out and 
suggests that courts do not intuitively view appropriations as a proper 
instance for deference to agency views. Indeed, sometimes courts say so 
expressly.271 
Instead of deference to agencies, courts regularly invoke general 
appropriations principles, often as stated by GAO.272 Indeed, although 
they do not put their reliance on GAO in these terms, courts give GAO’s 
approach to interpreting appropriations statutes a weight akin to Skidmore 
deference.273 In its recent decision on the risk corridor rider, for example, 
the Supreme Court primarily relied on appropriations principles enunci-
ated in past case law and by GAO, only noting in passing how the imple-
menting agencies had interpreted the rider.274 This interpretive reliance 
on GAO is unusual given GAO’s ties to the legislative branch, but reflects 
the expertise GAO has developed through its appropriations enforcement 
and oversight roles.275 One effect, however, is to downplay the area-specific 
                                                                                                                           
 270. Lawrence, Congress’s Domain, supra note 262, at 1062; see also U.S. House of 
Representatives v. Burwell, 185 F. Supp. 3d 165, 188 (D.D.C. 2016), vacated in part sub nom. 
U.S. House of Representatives v. Azar, No. 14-1967 (RMC), 2018 WL 8576647 (D.D.C. May 
18, 2018) (arguing that whether a permanent appropriations provision extended to cover 
insurers’ cost-sharing payments under the Affordable Care Act is a major question for which 
deference is inappropriate). 
 271. See California v. Trump, 267 F. Supp. 3d 1119, 1132 (N.D. Cal. 2017) (invoking 
separation of powers as a reason to not read appropriations statutes broadly); Burwell, 185 
F. Supp. 3d at 174 (arguing that the statute governing appropriations interpretation imposes 
a clear statement requirement). 
 272. See Salazar v. Ramah Navajo Chapter, 567 U.S. 182, 187–88 (2012) (failing to 
mention deference and instead invoking GAO appropriations principles to determine that 
the government owed tribes the full cost of provided services). 
 273. See U.S. Dep’t of the Navy v. Fed. Lab. Rels. Auth., 665 F.3d 1339, 1349 (D.C. Cir. 
2012) (stating that the court gives weight but does not defer to GAO, ultimately exercising 
independent judgment in interpreting appropriations statutes). 
 274. Compare Me. Cmty. Health Options v. United States, 140 S. Ct. 1308, 1319–21 
(2020) (relying on GAO principles to determine that the ACA created a government 
obligation to pay insurers), with id. at 1324–25 (committing one paragraph to the relevant 
agency’s “response to the riders”). 
 275. See Dep’t of the Navy, 665 F.3d at 1349 (noting GAO’s legislative connection); 
Nevada v. Dep’t of Energy, 400 F.3d 9, 16 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (“[W]e give special weight to 
[GAO’s] opinions due to its accumulated experience and expertise in the field of 
government appropriations.” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Int’l Union, 
United Auto., Aerospace & Agric. Implement Workers v. Donovan, 746 F.2d 855, 861 (D.C. 
Cir. 1984))). 
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policy aspects of appropriations measures by framing appropriations dis-
putes in terms of broader government contracting and fiscal principles. 
This may result in interpretations of appropriations measures that poorly 
fit the policy contexts in which they are operative, even as it produces a 
more coherent body of overall appropriations law. 
D. Appropriations and Statutory Interpretation 
As this discussion of deference suggests, statutory interpretation is a 
public law area where appropriations do receive judicial attention. 
Appropriations exceptionalism is common, with courts developing a body 
of doctrinal rules specific to the appropriations context. For instance, the 
making of an appropriation must be expressly stated, an interpretive rule 
that is statutorily codified.276 Similarly, although later-passed appropria-
tions legislation can trump earlier substantive legislation, the Supreme 
Court has held that the usual presumption against repeals by implication 
is especially strong in the appropriations context.277 There is also “a very 
strong presumption that if an appropriations act changes substantive law, 
it does so only for the fiscal year for which the bill was passed.”278 As a 
result, if Congress wants to change substantive legislation through an 
appropriation it must do so clearly,279 and if it wishes to change substantive 
law going forward it must include language of “futurity” such as the word 
“hereafter.”280 Courts also construe appropriations measures narrowly 
when they arguably conflict with authorizing statutes.281 These rules draw 
on GAO’s statements of appropriations principles and in turn are codified 
                                                                                                                           
 276. 31 U.S.C. § 1301(d) (2018); Off. of Pers. Mgmt. v. Richmond, 496 U.S. 414, 424 
(1990). 
 277. Me. Cmty. Health Options, 140 S. Ct. at 1323; Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Soc’y, 
503 U.S. 429, 440 (1992); GAO Red Book, GAO-16-464SP, supra note 53, ch. 2, at 57–58, 
76–78. 
 278. Tin Cup, LLC v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 904 F.3d 1068, 1073 (9th Cir. 2018) 
(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Bldg. & Constr. Trades Dep’t, AFL-CIO v. 
Martin, 961 F.2d 269, 273 (D.C. Cir. 1992)); see also Minis v. United States, 40 U.S. 423, 445 
(1841) (stating that a temporary appropriations act ought not be read as imposing a 
provision on “all future appropriations . . . unless it is expressed in the most clear and 
positive terms, and where the language admits of no other reasonable interpretation.”). 
 279. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Fla. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 619 F.3d 1289, 
1296–300 (11th Cir. 2010) (“Congress has the power to effect a repeal through an 
appropriations bill—Congress just needs to be clear it is doing so.” (citing United States v. 
Will, 449 U.S. 200, 222 (1980))). 
 280. Tin Cup, 904 F.3d at 1073 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Nat’l Res. 
Def. Council v. U.S. Forest Serv., 421 F.3d 797, 806 n.19 (9th Cir. 2005)); see also United 
States v. Vulte, 233 U.S. 509, 524 (1914) (emphasizing the need for “words of prospective 
extension”). 
 281. See, e.g., Calloway v. District of Columbia, 216 F.3d 1, 9 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (“When 
Congress wants to use an appropriations act to limit court authority, it knows precisely how 
to do so.”). 
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in those statements and applied in GAO’s own decisions.282 The Supreme 
Court also has invoked features of the appropriations process to justify 
these rules, arguing that members of Congress expect appropriations 
legislation to be short-term and therefore are less likely to be focused on 
changes to substantive law when voting on appropriations.283 
Despite such attention to appropriations, marginalization occurs here 
as well. Most of these appropriations-specific rules downplay the 
substantive import of appropriations, making it difficult for Congress to 
use appropriations to change governing law. Even general interpretive 
doctrines are applied to limit appropriations’ impact.284 Perhaps the prime 
example of this is Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill.285 There, Congress 
repeatedly had appropriated funds to finish building a dam whose opera-
tion would violate the Endangered Species Act, and statements in the 
Appropriations Committee reports made clear that this violation should 
not prevent the dam from being completed.286 Nonetheless, the Court 
enjoined construction of the dam, arguing that giving weight to the 
reports would allow the Appropriations Committee to invade the author-
izing committee’s domain and push its policy onto an unsuspecting 
Congress.287 Occasionally, courts put more substantive weight on appropri-
ations measures, as the Federal Circuit recently did in concluding that the 
risk corridor rider suspended the government’s obligation in the ACA to 
make risk corridor payments.288 But the Supreme Court promptly 
reversed, holding nearly unanimously that the appropriations measure did 
no such thing.289 
Indeed, the Court’s concern to limit the substantive impact of appro-
priations helps explain seeming inconsistencies in its recent approaches 
to appropriations measures. In a 2012 decision, Salazar v. Ramah Navajo 
Chapter, the Court dismissed the fact that the substantive statute made pro-
vision of funds under the Act “subject to the availability of appropriations” 
                                                                                                                           
 282. See, e.g., Me. Cmty. Health Options, 140 S. Ct. at 1319–21. 
 283. See Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 190–91 (1978); Tin Cup, 904 F.3d at 1073. 
 284. See, e.g., Nevada v. Dep’t of Energy, 400 F.3d 9, 16 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (applying to 
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 285. 437 U.S. 153 (1978). 
 286. Id. at 163–71. 
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Construction and Statutory Revisionism: The Strange Case of the Appropriations Canon, 14 
J. Contemp. Legal Issues 669, 676–84 (2005) (sourcing the origin of the appropriations 
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 288. See Moda Health Plan, Inc. v. United States, 892 F.3d 1311, 1325–27 (Fed. Cir. 
2018), rev’d and remanded sub nom. Me. Cmty. Health Options, 140 S. Ct. 1308. 
 289. See Me. Cmty. Health Options, 140 S. Ct. at 1323–26; see also id. at 1332–34 (Alito, 
J., dissenting) (failing to address whether the rider changed the government’s statutory 
obligation to pay). 
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in concluding that the government’s obligation to pay tribes for their full 
costs was not affected by an insufficient appropriation.290 Just eight years 
later, however, the Court emphasized that the risk corridor provision did 
not contain language conditioning payments on provision of funding, 
such as the “subject to the availability of appropriations” language, in hold-
ing that the appropriations rider did not alter the government’s obligation 
to pay. The Court never acknowledged this inconsistency and cited Salazar 
approvingly.291 Yet despite this contrary reasoning, the bottom-line result 
in the two cases was the same: The Court refused to read an appropriations 
measure as limiting a payment promise contained in an authorization stat-
ute, in contexts where services were already provided in reliance on the 
payment promises. It is hard not to see a desire to protect expectations 
and enforce statutory obligations as driving both decisions, despite their 
inconsistency. 
Moreover, in developing these appropriations statutory interpretation 
doctrines, courts for the most part have not paid close attention to 
important aspects of the appropriations process. For example, courts do 
not distinguish between annual and permanent appropriations measures, 
but the two differ in important ways that appear relevant to how they 
should be interpreted.292 Similarly, empirical studies of congressional 
drafting practices reveal that members of Congress give particular weight 
to appropriations committee reports in understanding appropriations 
legislation and also give substantial weight to CBO’s estimates of the 
budgetary impact of legislation. Yet courts treat appropriations reports no 
differently than other committee reports and do not look to CBO 
interpretations of statutory meaning as particularly instructive.293 
E. Appropriations and Political Branch Public Law 
There is one public law arena where appropriations play a starring 
role: political branch public law. Historically, it was the political branches 
that set out the constitutional contours of appropriations, with nineteenth-
century politics marked by constitutional debates over using federal funds 
                                                                                                                           
 290. 567 U.S. 182, 190–91, 197, 199–200 (2012). 
 291. Me. Cmty. Health Options, 140 S. Ct. at 1319, 1322–23. 
 292. See Lawrence, Congress’s Domain, supra note 262, at 1090–91 (arguing that 
because Congress is better able to push back on agency implementation and interpretation 
of appropriations measures through annual appropriations than permanent appropria-
tions, agency views of annual measures deserve deference, but their views of permanent 
measures do not). 
 293. See Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation from the 
Inside—An Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part I, 
65 Stan. L. Rev. 901, 980–82 (2013); Abbe R. Gluck, Congress, Statutory Interpretation, and 
the Failure of Formalism: The CBO Canon and Other Ways that Courts Can Improve on 
What They Are Already Trying to Do, 84 U. Chi. L. Rev. 177, 180–81 (2017). 
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for internal improvements and presidential impoundments.294 In addition 
to the key statutes governing the budget and appropriations process, a 
number of other statutes extensively regulate the Treasury, management 
of public funds, agency financial personnel and accounting, and much 
more.295 In response to the Trump Administration’s border wall repro-
gramming, legislation in the House tightened the ICA and required 
greater transparency over apportionment, transfer, and reprogramming 
of appropriated funds, among other measures.296 A vast array of adminis-
trative issuances further govern appropriations and implement these stat-
utes, such as OMB memos and circulars, GAO decisions and statements of 
appropriations principles, and legal interpretations from the Office of 
Legal Counsel (OLC) at the DOJ.297 On top of this are norms and practices 
long adhered to across the legislative and executive branches.298 Many of 
these measures are largely limited to the political branches and as noted 
above may not be enforceable in courts.299 
Yet the separation between political and judicial public law on 
appropriations is easy to exaggerate. Frequently, political branch actors 
invoke court decisions in addressing appropriations questions. In 
particular, GAO regularly cites and relies on judicial decisions in its 
compilation of principles of appropriations law known as the Red Book.300 
As a result, many of the judicial doctrines that marginalize appropriations 
have the same effect in the political realm. This is especially true of 
doctrines limiting the extent to which appropriations measures are read 
as changing substantive enactments, which are echoed in GAO 
interpretations.301 
Moreover, some of this political branch public law of appropriations 
is fraying in the face of deep partisan divides. This fraying is evident not 
only in the number of recent appropriations disputes appearing in court, 
but also in increased deviations from longstanding norms and divisions 
between legislative and executive interpretations of appropriations 
measures. The Trump Administration’s “position ha[d] become one of 
                                                                                                                           
 294. See Alison L. LaCroix, The Interbellum Constitution: Federalism in the Long 
Founding Moment, 67 Stan. L. Rev. 397, 409–44 (2015). 
 295. See 31 U.S.C. §§ 101–3907 (2018); supra text accompanying notes 49–56, 66–74. 
 296. Congressional Power of the Purse Act, H.R. 6628, 116th Cong. §§ 101–105, 201–
214 (2020). Congress also enacted additional budget accountability and transparency 
measures. See William M. (Mac) Thornberry National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 
Year 2021, H.R. 6395, 116th Cong., 2d Sess. § 9601 (2020) (enacted). 
 297. See supra text accompanying notes 75–80; infra text accompanying note 351. 
 298. See supra text accompanying notes 42–44, 69, 117. 
 299. See supra text accompanying notes 257–261. 
 300. See, e.g., GAO Red Book, GAO-16-463SP, supra note 80, ch. 1, at 2 (noting that 
GAO would update the Red Book annually “to incorporate new Comptroller General case 
law as well as discussions of particularly prominent decisions from the courts”). 
 301. See, e.g., id., ch. 2, at 76–79. 
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open defiance” of requirements of congressional consultation and 
approval.302 In addition to agencies proceeding with transfers and 
reprogramming of funds notwithstanding appropriations committee 
opposition, OMB expanded its understanding of Antideficiency Act excep-
tions and in other ways pushed at the limits of accepted appropriations 
practices.303 It also asserted its power over what constitutes an 
Antideficiency Act violation that must be reported to GAO.304 OMB did so 
in the face of conflicting GAO views, instructing agencies and officials that 
GAO determinations are not binding on the executive branch and that 
agencies should not report Antideficiency Act violations unless the agen-
cies, consulting with OMB, agreed that a violation occurred.305 In short, 
the substance of political branch appropriations law appears increasingly 
undermined by the same broader forces of political polarization and 
expansive assertions of executive power. Whether this trend continues 
under the Biden Administration, particularly now that Democrats control 
both Congress and the White House, remains to be seen. 
III. IS THE MARGINALIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS A PROBLEM? 
This account of how appropriations are marginalized in public law 
doctrine raises two pressing questions: First, why have appropriations been 
pushed to the sidelines of so many public law doctrines? And second, is 
this marginalization a problem? These two questions are closely linked, in 
                                                                                                                           
 302. Molly E. Reynolds & Philip A. Wallach, Am. Enter. Inst., Does the Executive Branch 
Control the Power of the Purse? 5 (2020), https://www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/
10/Does-the-executive-branch-control-the-power-of-the-purse.pdf?x88519 (on file with the 
Columbia Law Review). 
 303. See Department of the Interior—Activities at National Parks During the Fiscal Year 
2019 Lapse in Appropriations, B-330776, 2019 WL 4200991, at *1, *11–12 (Comp. Gen. 
Sept. 5, 2019) (concluding that the Department of the Interior violated the Antideficiency 
Act during the partial shutdown by using resources to pay for expenses that ordinarily would 
be covered by National Park Service appropriations); supra text accompanying note 120; 
see also Louise Radnosfsky, Much of Federal Government Expected to Keep Running in 
Shutdown, Wall St. J. (Jan. 19, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/much-of-the-federal-
government-wouldnt-shut-down-in-a-government-shutdown-1516357801 (on file with the 
Columbia Law Review) (contrasting Obama’s and Trump’s approaches to the Antideficiency 
Act). 
 304. See Circular A-11, supra note 75, § 145.8 (instructing agencies to report such 
violations only if “the agency, in consultation with OMB, agrees with GAO that a violation 
has occurred”). 
 305. See Off. of Mgmt. & Budget, Exec. Off. of the President, Memorandum for Agency 
General Counsels 1–2 (2019), https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/wp-content/uploads/
2019/11/Memo-to-Agencies-on-A-11.pdf [https://perma.cc/QL4L-S9DK] (“When an 
agency of the Legislative Branch interprets a law differently than the Executive Branch, the 
Executive Branch is not bound by its views . . . . [A]n Executive Branch agency is under no 
obligation to report an action it has determined does not constitute an [Antideficiency Act] 
violation.”); supra text accompanying notes 120–144; see also Agency Reporting of GAO 
Determinations of Antideficiency Act Violations, B-331295, 2019 WL 4594337, at *1 (Comp. 
Gen. Sept. 23, 2019) (disagreeing with OMB’s position). 
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that whether the marginalization of appropriations is problematic turns 
largely on whether the rationales for marginalization are justified. This 
part identifies three overarching rationales—a view of appropriations as 
closely tied to sovereignty; the belief that therefore appropriations should 
be left to the purview of the political branches; and a normative prioritiza-
tion of substantive legislation—and argues that none justify the current 
marginalization of appropriations. To the contrary, the minimizing of 
appropriations in public law doctrine departs from the importance of 
appropriations in the Constitution, undercuts key constitutional values, 
and creates a de facto presidential spending authority fundamentally at 
odds with the separation of powers. 
A. The Why of Appropriations Marginalization 
The numerous examples detailed above highlight the shared theme 
of appropriations being pushed to the doctrinal sidelines, but they also 
highlight that appropriations’ doctrinal marginalization is not monolithic. 
Not only do these examples fall into different methodological camps—
appropriations exceptionalism, silence, assimilation, or jurisdictional 
exclusion—but they have significantly different impacts in practice. Some 
instances operate to limit the practical import of appropriations, such as 
appropriations-exceptionalist rules of statutory interpretation that make it 
difficult for appropriations measures to change substantive legislation. A 
similar result follows from the courts’ general failure to engage with 
appropriations in separation of powers analysis. Other doctrinally limiting 
moves, however, actually make appropriations a more powerful means of 
governmental action. The nonreviewability of agency decisions involving 
lump-sum appropriations is a case in point; the effect of this exclusion of 
appropriations is to give the executive branch freedom to reallocate funds 
(usually with congressional approval) without the risk of litigation. 
These examples also reveal different underlying rationales for 
appropriations’ marginalization in doctrine. Three rationales repeatedly 
arise: a perception of appropriations as primarily an issue for the political 
branches; an identification of government funds as especially tied to 
sovereignty; and a normative prioritization of substantive legislation. 
Indeed, the practical impact of an instance of appropriations 
marginalization often reflects its underlying rationale. Forms of doctrinal 
marginalization that operate to enhance appropriations’ practical impact 
tend to be based on a perception of appropriations as primarily an issue 
for the political branches or an identification of government funds as 
especially tied to sovereignty. By contrast, the underlying driver when 
marginalization limits the practical impact of appropriations is often a 
normative prioritization of substantive legislation. 
The first two of these rationales—the political nature and sovereignty 
ties of appropriations—are closely related. Appropriations are seen as a 
political prerogative and not for the courts in part because control of the 
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federal fisc is closely tied to sovereignty. Thus, in justifying the adjudication 
of government funds disputes outside of Article III, the Court has 
connected the public rights doctrine “to the traditional principle of 
sovereign immunity, which recognizes that the Government may attach 
conditions to its consent to be sued” and “draws upon a historical under-
standing that certain prerogatives were reserved to the political Branches 
of Government.”306 Early on, the Appropriations Clause was identified as 
an express constitutional basis for the federal government’s sovereign 
immunity in damages actions.307 Granted, sovereign immunity is not lim-
ited to suits for money and embodies a broader principle that forcing the 
government to be subject to suits by private parties is an affront to its “sov-
ereign dignity.”308 But the Court has insisted that the link between sover-
eign immunity and a state’s control of its treasury is particularly tight, both 
historically and as a matter of democratic principle: Financial independ-
ence is essential for the states’ “ability to govern in accordance with the 
will of their citizens. Today, as at the founding, the allocation of scarce 
resources among competing needs and interests lies at the heart of the 
political process.”309 
Yet the idea that the allocation of government funds represents a core 
prerogative of the political branches surfaces outside the context of 
sovereign immunity as well. In Lincoln, it took the form of a pragmatic 
assessment of institutional competency. In holding lump-sum allocation 
decisions nonreviewable, the Court there emphasized that such decisions 
involved complicated balancing of factors and priorities that were 
peculiarly within an agency’s expertise and not a court’s.310 This same 
emphasis on political prerogatives is also evident in some spending power 
cases that reach the merits, with the Court underscoring the government’s 
                                                                                                                           
 306. N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipeline Co., 458 U.S. 50, 67 (1982) (plurality 
opinion) (Brennan, J.); Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 
How.) 272, 283 (1855); see also Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462, 489 (2011) (emphasizing 
the sovereign immunity roots of Murray’s Lessee while acknowledging that the category of 
public right has expanded to include instances in which the government is not a party but 
the suit is between two private parties over a right that is “integrally related to particular 
Federal Government action”). 
 307. Paul F. Figley & Jay Tidmarsh, The Appropriations Power and Sovereign Immunity, 
107 Mich. L. Rev. 1207, 1261–64 (2009) (“Early commentaries on the Constitution . . . drew 
an explicit connection between the Appropriations Clause and the sovereign immunity of 
the federal government in damage actions.”); see also Vicki C. Jackson, Suing the Federal 
Government: Sovereignty, Immunity, and Judicial Independence, 35 Geo. Wash. Int’l L. 
Rev. 521, 541–52 (2003) [hereinafter Jackson, Suing the Federal Government] (identifying 
several sources for federal sovereign immunity, including not just the Appropriations Clause 
but also Congress’s control of federal court jurisdiction and English common law). 
 308. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 715 (1999). 
 309. Id. at 751. 
 310. Lincoln v. Vigil, 508 U.S. 182, 193 (1993) (quoting Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 
821, 831 (1985)). 
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broad freedom to impose conditions on government funds when using 
those funds to advance government policies.311 
This discussion highlights that the marginalization of appropria-
tions in public law doctrine is closely linked to the centrality of appro-
priations in the political branches. Both reflect the identification of 
appropriations as inherently political and an arena where courts should 
play a limited role. Moreover, despite invoking the political branches 
generically and on occasion focusing on executive branch discretion, 
appropriations jurisprudence makes clear that control over government 
funds falls fundamentally to Congress.312 Indeed, the link between 
political prerogatives and sovereign immunity reinforces Congress’s 
centrality, as the power to waive sovereign immunity lies with Congress 
and not with the executive branch.313 
Still, political prerogatives and sovereignty alone do not explain 
appropriations’ doctrinal marginalization. After all, governments also set 
policy and exercise their sovereignty through substantive legislation and 
administrative regulations. But unlike appropriations, these types of 
measures lie at the core of public law doctrines, with courts regularly 
engaged in policing the legality of such governmental actions. What also 
animates the marginalization of appropriations is a view of legislation and 
public law that puts primacy on substantive enactments that formally bind 
private parties. 
This ideal of lawmaking keyed to substantive legislation that coerces 
private individuals is particularly evident in separation of powers cases.314 
Perhaps most clearly, in Gundy, Justice Gorsuch defined the legislative 
power as “the power to adopt generally applicable rules of conduct gov-
erning future actions by private persons.”315 That description fails to 
account for appropriations measures, which aim at funding the govern-
ment rather than regulating private actors. As John Harrison has 
                                                                                                                           
 311. See, e.g., Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 229, 
235 (2000) (stating that “[w]hen the government speaks, for instance to promote its own 
policies or to advance a particular idea, it is, in the end, accountable to the electorate and 
the political process for its advocacy,” but requiring viewpoint neutrality when the govern-
ment seeks to create a forum for speech). 
 312. Off. of Pers. Mgmt. v. Richmond, 496 U.S. 414, 427–28 (1990); see also Lincoln, 508 
U.S. at 193 (emphasizing that Congress can limit executive discretion over funding 
allocations through line-item appropriations). 
 313. Wagstaff v. Dep’t of Educ., 509 F.3d 661, 664 (5th Cir. 2007). 
 314. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226–27 (2001) (tying deference to 
Congress’s grant to an agency of the power to issue rules with legal force and effect, as well 
as the agency’s exercise of that power); Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 446–47 
(1998) (putting primacy on changes to formally enacted text and dismissing the President’s 
past ability to achieve much the same result in practice using standard appropriations 
controls). 
 315. Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2133 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). 
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remarked, Gorsuch’s definition excludes matters involving the govern-
ment’s use of public resources, even though such use similarly requires 
legislative authorization.316 And the public rights doctrine is premised on 
the claim that ordinary separation of powers constraints only apply to 
governmental actions that regulate private individuals and property.317 
In like vein, the Court has “repeatedly characterized . . . Spending 
Clause legislation as ‘much in the nature of a contract,’” precisely because 
it becomes operative only upon recipients’ voluntary and knowing 
acceptance of funding conditions and not through compulsion alone.318 
Relatedly, in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius the Court 
made clear that spending conditions qua spending conditions are 
unconstitutional if they cross the line from voluntary to coercive.319 Much 
spending power litigation involves state and local governments and thus 
lacks the emphasis on binding private parties evident in the separation of 
powers context. Yet these cases reveal a shared belief that coercion is the 
focus of constitutional concern and add an understanding of federal funds 
as generally noncoercive. 
Judicial accounts of the legislative process also display an emphasis on 
general substantive enactments.320 The Court paints the national legisla-
tive process as structured to make lawmaking deliberate and difficult; “leg-
islation should not be enacted unless it has been carefully and fully con-
sidered by the Nation’s elected officials.”321 Appropriations also go 
                                                                                                                           
 316. John C. Harrison, Executive Discretion in Administering the Government’s Rights 
and the Delegation Problem 1–2, 4, 10 (Sept. 3, 2020), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3686204 
(on file with the Columbia Law Review) (unpublished manuscript) (noting that Congress’s 
legislative power under Article I is not limited to the ability to “adopt general and 
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 317. See Caleb Nelson, Adjudication in the Political Branches, 107 Colum. L. Rev. 559, 
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property necessitated the involvement of courts). 
 318. NFIB, 567 U.S. 519, 578 (2012) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Barnes v. Gorman, 
536 U.S. 181, 186 (2002)). 
 319. Id. at 578–79; see also Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Anti-Leveraging Principle and the 
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 320. See, e.g., Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar, Earmarking Earmarking, 49 Harv. J. on 
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general authorizing legislation is preferable to targeted appropriations as a means of 
shaping substantive policy outcomes”). 
 321. Immigr. & Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 949 (1983); see also Gundy 
v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2134 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (arguing that the 
Framers “[r]estrict[ed] the task of legislating to one branch characterized by difficult and 
deliberative processes” to “promote fair notice and the rule of law” as well as protect liberty 
and minority rights). 
1136 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 121:4 
through the bicameralism and presentment process, but in the case of 
appropriations the emphasis is instead on the need to enact legislation to 
avoid funding gaps rather than on the dangers of too-frequent enact-
ments. Indeed, concern not to burden the appropriations process with 
substantive disputes contributed to the early separation of substantive 
measures and appropriations legislation through House and Senate 
rules.322 In Hill, the Court expressly invoked these process contrasts to 
defend a higher threshold before appropriations measures are found to 
alter substantive legislation, arguing that “[w]hen voting on appropria-
tions measures, legislators are entitled to operate under the assumption 
that the funds will be devoted to purposes which are lawful . . . . Without 
such an assurance, every appropriations measure would be pregnant with 
prospects of altering substantive legislation . . . .”323 As Matthew 
McCubbins and Daniel Rodriguez have argued, Hill also took a decidedly 
dim view of using the appropriations process to set policy.324 According to 
the Court, the “Appropriations Committees had no jurisdiction over the 
subject of endangered species, much less did they conduct the type of 
extensive hearings which preceded passage of the . . . substantive 
legislation” that would be amended; “there is no indication that Congress 
as a whole was aware” of the issue.325 Therefore, the repeated explicit 
statements in the Committee’s reports that the dam should be built 
represented nothing more than the “personal views” of Committee 
members.326 
B. Evaluating the Marginalization of Appropriations 
The marginalization of appropriations in public law creates a 
substantial disconnect between governance reality and public law. Such a 
disconnect is hardly unique to appropriations. A number of scholars have 
detailed how existing statutes and public law doctrines ill-fit actual 
practices in Congress and the executive branch. Dan Farber and Anne 
Joseph O’Connell have gone so far as to identify a “lost world of 
administrative law” that rests on assumptions no longer true of how the 
administrative state primarily functions.327 Abbe Gluck has made a similar 
                                                                                                                           
 322. Chuzi, supra note 59, at 999–1000. 
 323. Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 190 (1978); see also Robertson v. Seattle 
Audubon Soc’y, 503 U.S. 429, 440 (1992) (“[A]lthough repeals by implication are especially 
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 324. McCubbins & Rodriguez, supra note 287, at 683, 687–90. 
 325. Hill, 437 U.S. at 191–92. 
 326. Id. at 193. 
 327. Daniel A. Farber & Anne Joseph O’Connell, The Lost World of Administrative Law, 
92 Tex. L. Rev. 1137, 1140 (2014); see also Abbe R. Gluck, Anne Joseph O’Connell & Rosa 
Po, Unorthodox Lawmaking, Unorthodox Rulemaking, 115 Colum. L. Rev. 1789, 1792, 
1852–54 (2015) (explaining the mismatch between modern reliance on unorthodox 
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claim about Congress and statutory interpretation, and the point is also 
true of actual congressional–presidential relationships and constitutional 
law.328 A variety of explanations are offered for these divides, ranging from 
the effects of political polarization and congressional inaction, to the need 
for greater operational efficiency, to the fact that current doctrines 
emerged in an era in which different practices and concerns dominated.329 
Whatever the causal explanation, the repeated theme is one of deep 
disconnect between public law and the way government institutions 
actually function today.330 Public law on the books is increasingly not 
public law in practice. 
Whether such disconnects justify revising public law is a harder 
question.331 In particular, to the extent the Constitution puts primacy on 
substantive enactments, or leaves appropriations to the political branches 
and minimizes the courts’ role, then the disconnect between doctrine and 
reality in appropriations may be proper. The current marginalization of 
appropriations might also be thought normatively preferable, by 
increasing political accountability and public deliberation over policy and 
also enhancing the rule of law. 
In fact, however, the current doctrinal marginalization of appropria-
tions is at odds with constitutional structure, disempowers Congress, and 
undermines political accountability as well as the rule of law. While legis-
lative and regulatory reforms are unquestionably essential in addressing 
appropriations abuses, the courts are also a necessary element of the 
                                                                                                                           
rulemaking and the now-outdated views of regulation that underpin administrative law); 
Michael S. Greve & Ashley C. Parrish, Administrative Law Without Congress, 22 Geo. Mason 
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 328. See Gluck, Imperfect Statutes, supra note 95, at 87–103 (describing how 
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Law, 2013 Sup. Ct. Rev. 1, 2–5. 
 331. See Gluck et al., supra note 327, at 1850–64 (suggesting that the answer turns on 
whether the goal of doctrine should be to “reflect how policymaking actually happens,” or 
to “advance [values such as] accountability or the rule of law”). 
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solution. Recognition of these points supports greater incorporation of 
appropriations into public law doctrine and greater legal acceptance of 
appropriations’ policy-setting role. 
1. The Constitutional Importance of Congress’s Appropriations Power. — A 
good place to begin assessing the doctrinal marginalization of appropria-
tions is with the Constitution. Constitutional text, structure, and history all 
make clear that the appropriations power is one of Congress’s central 
authorities and particularly essential in ensuring the power of Congress 
vis-à-vis the executive branch. 
The fiscal provisions of the Constitution were critical to its adoption. 
Under the Articles of Confederation, Congress lacked a power to tax and 
was dependent on requisitioning the states for revenue—requisitions that 
frequently went unpaid.332 The need for a consistent source of revenue 
and means by which the federal government could pay its debts “drove the 
constitutional Revolution of 1787.”333 Congress’s powers to tax and 
appropriate are not simply economically intertwined but also textually 
conjoined at the outset of the list of Congress’s enumerated powers. Both 
powers are presented in terms that appear very broad and have been so 
read by the Supreme Court.334 Congress is given power to “lay and collect 
Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the 
common Defence and general Welfare,” with taxes subject to a few 
additional limitations.335 
The Constitution then goes further, specifying in the Appropriations 
Clause that such spending requires an appropriation “by Law.”336 The rein-
forcement provided by the Appropriations Clause is textually unnecessary. 
Simply vesting the spending power in Congress would be sufficient to give 
Congress control over appropriations, and the requirement that Congress 
act by law is a necessary concomitant of the Bicameralism and Presentment 
Clauses, which mandate passage by both houses and consent from the 
President (or overriding the President’s veto by a supermajority of both 
                                                                                                                           
 332. Michael J. Klarman, The Framers’ Coup: The Making of the United States 
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admits. See, e.g., David E. Engdahl, The Spending Power, 44 Duke L.J. 1, 49–53 (1994) 
(arguing that “one can be very easily seduced into thinking that any ‘general Welfare’ 
objective is an enumerated one”). 
 335. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8. The additional limitations are a requirement that taxes be 
uniform, id.; a requirement that direct taxes be apportioned, id. § 2; and a prohibition on 
taxing exports from a state, id. § 9. 
 336. Id. § 9, cl. 7. 
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houses) for all legislative action.337 This textual reinforcement of 
Congress’s role—something the Constitution omits for other congres-
sional powers—shows the importance that the Framers assigned to popu-
lar legislative control over government funds.338 The requirement that 
appropriations be made by law also puts the onus on the executive branch 
to identify affirmative congressional authorization before obligating 
funds; congressional silence or the lack of a congressional prohibition 
does not suffice. Justice Story acknowledged this point early on, stating 
that “[i]f it were otherwise, the executive would possess an unbounded 
power over the public purse of the nation; and might apply all its monied 
resources at his pleasure.”339 
The real significance of the Appropriations Clause is thus what it 
signals about the Constitution’s structure: The Appropriations Clause 
imposes congressional control of government funds as a critical check on 
the executive branch.340 Indeed, this function is built into the Clause. 
                                                                                                                           
 337. Id. § 7; Immigr. & Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 952 (1983); see 
also Stith, supra note 34, at 1349–50 (“If the Constitution thus strictly forbids ‘executive 
appropriation’ of public funds, the exercise by Congress of its power of the purse is a 
structural imperative.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 338. Gregory Sidak rejects the argument that the Appropriations Clause’s requirement 
of appropriations by law reinforces congressional control, emphasizing that “‘[l]aw’ can 
consist of the Constitution, legislation, treaties, the common law, and contract” and that 
“one could argue that the appropriations clause establishes the general rule that when any 
one of the three branches (not just Congress) spends public funds, it must have a legal 
authorization for doing so.” Sidak, supra note 34, at 1168, 1170–71. But Sidak’s argument 
ignores the fact that Article I, § 8 expressly grants Congress the power to spend, a power not 
given to any other branch. Against this backdrop, the reference to law in the Appropriations 
Clause logically means legislation, as that is the means by which Congress acts. This reading 
of “law” as “legislation” is further reinforced by the Clause’s surfacing in Article I, which up 
through Section 9 (where the Clause is found) addresses only the legislative branch. See 
U.S. Const. art. 1, §§ 1–9. And all the other references to “law” in Article I refer to 
legislation. See, e.g., U.S. Const. art. I, § 2 (providing that representation shall be 
apportioned based on an “actual Enumeration” undertaken “in such Manner” as “the 
Congress of the United States . . . shall by Law direct”); id. § 4 (“The Times, Places and 
Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each 
State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such 
Regulations . . . .”); id. § 7 (discussing the various ways that a bill can “become a Law”). 
 339. 3 Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution § 1342, at 213–14 (Boston, 
Hillard, Gray & Co. 1833). Story praised this assignment of appropriations control to 
Congress: 
“As all the taxes raised from the people, as well as the revenues arising 
from other source, are to be applied to the discharge of the expenses, and 
debts, and other engagements of the government, it is highly proper, that 
congress should possess the power to decide, how and when any money 
should be applied for these purposes.” 
Id. at 213. 
 340. See Edward S. Corwin, The Constitution and What It Means Today 134 (14th ed. 
1978) (describing Congress’s appropriations power as “the most important single curb” on 
the President); see also Stith, supra note 34, at 1349 (arguing that “a primary significance 
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Unlike Congress’s regulatory authorities, which directly target private 
action and impose duties on government to implement substantive 
legislative regimes, the Appropriations Clause is focused first and foremost 
on the government itself. This is not to suggest that Congress does not use 
appropriations to affect private action—of course it does. But the central 
aim of appropriations is providing the government with the funds needed 
to operate. Moreover, particularly when combined with the practice of 
annual or time-limited appropriations, the Clause ensures that the 
executive branch must continuously secure congressional support for its 
chosen courses of action.341 As Josh Chafetz has emphasized, the result is 
to give Congress critical leverage over government policy.342 
The history of the Appropriations Clause also shows the importance 
of legislative appropriations control and the Clause’s role as a check on 
the executive. Along with the Origination Clause, which requires revenue-
raising bills to originate in the House, the Appropriations Clause was 
added as part of the great compromise that combined popular 
representation in the House with equal state representation in the 
Senate.343 Debates from the Constitutional Convention make clear that the 
Framers agreed that control of the public fisc must lie with the legislature 
and was a preeminent power.344 Such agreement on the need for legislative 
control of the purse is not surprising in light of Parliament’s historical use 
of appropriations to rein in the British monarchy, as well as the practice in 
early state constitutions of granting the state legislature broad control over 
state finances and state treasurers.345 James Madison put the point plainly 
in Federalist No. 58, where he wrote that the “power over the purse may, 
in fact, be regarded as the most complete and effectual weapon with which 
                                                                                                                           
of the appropriations clause . . . lies in what it takes away from Congress: the option not to 
require legislative appropriations prior to expenditure.”). For the contrary view that 
Congress lacks any broad power of the purse with which to check the President and that the 
Appropriations Clause was simply intended to ensure fiscal responsibility, see Sidak, supra 
note 34, at 1164–83. 
 341. See Chafetz, Congress’s Constitution, supra note 37, at 62; Price, supra note 33, at 
367–69. 
 342. Chafetz, Congress’s Constitution, supra note 37, at 66–73; see also Josh Chafetz, 
Opinion, Don’t Be Fooled, Trump Is a Winner in the Supreme Court Tax Case, N.Y. Times 
(July 9, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/09/opinion/trump-taxes-supreme-
court-.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (explaining how Congress could have 
used its “power of the purse” to compel President Trump to release his tax information). 
 343. Figley & Tidmarsh, supra note 307, at 1248–52 (describing the legislative history of 
the Appropriations Clause at the Constitutional Convention). 
 344. Id. at 1248–55; see also Banks & Raven-Hansen, supra note 37, at 27–32 (describing 
discussion of appropriations in the Convention and during ratification); Michael W. 
McConnell, The President Who Would Not Be King: Executive Power Under the 
Constitution 101 (2020) (“It was undisputed the executive would have no prerogative power 
to tax, spend, or borrow.”). 
 345. Chafetz, Congress’s Constitution, supra note 37, at 45–55; Casper, supra note 47, 
at 3–8. 
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any constitution can arm the immediate representatives of the 
people . . . .”346 And members of Congress were quick to try to use this 
weapon of influence, with efforts to assert congressional appropriations 
control through itemized appropriations beginning in the last years of the 
Washington Administration.347 
Although few dispute Congress’s primacy in appropriations, more 
controversy exists over whether the Constitution’s assignment of appropri-
ations to Congress precludes the President from exercising any independ-
ent spending power. Notwithstanding the Appropriations Clause, 
Presidents have made unauthorized expenditures since the Founding—
sometimes seeking subsequent congressional approval.348 They have also 
long challenged some legislative limits on appropriated funds as intruding 
on constitutionally granted presidential powers.349 In his famous 1981 
opinion on the Antideficiency Act, Attorney General Benjamin Civiletti 
stated—without further elaboration—that “[m]anifestly, Congress could 
not deprive the President of [a constitutional] power by purporting to 
deny him the minimum obligational authority sufficient to carry this 
power into effect.”350 Interestingly, however, the executive branch has on 
occasion rejected broad claims of presidential power over governmental 
funds. A prime example is William Rehnquist’s opinion, when head of 
OLC, disclaiming presidential impoundment authority in the face of a 
congressional directive to spend, despite presidential impoundment 
practices dating back to the eighteenth century.351 
                                                                                                                           
 346. The Federalist No. 58, at 359 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1st ed. 1961). 
 347. See Wilmerding, supra note 36, at 20–49. 
 348. Id. at 4–19. 
 349. Price, supra note 33, at 373–78; see also Legis. Prohibiting Spending for 
Delegations to U.N. Agencies Chaired by Countries that Support Int’l Terrorism, 33 Op. 
O.L.C. 221, 221 (2009) (concluding that a limit in an appropriations act prohibiting 
spending funds for U.S. delegation to certain United Nations bodies unconstitutionality 
infringed on the President’s constitutional power to conduct foreign relations and may be 
disregarded); Memorial of Captain Meigs, 9 Op. Att’y Gen. 462, 468–69 (1860) (stating, in 
the course of interpreting an appropriations provision, that Congress could not interfere 
with the President’s constitutional power to determine “what officer shall perform any 
particular duty”). 
 350. Auth. for the Continuance of Gov’t Functions During a Temp. Lapse in 
Appropriations, 43 Op. Att’y Gen. 293, 297, 299 (1981); see also Memorandum from Walter 
Dellinger, Assistant Att’y Gen., Off. of Legal Couns. to the Dir., Off. of Mgmt. & Budget, 
Gov’t Operations in the Event of a Lapse in Appropriations 4–5 (Aug. 16, 1995), 
https://www.justice.gov/opinion/file/844116/download [https://perma.cc/9DDP-WWPT] 
(agreeing with the 1981 opinion’s exception to the Antideficiency Act for presidential 
powers). 
 351. Presidential Authority to Impound Funds Appropriated for Assistance to Federally 
Impacted Schools, 1 Op. O.L.C. Supp. 303, 309–11 (1969); see also Memorandum from 
Homer S. Cummings to the President, Presidential Authority to Direct Departments and 
Agencies to Withhold Expenditures from Appropriations Made 16 (May 27, 1937), 
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Courts have not ruled on whether any such presidential spending 
authority exists.352 This is perhaps another sign of appropriations’ 
doctrinal marginalization but also reflects the fact that the political 
branches usually have avoided head-on disputes over appropriations.353 
Constitutional scholarship on the question is divided. In response to Iran–
Contra, Kate Stith concluded that the President and executive officials 
could never spend without legislative authorization,354 while Gregory Sidak 
argued that Presidents can spend the minimum amount they deem 
necessary in order to wield presidential prerogatives or satisfy presidential 
duties, even if Congress has denied funds or provided a lesser amount.355 
More often, claims for presidential spending authority fall somewhere in 
between these extremes. Recently, for example, Zachary Price has argued 
that the President can spend without congressional authorization only 
with respect to what Price terms “resource-independent” powers that the 
President can exercise personally and that serve to check the legislative 
branch or assert presidential control over the executive.356 Yet even mod-
erate efforts run into difficulties, given the lack of a textual basis for the 
lines they draw and the presence of conflicting structural imperatives.357 
                                                                                                                           
https://www.justice.gov/file/19191/download [https://perma.cc/6DAF-98CU] (“Opin-
ions of the Attorney General indicate that presidential power over appropriations must find 
its source in legislation.”). 
 352. Price, supra note 33, at 379. One decision that arguably comes close is United States 
v. Klein, which invalidated a provision in an appropriations bill stripping jurisdiction over 
some claims on the grounds, among others, that the provision “impair[ed]” the effect of a 
presidential pardon. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 147–48 (1871). But Klein is a notoriously opaque 
decision more focused on congressional power to strip court jurisdiction, and it discusses 
appropriations only in passing. See id. at 144, 146–47. A more express rejection of the 
proposition of independent presidential spending authority came from Justice McReynolds 
dissenting in Myers v. United States. See 272 U.S. 52, 187 (1926) (McReynolds, J., dissenting) 
(“He must utilize the force which Congress gives. He cannot, without permission, appoint 
the humblest clerk or expend a dollar of the public funds.”). 
 353. For instance, despite questioning the constitutionality of an appropriations 
provision prohibiting the use of funds to transfer Guantánamo Bay detainees, President 
Obama generally complied with its terms. Price, supra note 33, at 374–75. 
 354. Stith, supra note 34, at 1345, 1348–51, 1356–61; see also Prakash, supra note 196, 
at 704 (“The President may wish to have funds to defray the projected expenses of the 
executive branch, but he has no constitutional right to them.”). 
 355. Sidak, supra note 34, at 1166–73, 1185–94. 
 356. Price, supra note 33, at 361–63. Price further contends that Congress cannot use 
its appropriations power to manipulate how the President wields her constitutional powers. 
Id. at 404–13; see also Banks & Raven-Hansen, supra note 37, at 160–63, 166–68 (denying 
that the President has inherent spending authority and assessing the constitutionality of 
spending limits by balancing the extent of intrusion on presidential constitutional functions 
against congressional need). 
 357. As a case in point, Price’s intriguing account runs into the difficulty that no 
presidential powers are truly and distinctively resource independent. Meaningful exercise 
of the veto, pardon, and appointment powers, for example, entails resources and staff. Price 
acknowledges as much and focuses instead on the formal exercise of these powers, which 
he argues a President could do alone. Price, supra note 33, at 390–91, 406–07. But it is also 
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The claim that Presidents enjoy broad independent authority to 
spend as they deem necessary is impossible to square with the 
Appropriations Clause’s text and history. Contrary to the Civiletti 
Memorandum’s assertion, even a more limited presidential authority to 
obligate the minimal level of funds objectively necessary to wield express 
presidential powers is far from “manifest[].”358 To be sure, allowing 
Congress carte blanche to prevent the President from exercising expressly 
granted powers through funding denials is also constitutionally troubling, 
with its theoretical potential to undermine the ability of Presidents to per-
form their constitutional functions.359 But the best way to accommodate 
these dueling constitutional imperatives may well be to conclude that 
Congress is constitutionally obliged to provide the funds needed for the 
President to function effectively, not that the President can claim 
constitutional authority to spend unauthorized funds when Congress fails 
to act. In her seminal work on the appropriations power, Stith made a 
structural argument for such a nonjudicially enforceable duty, contending 
that “Congress is obliged to provide public funds for constitutionally 
mandated activities—both obligations imposed on the government 
generally and independent constitutional activities of the President.”360 
Even accepting that some independent presidential spending 
authority exists, however, it is operative at the margins. Hence, this debate 
should not obscure the fundamental thrust of the Appropriations Clause 
as a central mechanism of congressional empowerment. Correspondingly, 
the rationales for appropriations marginalization in public law doctrine 
should be assessed, at least in part, on the extent to which they accord with 
this congressional empowering function. 
2. The Illegitimacy of Prioritizing Substantive Statutes. — This constitu-
tional backdrop undercuts those forms of appropriations marginalization 
                                                                                                                           
possible to imagine the President formally undertaking direct law enforcement, albeit 
poorly, or—to name two early functions of the early American state—providing customs 
guidance or deciding on applications for land grants. See Jerry L. Mashaw, Creating the 
Administration Constitution: The Lost One Hundred Years of American Administrative Law 
34 (2012). More persuasive is Price’s emphasis on whether a presidential power operates as 
a check on Congress and whether Congress is seeking to manipulate the exercise of 
presidential powers. Price, supra note 33, at 395, 405–06. But one could argue that these 
factors resolve to the familiar if amorphous inquiry into “the extent to which [a legislative 
restriction] prevents the Executive Branch from accomplishing its constitutionally assigned 
functions.” Nixon v. Adm’r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 443 (1977). 
 358. Auth. for the Continuance of Gov’t Functions During a Temp. Lapse in 
Appropriations, 43 Op. Att’y Gen. 293, 299 (1981). Constitutional scholar Charles Black 
famously stated that “Congress could . . . reduce the president’s staff to one secretary for 
answering social correspondence.” Charles L. Black, Jr., The Working Balance of the 
American Political Departments, 1 Hastings Const. L.Q. 13, 15 (1974). 
 359. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 691 (1988) (“[T]he real question is whether 
the removal restrictions are of such a nature that they impede the President’s ability to 
perform his constitutional duty.”).  
 360. Stith, supra note 34, at 1348–52. 
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that are based on prioritizing substantive statutes over appropriations 
measures. Provision of Congress’s new substantive authorities, especially 
the power to regulate foreign and interstate commerce, was also a central 
concern of the Framers.361 But acknowledging appropriations’ constitu-
tional importance does not entail subordinating Congress’s other author-
ities. The claim is instead simply that the policy choices Congress makes 
using its appropriations power deserve equal stature. Indeed, despite 
rivalries between authorization and appropriations committees, the 
relationship between Congress’s substantive and appropriations powers is 
more supportive when viewed from the perspective of Congress as a 
whole.362 In particular, appropriations can serve to reinforce Congress’s 
substantive authorities by providing ongoing avenues for congressional 
control of policy in between enactment of substantive measures. In a world 
marked by broad delegations of substantive authority to the executive 
branch, the need to secure annual appropriations “preserve[s] 
congressional influence over the executive’s implementation of perma-
nent programs.”363 Appropriations also may allow for discrete policy 
adjustments without opening up the broader policy for revision.364 
This suggests a broader flaw in the prioritization of substantive 
statutes over appropriations. Underlying this prioritization is a misguided 
understanding of lawmaking that puts primacy on initial enactments. But 
in fact, lawmaking is a far more iterative and ongoing process, with 
Congress responding to executive branch implementation and policies 
and the executive branch in turn responding to Congress. Appropriations 
measures are a critical part of that ongoing process—along with oversight, 
informal legislative–executive interactions, appropriations authorizations, 
and statutory amendments. Taking appropriations seriously thus allows for 
a fuller and more accurate understanding of our constitutional system for 
making law. 
a. Political Accountability. — Those prioritizing Congress’s substantive 
authorities often justify doing so on political accountability grounds. A 
familiar critique of policy-based appropriations riders is that they are 
adopted by appropriations committees whose members and staff have less 
expertise in the substantive area in question.365 In addition, the time 
restrictions of the appropriations process offer little opportunity to 
                                                                                                                           
 361. See Klarman, supra note 332, at 21–25, 129. 
 362. Cf. Black, supra note 358, at 15 (“And underlying all the powers of Congress is the 
appropriations power . . . .”). 
 363. Lawrence, Disappropriation, supra note 30, at 54, 58–60; see also Chafetz, 
Congress’s Constitution, supra note 37, at 61–66 (“[I]ncreased budgetary capacity gives 
Congress more power to affect non-fiscal policy.”); Beermann, supra note 30, at 85–90 
(discussing Congress’s use of appropriations riders to supervise the execution of federal 
laws). 
 364. See McCubbins & Rodriguez, supra note 287, at 705–06. 
 365. See, e.g., Lazarus, supra note 90, at 653–56. 
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ventilate issues or explore alternatives, and members often vote on vast 
omnibus appropriations bills without knowing what they contain.366 More-
over, sometimes the appropriations process can seem like crass politics at 
its worst, filled with leadership backroom deals and logrolling to get mem-
bers of Congress on board.367 By contrast, authorizing legislation—
whether in the form of organic statutes or periodic appropriations author-
izations—originates with the legislative committee that has substantive 
responsibility for the relevant subject area. Not only do its members and 
staff have greater knowledge of the field, they are more connected to the 
relevant stakeholders and programmatic agency staff, and the slower pro-
cess of enactment for authorization measures allows more opportunity for 
investigation and consideration.368 The greater deliberation and debate 
connected to substantive enactments are also said to ensure that members 
of Congress are aware of the policy being enacted and allow broader pop-
ular engagement.369 These arguments connect to the Constitution’s 
concern with ensuring deliberation in lawmaking, so as “to protect the 
whole people from improvident laws” by ensuring “that the legislative 
power would be exercised only after opportunity for full study and debate 
in separate settings.”370 
It’s worth noting, however, that other scholars have questioned these 
characterizations, arguing that in fact the Appropriations Committees are 
more representative of Congress, appropriations bills are more bipartisan, 
and the appropriations process is in some ways more transparent and open 
than are authorizing committees and legislation.371 Recent experience 
with earmarks provides a good illustration of this point. For many, 
earmarks—specific allocations of funds at the behest of a member of 
Congress as the price of the member’s support for appropriations bills—
are the epitome of corrupt politics and wasteful spending. Yet some 
scholars argue that singling out earmarks for condemnation of this score 
                                                                                                                           
 366. See, e.g., Luke Broadwater, Jesse Drucker & Rebecca R. Ruiz, Buried in Pandemic 
Aid Bill: Billions to Soothe the Richest, N.Y. Times (Dec. 22, 2020), https://www.nytimes. 
com/2020/12/22/us/politics/whats-in-the-covid-relief-bill.html (on file with the Columbia 
Law Review) (describing a rushed COVID-19 stimulus bill that lawmakers could not read in 
advance). 
 367. See Sinclair, supra note 74, at 111–14, 117–20; Lazarus, supra note 90, at 650; Price, 
supra note 33, at 368–69. 
 368. See Lazarus, supra note 90, at 653–61; see also Adler & Walker, supra note 164, at 
1956; Devins, supra note 94, at 457–58; Chuzi, supra note 59, at 1005–07. 
 369. See Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S 153, 190–91 (1978); see also Elizabeth 
Garrett, Rethinking the Structures of Decisionmaking in the Federal Budget Process, 35 
Harv. J. on Legis. 387, 425–26 (1998) (“[T]he formulation of the federal budget . . . is a 
complex process in which important decisions can be hidden in omnibus bills or through 
the use of dense, technical language . . . . In short, the complexity and immensity of 
budgeting undermine the value of political accountability.”). 
 370. Immigr. & Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983). 
 371. See, e.g., McCubbins & Rodriguez, supra note 287, at 695–706. 
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is unjustified; corruption in the form of undue influence and lobbying by 
regulated interests is often at play in substantive legislation as well, if less 
transparent and acknowledged.372 Moreover, while enactment of an 
earmark ban in 2011 did not remove corruption from politics, it did serve 
to make enacting legislation more difficult, by denying legislators a central 
tool for obtaining buy-in from lawmakers.373 
Even if the claimed political accountability advantages of authori-
zation statutes are real, such differences do not justify courts prioritizing 
substantive enactments as a constitutional matter. The constitutional con-
cern with deliberation is not free-floating but instead derives from the 
bicameralism and presentment process for legislation.374 That process 
applies to both substantive and appropriations measures. As important, 
the Constitution leaves the choice of procedures for enacting legislation 
beyond bicameralism and presentment entirely up to Congress.375 This 
means that Congress gets to decide whether to set policy through substan-
tive enactments or appropriations and also could provide for greater delib-
eration of policy measures attached to appropriations if it so chose. If 
Congress hasn’t done so, no constitutional basis exists for courts to second-
guess Congress’s choices. 
A potentially stronger argument for prioritizing substantive enact-
ments is that the House and Senate, exercising their procedural authority, 
have long had rules barring legislating through appropriations.376 But 
these rules contain many exceptions and are frequently waived, and if 
thereby inapplicable should not get interpretive weight.377 Furthermore, if 
Congress is now choosing to set policy through appropriations, then 
respecting Congress’s exercise of its constitutional prerogatives prohibits 
courts from enforcing congressional rules to which Congress itself no 
longer adheres. 
                                                                                                                           
 372. Cuéllar, supra note 320, at 277; see also Russell W. Mills & Nicole Kalaf-Hughes, 
Exit Earmarks, Enter Lettermarks, R Street Policy Study, Jan. 2017, at 2–5 (“Despite the ban 
on earmarks, political scientists would argue that lawmakers still face electoral pressure to 
secure federal funding for their districts.”). 
 373. See Mills & Kalaf-Hughes, supra note 372, at 2–3; Cuéllar, supra note 320, at 254–
55. But see Andrew H. Sidman, Pork Barrel Politics: How Government Spending 
Determines Elections in a Polarized Era 131 (2019) (questioning the extent to which 
lawmakers will trade votes for earmarks under polarization). 
 374. See Chadha, 462 U.S. at 950–51; John F. Manning, Separation of Powers as Ordinary 
Interpretation, 124 Harv. L. Rev. 1939, 1982–83 (2011) (“By carving up the lawmaking 
power . . . [bicameralism and presentment] appears to promote several overlapping inter-
ests: . . . [I]t restrains momentary passions by promoting caution and deliberation . . . .” 
(footnote omitted)). 
 375. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 5, cl. 2 (“Each House may determine the Rules of its 
Proceedings . . . .”); Marshall Field & Co. v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 671 (1892). 
 376. See supra note 61 and accompanying text. 
 377. See Chuzi, supra note 59, at 1003–04. 
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Equally important, comparative assessment of political accountability 
cannot be made in a theoretical vacuum. The argument for prioritizing 
substantive measures based on their functional advantages fails to account 
for contemporary governance realities of deep partisan polarization and 
divisiveness in Congress.378 Setting policy by substantive legislation may 
well be the preferred course, and Congress still enacts many substantive 
measures.379 Realistically, however, substantive legislative enactments are 
very difficult now for many contentious policy areas.380 If in practice appro-
priations measures are a central mechanism by which Congress is able to 
act today, then appropriations are a better policymaking tool for Congress 
than substantive enactments alone. Under these circumstances, prioritiz-
ing substantive enactments over more contemporaneous policy choices 
contained in appropriations measures serves to disempower the current 
Congress compared to its predecessors. Moreover, if appropriations are 
the terrain on which policy is actually determined, then public law’s focus 
on authorization statutes and processes obscures power realities and mis-
directs public attention. Public law doctrine would better serve accounta-
bility goals by acknowledging reality and potentially spurring changes to 
improve the policy-setting capacity of the appropriations process.381 
b. The Rule of Law. — A separate argument for prioritizing substantive 
enactments is that doing so advances the rule of law by protecting reliance 
and helping ensure the government lives up to its funding commitments. 
This rule of law concern underlies the Court’s special resistance to implied 
repeal by appropriations statutes, especially when parties provided services 
based on statutory promises of payment. But the same concern can exist 
when a program promises permanent benefits yet is funded on an annual 
basis and Congress fails to provide adequate funding.382 Indeed, arguably 
a similar concern exists when Congress imposes substantive responsibili-
ties on agencies and then massively underfunds them. Even when the 
national government is not unfairly profiting from services it has not paid 
for, a wide array of actors may end up relying on the government to per-
form promised tasks to their detriment. 
                                                                                                                           
 378. See supra text accompanying notes 86–90. 
 379. See Adler & Walker, supra note 164, at 1957; Chuzi, supra note 59, at 1019–24; 
Sean Farhang, Legislative Capacity and Administrative Power Under Divided Polarization 
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Review) (unpublished manuscript). 
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 382. Lawrence, Disappropriation, supra note 30, at 47–51. 
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Although these reliance and fairness concerns are quite real, it is hard 
to justify appropriations marginalization on rule of law grounds. To begin 
with, there is a tension between these reliance and fairness concerns on 
the one hand and political accountability on the other. In essence, the 
concern is that it is too easy for Congress to change policy through appro-
priations, but that very ability to change policy with relative ease enhances 
political accountability.383 Lawrence has sought to reconcile this tension by 
emphasizing the political accountability costs of courts mistakenly con-
cluding that an appropriations statute denied funding for a statutory obli-
gation when that was not what Congress and the President intended. He 
argues that to avoid thereby frustrating “the will of . . . Congress as 
expressed in a clear underlying permanent legislative commitment[,] . . . 
courts should presume when interpreting ambiguous appropriations that 
Congress always pays its debts.”384 Yet such a presumption would simply 
trade one political accountability hit for another, namely the risk that 
courts then would downplay congressional efforts to change substantive 
law through appropriations. An approach more likely to approximate con-
gressional intent on the whole would be for courts to interpret the appro-
priations measure at issue without presumptions either way. 
More broadly, privileging substantive enactments over appropriations 
can undermine the rule of law by increasing the risk of legal system 
inconsistency. The ACA risk corridor program provides a case in point. 
There, Congress both imposed funding obligations on the government 
and clearly prohibited the government from meeting that obligation 
through the risk corridor rider. Reading a later-in-time appropriations 
measure as altering a payment promise may actually advance rule of law 
concerns by removing such contradictions. Indeed, the Federal Circuit 
appears to have made a move along these lines, arguing that Congress 
would not intend the risk corridor funding obligation to exist in “fiscal 
limbo.”385 Of course, that leaves the substantial inequity of plans incurring 
the substantial financial costs of participating in the ACA exchanges only 
to have the government renege on its promise to pay after the fact. But 
unless the government’s action amounted to a regulatory taking or due 
process violation, this inequity is one for Congress to remedy or avoid 
causing in the first place. 
Appropriations marginalization undermines the rule of law in other 
ways as well. In the form of jurisdictional exclusion, appropriations 
marginalization can put appropriations challenges outside the orbit of 
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judicial scrutiny, thereby limiting the extent to which courts are available 
to ensure that the government operates within its lawful authority—a 
policing role that contributes to the legitimacy of the national 
administrative state.386 The rule of law is similarly at odds with the 
sovereignty claims that underlie appropriations marginalization; whereas 
the former demands that the government operate in accordance with the 
law, the latter excuses the government from being legally forced to meet 
its obligations or pay for its legal transgressions.387 Given Congress’s 
enactment of numerous statutes consenting to suit against the 
government, one could question the extent to which sovereignty can 
justify appropriations marginalization today, at least independent from 
concerns with protecting the prerogatives of the political branches.388 At a 
minimum, however, relying simultaneously on the rule of law and 
sovereignty to justify appropriations marginalization seems incongruous. 
c. The Duty to Fund. — I have elsewhere suggested that while Congress 
can alter the government’s substantive responsibilities, it may violate a 
nonjusticiable constitutional duty to fund if it leaves statutory responsibil-
ities in place but sabotages the government’s ability to meet them by 
providing grossly inadequate funding.389 Although early suggestions of 
such a duty can be found in congressional debates, these suggestions did 
not bear fruit and today “the great weight of historical practice contradicts 
it.”390 But a duty to fund can be based on a structural constitutional prin-
ciple of a duty to supervise delegated power.391 Arguably, it could also be 
rooted in constitutional concerns to secure effective government—con-
cerns that animated the Framers to grant Congress direct revenue-raising 
capacity.392 Albeit different in scope, such a duty bears similarities to Stith’s 
claim that the grant to the President of certain constitutional powers 
entails the minimum resources necessary to wield them.393 She also argued 
that “Congress has not only the power but also the duty to exercise 
                                                                                                                           
 386. On the historical importance of the availability of judicial review to the legitimacy 
of administrative government, see generally Daniel R. Ernst, Tocqueville’s Nightmare: The 
Administrative State Emerges in America, 1900–1940 (2014) (discussing the rise of judicial 
review of administrative procedure and agency fact-finding). 
 387. The tension between sovereign immunity and the rule of law is well known. See, 
e.g., United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 220 (1882) (rejecting the federal government’s claim 
to sovereign immunity and proclaiming that “[n]o man in this country is so high that he is 
above the law”); Jackson, Suing the Federal Government, supra note 307, at 523. 
 388. See Hart & Wechsler, supra note 172, at 896–904 (describing relevant statutes). 
 389. Gillian E. Metzger, The Constitutional Duty to Supervise, 124 Yale L.J. 1836, 1931–
32 (2015) [hereinafter Metzger, Duty to Supervise]. 
 390. Price, supra note 33, at 382–86 (describing the surfacing of the duty to fund idea 
in the Jay Treaty and Reconstruction debates). 
 391. Metzger, Duty to Supervise, supra note 389, at 1931–32. 
 392. See supra text accompanying notes 332–333. 
 393. See supra text accompanying note 354. 
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legislative control over federal expenditures.”394 Where specific statutory 
obligations and commitments are involved, due process and fundamental 
fairness concerns also come into play in justifying a duty to fund.395 
Such a duty to fund is somewhat in tension with my argument here, 
insofar as the duty prioritizes substantive legislation over appropriations 
measures as the means by which Congress sets policy. Moreover, given its 
constitutional basis, a duty to fund should trump countervailing policy 
concerns. The judicial nonenforceability of the duty mitigates this tension 
to some extent, but does not fully remove it. Congress is independently 
obligated to adhere to constitutional requirements, whether or not those 
are judicially enforced. 
One factor helping to alleviate this tension is that such a general duty 
to fund is largely operative at the extremes of funding denial for an agency 
and thus likely would not come into play in the mine run of congressional 
appropriations decisions. Even more important, the duty to fund is 
compatible with a robust view of Congress’s appropriations power when 
both are understood as part of an overall obligation by Congress to 
supervise delegated authority. Whether providing adequate funding or 
refusing to fund on policy grounds, Congress is playing that supervisory 
role. The two are also aligned in both offering ways of targeting systemic 
legal inconsistency, albeit from opposite angles—one urging Congress to 
provide funding to meet statutory obligations and the other arguing that 
Congress’s failure to fund should be recognized as sometimes changing 
the underlying law. 
3. Appropriations Marginalization and the Separation of Powers. — Priori-
tizing substantive enactments thus fails to justify appropriations marginal-
ization. But the rationale of preserving political branch prerogatives, 
especially of Congress, appears to have a stronger basis. Limiting the 
appearance of appropriations disputes in court allows Congress broad 
room to wield its appropriations power without fear of judicial intrusion. 
In practice, knowing that Congress can enact detailed appropriations that 
would restrict agencies’ flexibility has incentivized agencies to be attentive 
to their congressional funders’ informal instructions on how funds should 
be used.396 Moreover, current doctrine gives Congress some say over when 
judicial review is available, in that Congress can increase court access by 
providing for specific mandatory appropriations. At the same time, leaving 
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appropriations to the political branches has kept the scope of presidential 
spending authority an open question for political negotiation rather than 
judicial resolution. 
The suggestion that separation of powers considerations militate 
against judicial involvement in setting the metes and bounds of appropri-
ations powers is an unusual one for the Supreme Court. Although in the 
past the Court was often willing to leave separation of powers to political 
determination, its course over many decades has been markedly differ-
ent.397 Today, the Justices portray judicial enforcement of the separation 
of powers as essential to the preservation of individual liberty, a task the 
Court is duty-bound to perform.398 A number of scholars question this turn 
to the courts to resolve separation of powers disputes between the political 
branches. They argue variously that the current judicialization of such 
disputes is a historical anomaly,399 that courts are unlikely to resolve these 
disputes well,400 and that the net result is just another separation of powers 
problem in the form of aggrandizement of the courts.401 From this 
perspective, the marginalization of appropriations in public law doctrine 
is a welcome and rare instance of courts adhering to their proper historical 
role. 
Yet this focus on judicial aggrandizement obscures that there is a real 
separation of powers cost to the doctrinal marginalization of appropria-
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tions. Increasingly, it operates to expand presidential power over govern-
ment funds at Congress’s expense. As the border wall and Ukraine epi-
sodes demonstrate, presidential control over budget execution provides 
significant opportunity to reprogram, transfer, and delay obligation of 
funds.402 And appropriations marginalization means that the executive 
branch can often do so in ways that deviate from governing statutes with 
limited fear of legal reprisal. Standing and justiciability doctrines create 
substantial barriers to some suits seeking to enforce appropriation statutes. 
Even private entities denied funding may lack a judicial remedy if the 
appropriation was expended or is discretionary, assuming no independent 
legal violation.403 Seeds of judicial shift are evident in the lower courts, with 
the Ninth Circuit’s decision allowing states and environmental 
organizations to bring an APA challenge to Trump’s border wall 
reprogramming and the D.C. Circuit’s decision allowing the House of 
Representatives to challenge the legality of this action.404 The Supreme 
Court has yet to bless these decisions, however.405 
Granted, Trump’s assertions of appropriations power were extreme 
and perhaps should not be the basis for broader doctrinal rethinking. But 
to view these appropriations actions as simply phenomena isolated to the 
Trump presidency is to ignore the broader background of deep political 
polarization of which they are part. In an era in which a political tribalism 
led well over a hundred members of Congress to challenge President 
Biden’s victory in court and at the electoral college count,406 it is hard to 
imagine that such political manipulation of appropriations will suddenly 
disappear. All the more because Trump’s actions were part of a trend 
toward greater presidential efforts to manipulate appropriations for policy 
gain that also surfaced under Obama.407 In addition, the impact of this de 
facto presidential control over funding needs to be assessed against the 
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background of significantly expanded presidential assertions of adminis-
trative power generally.408 One of Congress’s main tools to push back at 
such presidential unilateralism is its control of the purse. As a result, the 
inability to enforce appropriations constraints on the executive branch 
can have a far-reaching effect on the legislative–executive balance of 
power. 
Of course, Congress has the ability to punish the executive branch for 
appropriations transgressions without resorting to the courts, by overturn-
ing executive branch repurposing of funds, enacting new constraints, or 
cutting agency funding. But leaving aside the question of how these new 
constraints then get enforced on a recalcitrant executive branch, the same 
partisan divisions that lead to appropriations exploitation will prove an 
obstacle to congressional response. Of particular note, it is much harder 
for Congress to enact legislation overturning presidential uses of already 
appropriated funds than to deny the funds in the first place. Overturning 
legislation will inevitably face a presidential veto and lacks the must-pass 
status of the initial appropriations bill. Meanwhile, retaliation in the next 
appropriations bill may come too late, and in some contexts Congress may 
not be willing to dramatically cut back funding. An equally critical factor 
is the partisan politics that characterize Congress today. For Congress to 
succeed in rebuffing presidential spending adventurism, both houses 
need to be committed to asserting their institutional prerogatives over 
appropriations. But as Daryl Levinson and Richard Pildes have 
underscored, partisan rather than institutional ties drive Congress.409 
Other important nonjudicial checks against presidential abuse of 
spending authority exist, such as oversight from GAO and inspectors 
general (IGs), executive branch lawyers, and agency officials who may fear 
personal Antideficiency Act liability.410 Such internal governmental checks 
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are essential law-enforcing mechanisms in the administrative state.411 Yet 
their effectiveness may be limited in the face of presidential resistance. 
Both GAO and IGs can be sidelined by the executive branch, as has 
occurred in recent years.412 It also seems unlikely that the executive branch 
would impose penalties on agency officials who spend or withhold funds 
at the direction of the President, OMB, or their agency leadership. A 
future administration led by a different party might do so, but the 
Antideficiency Act has never been criminally enforced, and administrative 
penalties will not be relevant for political officials who have left the 
government.413 
A more basic flaw with arguments for political rather than legal 
enforcement of appropriations limits is that these two types of constraints 
are interdependent.414 The effectiveness of political branch appropria-
tions checks often stems from legal checks that lie in the background. 
Agencies will likely be more attentive to congressional input on spending 
if they fear a lawsuit that would enjoin their funding moves as unauthor-
ized, thereby forestalling independent executive branch action. The 
opposite is also true; particularly given the lack of transparency involving 
appropriations, litigation may often depend on internal watchdogs, GAO 
investigations, or congressional hearings for evidence of executive branch 
violations of appropriations statutes. In short, neither legal nor political 
mechanisms of enforcement may be as effective alone as they are together. 
Hence, even if in theory the marginalization of appropriations in 
public law doctrine corresponds to the constitutional assignment of 
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appropriations to Congress, in practice it operates to erode that 
constitutional structure. Against the background of today’s political 
climate and the structural barriers Congress faces in reacting to executive 
branch abuses of appropriations, leaving appropriations to the political 
branches too often amounts to transferring a de facto power over 
appropriations to the President. Correspondingly, expanding judicial 
involvement in appropriations may actually serve to enforce the separation 
of powers insofar as it reasserts congressional appropriations control. 
This is not to deny that drawing courts more into appropriations 
disputes can have real downsides. In addition to a systemic risk of judicial 
aggrandizement, greater judicial scrutiny can tie executive branch appro-
priations actions up in litigation, a significant issue in the appropriations 
context when funds must be obligated within a one-year window and the 
government needs flexibility to respond to sudden demands.415 Perhaps 
more concerning, greater judicial involvement can operate to further 
undermine longstanding appropriations norms that are not judicially 
enforceable, such as the practice of agencies obtaining the approval of 
their appropriations subcommittee before reprogramming appropriated 
funds.416 
What this means is that neither judicial involvement nor judicial 
exclusion is appropriate across the board. Instead, a nuanced approach is 
required that will target judicial involvement in ways that strengthen 
congressional power over appropriations and recognize appropriations as 
a central congressional policy-setting tool. 
IV. INCORPORATING APPROPRIATIONS 
Taking appropriations seriously requires action by all three branches 
of government. Recent developments have identified areas that could 
benefit from legislative reform, from the lack of transparency over budget 
execution and apportionment to the breadth of statutory grants of transfer 
authority.417 Congress also could expand its use of appropriations to push 
back at other forms of executive branch excess and should consider 
amending its internal rules governing appropriations to better align with 
its actual practices.418 Meanwhile the executive branch could renew its 
commitment to appropriations norms and issue new regulations and 
guidance that pull back from more aggressive appropriations practices. 
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This Part takes up the task of sketching what taking appropriations 
seriously might mean for the courts. It assesses how existing public law 
doctrines should be altered to better take account of appropriations. It 
then examines what such an approach might mean in practice by applying 
it to the border wall dispute. 
A. Incorporating Appropriations in Public Law Doctrine 
Accepting that appropriations should be incorporated more into 
public law doctrine, what would that entail? At a minimum, taking appro-
priations seriously requires actually engaging with appropriations. As a 
result, of the techniques used to marginalize appropriations, appropria-
tions silence is the hardest to justify. On the other hand, the derivation of 
special rules for appropriations per se—appropriations exceptionalism—
often may be the proper approach. Many congressional powers are 
governed by distinct doctrines, reflecting their different constitutional 
scope and basis.419 No reason exists why the same should not be true about 
the appropriations power, provided the appropriations-specific rule does 
not stem from an effort to minimize appropriations’ significance. Put dif-
ferently, appropriations exceptionalism is problematic when it unjustifi-
ably subordinates Congress’s power of the purse. Appropriations-specific 
rules that help ensure the effectiveness and equal treatment of Congress’s 
appropriations power, or that reflect the scope and unique features of that 
power, are legitimate. 
The following discussion assesses how better to integrate appropria-
tions into current public law doctrine, focusing on the role of appropria-
tions in separation of powers analysis, interpretation of appropriations 
statutes, and jurisdiction over appropriations disputes. Importantly, in 
many instances taking appropriations seriously does not entail changes to 
current doctrine, even as it requires that courts engage with appropria-
tions more directly. 
1. Appropriations Exceptionalism and Constitutional Analysis. — The 
rejection of appropriations silence, and potential acceptability of appro-
priations exceptionalism, are of particular relevance to constitutional anal-
ysis. The Court’s general silence on appropriations in separation of powers 
cases is especially striking when considered against the constitutional 
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importance of Congress’s appropriations power and that power’s central 
role as a check on the executive branch. 
a. Delegation. — As suggested above, delegation challenges are one 
area where express consideration of appropriations is particularly merited, 
all the more so given the current interest in revitalizing the nondelegation 
doctrine.420 The SORNA example discussed above421 provides an illustra-
tion of what paying attention to appropriations in delegation challenges 
would look like in practice. Had the SORNA appropriation acts expressly 
included provision of funds to enforce application of SORNA to all pre-
Act offenders, that would have defeated the delegation challenge on its 
own. Even an express reference in the statutory text to “the estimated 
caseload of 100,000 noncompliant sex offenders,” a number that necessi-
tated SORNA applying to all pre-Act offenders, should have sufficed. As 
discussed below, a strong argument can be made that the statements in the 
Appropriations Committee’s reports to this effect should be viewed as 
establishing that Congress understood the Act to apply to all pre-Act 
offenders or sanctioned that application.422 At a minimum, however, this 
evidence should have been considered by the Court, along with the other 
provisions of SORNA’s text and history, as a constraint on executive 
branch discretion. 
More broadly, the fact that Congress oversees and controls agency 
implementation of statutes through the appropriation process—even 
absent reference to the specific agency action provoking a delegation 
challenge—is further support for the largely moribund state of the 
nondelegation doctrine. In the face of this practice, nondelegation’s 
central claim that agencies are setting policy without Congress is hard to 
maintain. Similarly, the fact that Congress specifically provides funds for 
an agency to undertake certain responsibilities should count as express 
delegation for purposes of assessing whether Congress wished to assign 
those responsibilities to the agency.423 Taking appropriations seriously 
requires acknowledging that the delegation of authority in a substantive 
or organic statute is only one component in determining the scope of an 
agency’s discretion; the amount of funds that Congress has provided for 
the agency to perform specific tasks is another crucial variable. Further-
more, although perhaps most salient to functionalist and pragmatic 
approaches to constitutional structure, this ongoing control through 
appropriations would seem relevant to assessing the constitutionality of 
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delegations across a range of interpretive methods.424 The fact that this 
control results from appropriations statutes enacted annually through 
bicameralism and presentment should matter to textualists and formalists, 
while early British and American uses of appropriations to constrain exec-
utive officials suggest that appropriations should also be relevant for 
originalists.425 
A separate question is whether Congress should be able to delegate 
control over appropriations to the executive branch. The constitutional 
importance of Congress’s power of the purse as a check on the executive 
might suggest that delegations here should be narrow. In this vein, Stith 
argued that permanent appropriations are unconstitutional when 
Congress does not specify the total amount of spending authority and 
undertake periodic review and thereby check executive action.426 Yet 
Congress’s longstanding practices of permanent and lump-sum appropri-
ations, combined with the historical exemption of government funds from 
the usual separation of power constraints, makes imposing special delega-
tion constraints on appropriations hard to justify.427 Concerns about 
delegations of appropriation authority undermining the constitutional 
structure are better addressed by reading such grants of authority 
narrowly, as suggested below.428 
b. Bowsher, Clinton, and One-House Vetoes. — With respect to delega-
tion, express consideration of appropriations might thus simply lead to 
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Philip Bobbitt, Constitutional Fate: Theory of the Constitution 6–7 (1982); see also M. 
Elizabeth Magill, The Real Separation in Separation of Powers Law, 86 Va. L. Rev. 1127, 
1136–47 (2000) (describing functionalism and formalism in separation of powers analysis). 
 425. See Casper, supra note 47, at 2–8 (describing the use of appropriations by the 
British Parliament, as well as by colonial and early state legislatures, to control executive 
officials). The originalist assessment of appropriations is complicated by the early practice 
of distinguishing appropriations and substantive legislation. See supra text accompanying 
note 43. 
 426. Stith, supra note 34, at 1345–46, 1382–84. 
 427. See Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 466–67 (1998) (Scalia, J., dissenting); 
see also Cincinnati Soap Co. v. United States, 301 U.S. 308, 321–22 (1937) (“Appropriation 
and other acts of Congress are replete with instances of general appropriations of large 
amounts, to be allotted and expended as directed by designated government agencies.”); 
supra text accompanying notes 170–174 (describing the public rights doctrine). Some 
scholars argue that delegation restrictions are in fact looser when public rights are involved. 
See Aditya Bamzai, Delegation and Interpretive Discretion: Gundy, Kisor, and the Formation 
and Future of Administrative Law, 133 Harv. L. Rev. 164, 180–82 (2019); Harrison, supra 
note 316 (manuscript at 6–13). This is on top of recent scholarship contending that no 
historical foundation exists for the nondelegation doctrine at all. See Julian Davis 
Mortenson & Nicholas Bagley, Delegation at the Founding, 121 Colum. L. Rev. 277, 279–82 
(2021). But see Ilan Wurman, Nondelegation at the Founding, 130 Yale L.J. (forthcoming 
2021) (manuscript at 4–9), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3559867 
[https://perma.cc/HYR5-BP4N] (disputing Mortenson and Bagley’s view). 
 428. See infra text accompanying note 442. 
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assimilation of appropriations into existing frameworks. In other 
separation of powers contexts, however, it might yield appropriations 
exceptionalism. Consider Bowsher in this regard, where the Court held that 
the Gramm–Rudman–Hollings Act was unconstitutional without ever 
engaging with the fact that the Act was regulating the appropriations 
process.429 As Justice White argued in Bowsher, the Court’s emphasis on 
Congress’s potential role in removing the Comptroller General is an 
unsatisfactory basis for holding the Act unconstitutional. Indeed, given the 
Constitution’s emphasis on congressional exercise of the appropriations 
power and the fact that the Act assigned the Comptroller General a central 
role in determining the amounts available to agencies to spend, a lack of 
congressional role would be constitutionally suspicious. Justice Stevens’s 
concurrence, concluding that the Act was unconstitutional because the 
Comptroller was exercising legislative power outside of the bicameralism 
and presentment process, recognized this central point.430 But Stevens’s 
opinion in turn failed to consider whether the requirements of 
bicameralism and presentment apply the same way to appropriations 
measures as to other legislation.431 
A case also can be made for allowing one-house vetoes to cancel 
executive branch reprogramming of appropriated funds. To be sure, the 
Appropriations Clause makes clear that bicameralism and presentment 
are required to authorize an appropriation; absent that process, an 
appropriation would not be “made by Law.”432 But using one-house vetoes 
to cancel executive branch reprogramming—the effect of which is simply 
to reassert the original appropriation that Congress made through 
bicameralism and presentment—appears more compatible with the 
Clause’s text. Moreover, as Peter Strauss has argued, the appropriations 
process—marked by ongoing political negotiations, time-limited 
measures, at least annual use of the full legislative process, and the 
                                                                                                                           
 429. Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 763–73 (1986) (White, J., dissenting). 
 430. Id. at 737–39, 753–58. 
 431. In Stevens’s defense, that application would seem to follow from the Court’s 
decision in INS v. Chadha three years earlier, holding that all exercises of legislative power 
must go through bicameralism and presentment in the course of invalidating the legislative 
veto. 462 U.S. 919, 956–59 (1983). Although Chadha involved immigration adjudication, the 
Court subsequently summarily affirmed application of Chadha to other contexts. See, e.g., 
Process Gas Consumers Grp. of Am. v. Consumer Energy Council of Am., 463 U.S. 1216, 
1216 (1983), aff’g Consumer Energy Council of Am. v. Fed. Energy Regul. Comm’n, 673 
F.2d 425 (D.C. Cir. 1982). The D.C. Circuit paid more attention to the fact that 
appropriations were involved in concluding Congress would not want the President to be 
able to defer spending appropriated funds without the possibility of a legislative veto and 
therefore invalidated the deferral provision initially enacted under the ICA. But the D.C. 
Circuit also failed to consider if appropriations were any different, stating simply that “[t]he 
appellants concede, as they must, that the legislative veto provision . . . [in the ICA] is 
unconstitutional under” Chadha. City of New Haven v. United States, 809 F.2d 900, 905, 909 
(D.C. Cir. 1987). 
 432. U.S. Const. art. I, § 9. 
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President’s ability to gain additional discretion over spending as a result of 
Congress retaining veto power—differs from the enactment of permanent 
substantive legislation.433 Further, although appropriations measures can 
affect the “legal rights [and] duties” of government officials and other 
individuals “outside the legislative branch,” they do not directly regulate 
the private rights of individuals the same way that substantive legislation 
does.434 Perhaps most importantly, legislative vetoes appear part of the 
historical gloss put on appropriations by the practice of both the legislative 
and executive branches.435 Congress has long asserted its power to veto 
executive branch reprogramming actions through appropriations com-
mittee disapproval, including provisions to this effect in appropriations 
acts to this day.436 And while the executive branch has publicly disputed 
the constitutionality of such measures, for just as long it has largely 
conformed to Congress’s direction.437 
2. Interpreting Appropriations Legislation. — In the statutory interpreta-
tion context, the problem is less appropriations silence than appropria-
tions-specific interpretive rules that unjustifiably prioritize substantive leg-
islation. Taking appropriations seriously would foreclose the exceptionally 
high threshold courts currently apply before an appropriations measure is 
found to implicitly repeal substantive legislation. The same result should 
follow for the requirement that an appropriations act must use particular 
words of “futurity” before it is read as permanently altering substantive 
statutes. The futurity requirement is a closer case because a core feature 
of appropriations acts is their one-year duration. Hence, demanding some 
evidence that Congress intends a provision of an appropriations statute to 
have a longer effect is justifiable, even if specific to appropriations. But 
                                                                                                                           
 433. Peter L. Strauss, Was There a Baby in the Bathwater? A Comment on the Supreme 
Court’s Legislative Veto Decision, 1983 Duke L.J. 789, 813–14; see also Am. Fed’n of Gov’t 
Emps. v. Pierce, 697 F.2d 303, 308–09 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (Wald & Mikva, JJ., dissenting from 
denial of rehearing en banc) (urging en banc review of a pre-Chadha legislative veto decision 
invalidating a provision that required the House and Senate Appropriations Committees to 
approve the use of any funds to reorganize HUD and suggesting that legislative vetoes might 
be more acceptable in some contexts). 
 434. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 952; cf. Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1552 (2016) 
(Thomas, J., concurring) (arguing that the threshold of injury to sue to enforce a public 
right is greater). 
 435. Trump v. Mazars, 140 S. Ct. 2019, 2023 (2020) (“[L]ongstanding practice ‘is a 
consideration of great weight’ in cases concerning ‘the allocation of power between the two 
elected branches of Government’” (quoting Nat’l Lab. Rels. Bd. v. Noel Canning, 573 U.S. 
513, 524–26 (2014))). See generally Curtis A. Bradley & Trevor W. Morrison, Historical 
Gloss and the Separation of Powers, 126 Harv. L. Rev. 411 (2012) (discussing the role of 
historical practice in separation of powers analysis). 
 436. Fisher, Legislative Veto, supra note 225, at 290. 
 437. See Schick, Federal Budget, supra 44, at 271; Lazarus, supra note 90, at 649–52; 
supra text accompanying note 115; see also Bradley & Morrison, supra note 435, at 454 
(emphasizing that there is a greater basis on which to infer executive branch acquiescence 
from conformity over time). 
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requiring that evidence to take a magic-words form seems to go too far, as 
Congress could indicate that intent in a variety of ways.438 
On the other hand, the appropriations-specific rule of giving weight 
to GAO’s views appears a legitimate reflection of the central role Congress 
has assigned GAO in appropriations disputes. While the courts’ reluctance 
to defer to agency interpretations of appropriations statutes often reflects 
broader deference doctrines,439 it also accords with core features of appro-
priations. The general presumption that Congress intends agencies to fill 
gaps in the statutes they implement does not fit well with appropriations 
realities, given Congress’s use of appropriations to control the executive 
branch and close supervision of how appropriated funds are used. The 
control that OMB wields on appropriations and budget matters within the 
executive branch also weighs against according agencies deference for 
their interpretations of appropriations statutes. 
Appropriations-specific interpretive rules also can be an important 
means of reinforcing Congress’s constitutional power of the purse. Feder-
alism clear-statement canons are a helpful analogy. Under these canons, 
the Court invokes federalism concerns as justification for requiring 
Congress to make its intention to impose a burden on states plain in a 
statute.440 A current example in the appropriations context is the 
requirement that appropriations must be express and not implied. This 
requirement is statutorily codified and embodied in GAO precedent, but 
its rigorous enforcement also follows from the Appropriations Clause’s 
demand that every appropriation must be authorized by law.441 A further 
possibility in this vein would be a rule that grants of unilateral 
appropriations authority to the executive branch should be narrowly 
construed. Under such a rule, ambiguities in statutory provisions 
authorizing transfers of appropriated funds or delays in expenditures 
would be read to narrow executive authority. As with other forms of 
constitutional avoidance, there is a risk that the resulting interpretation 
will differ from what Congress intended.442 But that risk is justified to 
                                                                                                                           
 438. Cf. McCubbins & Rodriguez, supra note 287, at 708–14 & n.137 (arguing that 
courts should not apply any presumptions and simply analyze congressional intent in the 
case at hand). 
 439. See supra text accompanying notes 263–269. 
 440. See, e.g., Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460–61 (1991) (outlining a federalism 
“plain statement rule”); Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981) 
(“[I]f Congress intends to impose a condition on the grant of federal moneys, it must do so 
unambiguously.”); see also Ernest A. Young, Two Cheers for Process Federalism, 46 Vill. L. 
Rev. 1349, 1373–80 (2001) (briefly listing, and then normatively evaluating, these “process 
federalism” doctrines). 
 441. See U.S. House of Representatives v. Burwell, 185 F. Supp. 3d 165, 168–69, 174, 
184–85 (D.D.C. 2016), vacated in part sub nom. U.S. House of Representatives v. Azar, No. 
14-1967 (RMC), 2018 WL 8576647 (D.D.C. May 18, 2018) (citing 31 U.S.C. § 1301(d) 
(2018)). 
 442. See Frederick Schauer, Ashwander Revisited, 1995 Sup. Ct. Rev. 71, 74. 
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protect congressional control of the purse and guard against the real 
danger of de facto presidential spending authority. 
A harder issue is whether taking appropriations seriously entails 
courts giving legal effect to statements in appropriations committee 
reports. Doing so would reflect the realities of the appropriations process. 
Unlike other committee reports, appropriations reports are drafted by the 
same legislative counsel used to draft bills, rather than by committee 
staff.443 As noted above and contrary to the Supreme Court’s assertions in 
Hill, evidence suggests that even members of Congress who are not on the 
Appropriations Committee treat appropriations reports as akin to legisla-
tion.444 Indeed, members of Congress would have little understanding of 
the import of an appropriations measure without recourse to the report, 
given the lack of detail and frequent lump-sum allocations in the appro-
priations bill itself. Meanwhile, the fact that executive branch officials 
generally adhere to the reports in practice gives them de facto binding 
effect.445 As a result, the concern that committee reports are not enacted 
through bicameralism and presentment is mitigated in the appropriations 
context. Put differently, members of Congress and the President under-
stand that they are to some extent enacting the committee reports when 
enacting appropriations legislation. Indeed, although committee reports 
are not amendable on the floor, sometimes amendments are offered to an 
appropriations bill expressly to counter a provision in the report.446 
Militating against making appropriations reports enforceable is the 
fact that Congress could include this detail in the text of an appropriations 
act if it so chose. Moreover, Congress’s decision to omit these details from 
the appropriations act itself likely reflects concern that agencies have flex-
ibility to deviate from specific allocations and other restrictions if the need 
arises, without having to obtain additional legislation.447 Combined with 
the limited duration of appropriations measures, which means that 
Congress will have both a regular opportunity and the potential leverage 
of appropriations’ must-pass status to force inclusion of such details in 
statutory text, these factors provide a strong basis for not treating 
                                                                                                                           
 443. Gluck & Bressman, supra note 293, at 980. 
 444. See supra text accompanying note 293. 
 445. Gluck & Bressman, supra note 293, at 980–82 (describing how “the purpose of the 
committee report in the appropriations context,” unlike in other contexts, “is essentially to 
legislate”); see also Jessica Tollestrup, Cong. Rsch. Serv., R44124, Appropriations Report 
Language: Overview of Development, Components, and Issues for Congress 1 (2015) 
(“Although report language itself is not law and therefore not binding in the same manner 
as language in the statute, agencies usually seek to comply with any directives contained 
therein.”). 
 446. Tollestrup, supra note 445, at 4. 
 447. See Lincoln v. Vigil, 508 U.S. 182, 192 (1993) (“[T]he very point of a lump-sum 
appropriation is to give an agency the capacity to adapt to changing circumstances and meet 
its statutory responsibilities in what it sees as the most effective or desirable way.”). 
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appropriations reports as directly legally enforceable.448 But these factors 
provide much less reason for courts not to give substantial weight to appro-
priations reports when it comes to interpreting what an appropriation 
means. In this context, the reports are not providing new requirements 
that Congress declined to include in enacted legislation but are instead 
supplying congressionally sanctioned explanations of the meaning of 
enacted provisions.449 
Finally, what does taking appropriations seriously mean for determin-
ing when an appropriations measure amends substantive law? Although it 
is unjustified to impose a particularly high threshold before an appropria-
tions measure is read as implicitly amending substantive law, finding such 
amendment whenever Congress fails to fully fund statutory authorizations 
is equally mistaken. Congress regularly appropriates less than is statutorily 
authorized and less than the executive branch needs to fully implement 
governing statutes. As a result, ordinarily Congress’s decision to provide 
less funding than a statute requires in a given year should not be read to 
repeal the unfunded aspects. Sometimes, however, congressional funding 
decisions should be given substantive significance. The saga of the ACA’s 
risk corridor funding provides such an instance. There, Congress did not 
simply underfund a statutory provision; instead, it expressly refused to 
fund a time-limited provision for the entire three-year period the provision 
was operative. In short, through the appropriations process Congress 
denied the provision any possible direct effect; the provision could only 
have an impact as a basis for judgment fund liability. In such a context, 
and contrary to the Supreme Court’s decision in Maine Community Health 
Options, Congress’s appropriations actions should have been found to 
repeal the risk corridor funding requirement. 
3. Jurisdiction over Appropriations Challenges. — This leaves the question 
of when appropriations challenges should be judicially reviewable. As 
noted above, Lincoln’s holding that agency allocation decisions with 
respect to a lump-sum appropriation are nonreviewable is another 
appropriations-specific rule.450 Arguably, the Lincoln rule goes too far in 
                                                                                                                           
 448. See Jesse M. Cross, When Courts Should Ignore Statutory Text, 26 Geo. Mason L. 
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 449. Courts occasionally look to appropriations committee reports in interpreting 
appropriations legislation, although they do not suggest that appropriations committee 
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 450. See supra text accompanying notes 234–241. 
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shielding executive action, and a better stance would be to hold that such 
decisions are simply presumptively nonreviewable, in line with the 
approach courts take to nonenforcement decisions. But unlike 
nonenforcement, the decision to provide a lump sum rather than itemized 
appropriation lies with Congress, and Congress is frequently consulted on 
agency decisions to reprogram lump-sum appropriations. Moreover, the 
certainty of the Lincoln rule is particularly helpful in the appropriations 
context, given the time-limited window in which appropriated funds can 
be obligated and agencies’ needs for flexibility and discretion. Given these 
factors, the Lincoln rule appears justified.451 
On the other hand, for these arguments to work, it is also necessary 
that the specific limits Congress includes in appropriations acts be 
judicially enforceable. Absent such enforceability, Congress’s ability to 
police executive branch funding actions would be compromised; its threat 
of punishing agencies who use appropriated funds in ways Congress did 
not intend or approve through greater statutory constraints or funding 
cut-offs would have no bite. As discussed above, the APA’s cause of action 
requires plaintiffs to show that the interests they assert are arguably within 
the zone of interests protected by the statute in question. Still, weak as the 
test is, it would exclude instances in which individuals are particularly and 
concretely harmed by challenged agency appropriations decisions, yet 
have no other relationship to the agency or appropriation at issue.452 
Moreover, injuries of this sort appear more likely in the appropriations 
context, given the fungibility of appropriated funds. 
One response would be for courts to apply an even more lenient 
version of the zone of interests test in the appropriations context or 
exempt suits alleging violation of appropriations statutes from the test 
altogether.453 This would be an appropriations-specific rule keyed to 
reinforcing congressional control of appropriations, and to that extent it 
resonates with the approach articulated here. But this approach ducks the 
question of whether Congress would want to allow third parties to sue in 
its stead in this fashion. That is surely at least debatable, given the potential 
for delay and loss of flexibility as agency appropriations decisions are 
mired in litigation. Moreover, these suits actually could serve to undercut 
congressional appropriations controls, if they were to go forward even 
when congressional appropriations committees had been consulted and 
had informally approved the appropriations change at issue. Allowing 
such congressional action to preclude suit, however, would come close to 
sanctioning binding legislative action outside the bicameralism and 
                                                                                                                           
 451. See Pasachoff, Trump Era Budget Powers, supra note 118, at 88–89 (emphasizing 
the need for spending discretion and cautioning that courts cannot reliably “police 
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 452. See supra text accompanying notes 245–250. 
 453. See supra notes 251–255. 
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presentment process, which is what doomed the legislative veto. Another 
route would be to allow private suits if Congress provides a private right of 
action, thereby signaling its desire for private enforcement in court.454 Yet 
this approach would force Congress to the choice of opening up 
appropriations actions broadly to suit or leaving some potentially major 
violations of appropriations statutes without legal recourse. 
An alternative that bypasses these concerns is to allow Congress 
itself—either both houses collectively or one house on its own—to sue to 
challenge unauthorized uses of appropriated funds. Such a move would 
more tightly connect appropriations litigation to the constitutional 
appropriations framework. It would also directly enforce Congress’s 
political control over appropriations, not simply because Congress could 
back up its complaints by suit but also because no suit would be 
forthcoming when Congress was consulted and approved the action at 
issue. And by thereby reinforcing the executive branch’s incentive to 
obtain congressional approval for transfers and reprogramming of 
appropriated funds, allowing Congress to sue might actually serve to limit 
judicial involvement.455 
The problem is that it is far from clear that Congress could have 
standing to sue for a violation of an appropriations statute. Recently, the 
D.C. Circuit took a capacious view of congressional standing, concluding 
that the House of Representatives had standing to challenge the border 
wall transfers, as well as that a House committee—and, further, just seven 
members of a committee—could sue over the Trump Administration’s 
refusal to comply with subpoenas and information requests.456 However, 
whether the Supreme Court will follow suit is unclear. Although the Court 
has expressly left open the possibility that Congress could sue to vindicate 
its institutional interests, it has also signaled some doubt about such 
suits.457 Congressional standing is also a topic of much academic debate. 
                                                                                                                           
 454. Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 164 (1997) (finding that a citizen-suit provision 
negates the prudential zone of interests requirement). 
 455. For an analogous approach that seeks to empower Congress using appropriations 
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 456. Maloney v. Murphy, 984 F.3d 50, 70 (D.C. Cir. 2020); U.S. House of Representatives 
v. Mnuchin, 976 F.3d 1, 12–14 (D.C. Cir. 2020); Comm. on the Judiciary v. McGahn, 968 
F.3d 755, 764–71 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (en banc). 
 457. See Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 823–28 (1997); see also Ariz. State Legislature v. 
Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 2652, 2665 n.12 (2015) (noting that “a suit 
between Congress and the President would raise separation-of-powers concerns” that the 
Court did not need to address in the case at hand). Compare United States v. Windsor, 570 
U.S. 744, 790 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that “Raines did not formally decide 
[the] issue . . . [of congressional standing,] but its reasoning” precludes it), with id. at 803–
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Some opponents of congressional standing argue that litigation to enforce 
a statute represents an executive function that Congress is constitutionally 
prohibited from performing.458 This claim proves too much; it would also 
mean that private parties cannot sue to challenge executive branch action 
as violating a statutory mandate and might raise questions about whether 
Congress can participate in litigation in any form, even as an amicus. To 
my mind, the more pressing concern is that allowing Congress to sue for 
executive branch failure to enforce statutes would open the courts to 
adjudicate a vast array of legislative–executive branch disputes, thereby 
elevating judicial power over the political branches and engulfing the 
courts in political battles.459 One solution might be to distinguish between 
Congress suing to enforce the Appropriations Clause and suing to enforce 
statutes, a move the district court made in U.S. House of Representatives v. 
Burwell.460 Such a distinction is impossible to sustain, however, given that 
whether the Clause is violated will turn on whether an obligation of funds 
by the government was statutorily authorized.461 
This is admittedly a hard question, but ultimately the arguments for 
limited congressional standing in the appropriations context are more 
persuasive. Accepting that harm to Congress’s appropriations power from 
executive branch violation of an appropriations limit is sufficient injury to 
allow suit, Congress as a whole could meet the core injury-causation-
redressability requirements for standing.462 Granted, the assumption that 
Congress’s institutional injury can be concrete and particularized enough 
to support standing is contentious, and Congress suing in court is surely 
not the main mechanism that the Constitution envisions for Congress 
                                                                                                                           
07 (Alito, J., dissenting) (arguing that congressional standing was available and not 
precluded by Raines). 
 458. Windsor, 570 U.S. at 788–91 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Tara Leigh Grove & Neal 
Devins, Congress’s (Limited) Power to Represent Itself in Court, 99 Cornell L. Rev. 571, 
574–76 (2014) (arguing that litigation to enforce a statute is an executive function that 
Congress cannot perform and also violates the constitutional norm of bicameralism). 
 459. See Comm. on the Judiciary v. McGahn, 951 F.3d 510, 517–19 (D.C. Cir. 2020), 
vacated en banc, 968 F.3d 755 (D.C. Cir. 2020); Chafetz, Executive Branch Contempt, supra 
note 401, at 1149–51; Pasachoff, Trump Era Budget Powers, supra note 118, at 88–89; see 
also Vicki C. Jackson, Congressional Standing to Sue: The Role of Courts and Congress in 
U.S. Constitutional Democracy, 93 Ind. L. J. 845, 856–58 (2018) (expressing concern that 
having standing to sue may reinforce Congress’s disinclination to take governance and 
compromise seriously). 
 460. 130 F. Supp. 3d 53, 69–70, 72–73 (D.D.C. 2015). 
 461. See U.S. House of Representatives v. Mnuchin, 379 F. Supp. 3d 8, 18–19 (D.D.C. 
2019), aff’d in part, vacated in part, remanded, 976 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2020). 
 462. Arizona State Legislature suggests that such an institutional interest is sufficient 
injury, even though the Court there noted that separation of powers concerns nonetheless 
might forestall congressional standing. Ariz. State Legislature, 135 S. Ct. at 2663–66 & n.12. 
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asserting its interests.463 Still, it is Congress that is constitutionally granted 
the power of the purse, providing a basis for claiming particularized harm. 
Moreover, despite the Court’s rejection of one-house legislative standing 
in some contexts,464 the Appropriations Clause’s requirement that each 
appropriation be authorized by statute arguably grants each house a 
distinct institutional interest in protecting its ability to block an appropri-
ation.465 And although the distinction between constitutional and statutory 
appropriations challenges fails, the critical role of the Appropriations 
Clause as a core congressional check on the executive branch can 
distinguish the appropriations context from other instances of executive 
branch statutory violations.466 
In the end, standing rests on separation of powers principles, and 
there are strong separation of powers concerns on both sides. Particularly 
when a lack of congressional standing would allow the executive branch 
to violate an appropriations provision with legal impunity, the separation 
of powers may be better served by allowing Congress to sue, especially 
since doing so may give the executive branch more reason to negotiate 
with Congress in the first place.467 It is also worth noting that Congress’s 
need to sue to enforce its appropriations power is to some extent a 
problem of the Supreme Court’s making, in invalidating the legislative 
veto across the board. Indeed, the very political and intragovernmental 
character of legislative–executive appropriations disputes that provides 
reason to deny Congress standing also supports allowing the legislative 
veto for appropriations actions. 
B. Incorporating Appropriations in Practice: The Border Wall Litigation 
The border wall litigation provides a good illustration of what this 
approach to taking appropriations seriously might mean in practice. 
                                                                                                                           
 463. See Grove, supra note 401, at 615–16 (challenging the idea of institutional injuries 
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the majority’s bargaining power”). 
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Although now on hold at the Court while the Biden Administration 
reviews the funds transfers at issue and potentially moot,468 the border wall 
litigation raised challenging jurisdictional and interpretive issues. 
The jurisdictional problem here is not finding a plaintiff who has 
standing; it is instead finding a plaintiff with standing who has a cause of 
action. In the Ninth Circuit, even the government agreed that the 
potential environmental effects of the wall meant that states in which the 
wall is being built and environmental organizations had standing.469 As 
noted above, the problem is that these environmental interests are 
marginal to the statutes involved, Section 8005 of the FY2019 DOD 
Appropriations Act and 10 U.S.C. §§ 284 and 2808, that govern the zone 
of interests inquiry for purposes of suing under the APA.470 Other plaintiffs 
come closer, in particular Washington and El Paso County, who claim that 
federal funds Congress had appropriated for defense projects in their 
jurisdictions were diverted to pay for the wall, resulting in lost economic 
activity and tax revenue for their jurisdictions.471 Members of Congress 
have long sought to direct appropriations money to benefit their districts 
economically—either through earmarks or other means472—so these 
interests bear a more plausible relationship to the FY2019 DOD 
Appropriations Act and Section 8005. But allowing such incidental 
economic effects to suffice for bringing suit under the APA also could 
open up appropriations actions broadly to legal challenge. That would also 
be the result of the Ninth Circuit’s holding that an equitable action will lie 
to challenge an executive branch appropriations action as ultra vires (and 
therefore violating the Appropriations Clause).473 
On the other hand, the institutional interests that the House of 
Representatives is asserting in its lawsuit challenging the border wall funds 
transfer lie at the heart of Section 8005. As the Ninth Circuit stated, “In 
enacting Section 8005, Congress primarily intended to benefit itself and 
its constitutional power to manage appropriations.”474 On its face, 
Section 8005 seeks to enforce congressional appropriations decisions, 
                                                                                                                           
 468. See Howe, supra note 7; supra text accompanying note 119. 
 469. See Sierra Club v. Trump, 963 F.3d 874, 884 n.9 (9th Cir. 2020), cert. granted, 141 
S. Ct. 618 (2020). So did the dissenting judge. Id. at 901–03 (Collins, J., dissenting); see also 
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 470. See supra text accompanying notes 246–250. 
 471. Washington v. Trump, 441 F. Supp. 3d 1101, 1113 (W.D. Wash. 2020); El Paso 
County v. Trump, 408 F. Supp. 3d 840, 848–52 (W.D. Tex. 2019), aff’d in part, rev’d on 
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 472. See Rebecca M. Kysar, Listening to Congress: Earmark Rules and Statutory 
Interpretation, 94 Cornell L. Rev. 519, 534–36 (2009) (describing earmarks and their 
prevalence during the George W. Bush Administration). 
 473. Sierra Club, 963 F.3d at 890. 
 474. California v. Trump, 963 F.3d at 942. 
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prohibiting a transfer of funds that Congress had previously denied. And 
Congress has a particular institutional interest in ensuring agencies adhere 
to the requirements of a statute that gives an agency discretion to transfer 
funds that Congress appropriated for one use to another.475 The fact that 
transfer authorizations are at issue is also helpful given that only the House 
of Representatives is suing. If the Trump Administration cannot transfer 
funds under existing appropriations acts, it would need to obtain a new 
statute to do so—a statute that the House on its own could prevent from 
being enacted given the requirement of bicameralism. As a result, the 
House is asserting its own institutional interests in ensuring that its 
approval is needed for any new use of funds, even if it is also asserting 
Congress’s collective institutional interest in having its laws enforced.476 In 
finding that the House had standing, the D.C. Circuit made an argument 
to just this effect, concluding that “the House is individually and distinctly 
injured because the Executive Branch has allegedly cut the House out of 
its constitutionally indispensable legislative role . . . . [and] defied an 
express constitutional provision that protects each congressional 
chamber’s unilateral authority to prevent expenditures.”477 
Under the approach advocated here, the best course would be to 
allow the House to sue rather than the states and environmental 
organizations. The whole point of a transfer provision is to allow the 
government flexibility to respond to a new development and to do so 
quickly without getting a supplemental appropriations bill passed. As a 
result, broadly available third-party litigation could be particularly costly in 
this context. But if the House is denied the ability to sue, then—as the 
Ninth Circuit argued—separation of powers concerns with protecting 
Congress’s power of the purse and preventing de facto independent 
presidential spending authority support applying a very lenient zone of 
interests inquiry or doing away with it altogether. 
On the interpretive front, the question is whether DOD’s transfer of 
billions of dollars to DHS to build the wall satisfied Section 8005’s 
requirement that the “the funds will be used for higher priority items, 
based on unforeseen military requirements, than those for which 
originally appropriated and in no case where the item for which funds are 
requested has been denied by the Congress”?478 The Ninth Circuit held it 
                                                                                                                           
 475. See 31 U.S.C. § 1532 (2018) (“An amount available under law may be withdrawn 
from one appropriation account and credited to another or to a working fund only when 
authorized by law.”). 
 476. U.S. House of Representatives v. Mnuchin, 976 F.3d 1, 14 (D.C. Cir. 2020) 
(concluding that the House had standing to challenge transfers under Section 8005 of the 
FY2019 DOD Appropriations Act and 10 U.S.C. §§ 284 and 2808). 
 477. Id. at 13. 
 478. The additional statutory provisions that the government invoked to authorize the 
funds transfer included counterdrug and military construction authorities. See 10 U.S.C. 
§§ 284, 2808 (2018); see also John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 
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did not, concluding that given the battles over border wall funding that 
had led to the thirty-five-day shutdown, DOD was on notice it might be 
asked to provide funds to build the wall. Nor, against this background, 
could it be said Congress did not anticipate the claimed need for the wall; 
instead, Congress opted repeatedly to deny wall funding, making the 
transfer doubly violative of Section 8005’s terms.479 Indeed, the appellate 
court also ruled that the border wall did not qualify as a “military 
requirement,” noting that the wall was not connected to a military 
installation or needed for troops, weapons, or war effort.480 Instead, its 
primary purpose was to benefit DHS, a civilian agency.481 GAO, however, 
reached the opposite conclusion. It agreed with the government that 
“unforeseen” refers to whether DOD was aware of the need to provide 
funds for border wall construction at the time DOD submitted its budget 
request and when Congress enacted DOD’s appropriations.482 And it 
further agreed that Congress did not deny the request by only providing 
$1.375 billion in border fencing funds, because that was a denial of DHS’s 
request for additional funds, with DOD not making any such funding 
request at all.483 
As suggested above, in an ordinary appropriations dispute GAO’s 
views deserve special weight, given its expertise and Congress’s delegation 
to it of an appropriations-policing role. Surprisingly, the Ninth Circuit 
never addressed GAO’s contrary view, despite it being relied upon by the 
dissenting judge. That was an unjustified omission; even if a court reaches 
a different conclusion, GAO’s views on the meaning of appropriations 
statutes deserve serious consideration. The harder question is whether the 
Ninth Circuit should have deferred to GAO’s views. 
Two factors counsel against such deference here. The first is that this 
was no ordinary appropriations dispute. Instead, it involves the executive 
branch’s unilateral reallocation of billions of dollars in furtherance of a 
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highly contentious immigration initiative that had just triggered the 
longest government shutdown in history. Arguably, therefore, this case 
involves the type of major “question of deep ‘economic and political 
significance’” that the Supreme Court has held is inappropriate for 
deference in non-appropriations contexts.484 Taking a standard public law 
approach to appropriations, therefore, would support a court deciding 
this question using its independent judgment, as the Ninth Circuit did. 
The second is that, in authorizing DOD to transfer appropriated funds to 
a different use without having to obtain legislation approving the change, 
Section 8005 serves to delegate unilateral appropriations authority to the 
executive branch. It is therefore the type of provision that, as suggested 
above, should be read with an eye to reaffirming congressional control of 
the purse. Particularly in light of Congress’s subsequent resolutions 
condemning the transfer, the Ninth Circuit’s narrow reading represents 
the better account of Section 8005’s scope.485 
CONCLUSION 
In today’s deeply polarized and politically competitive world, appro-
priations are a critical means by which both Congress and the President 
seek to control policy. This increased dependence on and exploitation of 
appropriations has significant impact on agencies’ functioning and the 
relationship between Congress and the executive branch. It is also leading 
to litigation, as a number of high-profile appropriations disputes spill over 
into courts. Yet while appropriations are the contemporary linchpin of 
government, they are marginalized in public law doctrine. Across several 
major domains of public law—constitutional law, administrative law, and 
statutory interpretation—a number of doctrines exclude appropriations 
disputes from court or minimize the importance of appropriations when 
judicial review occurs. Even when appropriations’ significance is not 
downplayed, they are often either pulled out of standard analytic 
frameworks or simply ignored. Appropriations are center stage in the 
political branches, however. These two phenomena are closely related; 
appropriations’ marginalization in public law doctrine is based in part on 
                                                                                                                           
 484. King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2488–89 (2015). 
 485. The argument would also support narrowly reading 10 U.S.C. § 2808, the other 
transfer provision relied on by the Trump Administration. Even capaciously read, however, 
Section 2808 fails to support the border wall funds transfers. Section 2808 provides that 
“[i]n the event of a . . . declaration by the President of a national emergency . . . that 
requires use of the armed forces, the Secretary of Defense, without regard to any other pro-
vision of law, may undertake military construction projects . . . that are necessary to support 
such use of the armed forces,” using funds appropriated for military construction. As the 
Ninth Circuit held, the border wall was “intended to benefit DHS and its subagencies, . . . 
not the armed forces” and failed to meet the statutory definition of military construction as 
“‘carried out with respect to a military installation.’” Sierra Club v. Trump, 977 F.3d 853, 
879–88 (9th Cir. 2020), petition for cert. filed, No. 20-685 (U.S. Nov. 17, 2020) (quoting 10 
U.S.C. § 2801(a)). 
1172 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 121:4 
the belief that appropriations are inherently matters for the political 
branches, not the courts. But appropriations marginalization also rests on 
a judicial prioritizing of substantive legislation over appropriations 
measures. 
Recognizing the doctrinal marginalization of appropriations and the 
resultant disconnect with appropriations reality is only the first step. The 
harder questions are whether this marginalization is nonetheless 
justified—and if not, how appropriations should be better incorporated 
into public law. This Article has argued that the current marginalization 
of appropriations is at odds with the Constitution. The very centrality of 
appropriations to policy disputes today reinforces the conclusion that 
prioritizing substantive enactments illegitimately undercuts Congress’s 
appropriations power. It also highlights the separation of powers costs of 
appropriations marginalization in public law doctrine, with jurisdictional 
exclusion in particular serving to expand the President’s de facto 
independent spending authority. Yet at the same time, this centrality also 
underscores the deeply political nature of appropriations and the dangers 
of expanding the judicial role. The challenge is to construct a doctrinal 
approach that better accords with the constitutional appropriations frame-
work and gives appropriations measures their due weight in court, while 
also reinforcing political branch regulation of appropriations. 
This Article has sought to sketch such an approach, identifying how 
taking appropriations seriously might alter constitutional analysis, statu-
tory interpretation, and access to judicial review. Although focusing on 
appropriations, this approach is animated by two ideas with implications 
for separation of powers disputes more broadly, both keyed to the deep 
governance challenges posed by partisan polarization and division today. 
One is that courts should be sensitive to the branches’ needs to wield their 
powers in new ways.486 Both Congress and the executive branch have 
turned to appropriations as a means of asserting policy control in the 
contemporary polarized environment, and courts should not discourage 
such efforts absent a clear constitutional foundation for doing so. The 
other is that courts should seek to set separation of powers rules that 
encourage interbranch negotiation. Embracing both of these ideas would 
not only lead to taking appropriations seriously, it would help to construct 
a separation of powers doctrine that would better suit our polarized era. 
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